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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On 17 December of 2010, a young fruit seller set himself on fire in front of 
the Sidi Bouzid governorate’s building in protest against what he saw as police 
harassment. To the general surprise, Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation 
triggered a widespread uprising across the country, which, within a few weeks, led to 
the overthrow of the long-serving president Ben Ali (14 January 2011). After the fall 
of the ‘dictator’, the political process of transformation began apace. Between 
January and February, a popular movement called the Casbah (I and II)1 placed the 
interim government led by Mohammed Ghannouchi under such pressure until a 
completely new government was formed and a new assembly created, replacing the 
parliament elected under Ben Ali. From March to October 2011, the political 
landscape began to take shape. For most of the political parties and civil society 
organizations, including the powerful trade union (Union Generale de Travailleurs 
Tunisiens - UGTT), revolution meant the final phase and accomplishment of the 
                                                            
1A general consensus was found once the RCD (the former party in power) was outlawed, a new 
assembly formed and a government under the leadership of Beji Caied Essebsi appointed with the 
mission of drafting a new electoral law and bringing the country to elections for the Cosntitutional 
Assembly. 
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political liberalization Ben Ali had promised in November 1987 when he came on 
power. It was the beginning of a transitional process to liberal democracy.  
After the elections of October 2011, the transition became instable, as a 
consequence both of the electoral success of the Islamist party al-Nahda and the rise 
of a radical Salafist movement in the streets of the country. The nationalist and left 
wing opposition questioned in fact the very legitimacy of the Nahda-led government. 
In 2013 episodes of street violence and the political assassinations of two left wing 
members of parliament further detsabilised the political scene. In July of the same 
year, the Egyptian military overthrew the elected Islamist president Mursi with the 
support of large sectors of the population. The following month, the Nahda party, 
fearing the same outcome in Tunisia, cut off its links with the Salafists and declared 
Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST), the most important and embattled salafi group in the 
country, a terrorist organization, leading to its disbandment. With Nahda now firmly 
in the democratising camp, the new constitution was finally approved on January 
2014 and the period of contention and constitutional transition came to an end with 
new parliamentary and presidential elections held according to the new rules.The 
anti-Islamist bloc came out on top in both percentage of votes and seats2 (Stepan, 
2016). 
This period of change between 2011 and 2014 is the object of analysis of this 
research. Tunisia is here taken as a case study to illustrate and critically engage with 
the larger debates in the area studies of the Middle East and North Africa studies 
(MENA region) on the evolution of the paradigms of democratization and 
authoritarianism and to suggest how to go beyond them. This period of regime 
change, labelled ‘Arab spring’ or ‘Arab uprisings’, has renewed academic debates on 
the ‘politics’ in the region. After more than two decades of discussions on 
institutional politics focusing on state apparatuses, authoritarian power, ruling elites 
and traditional opposition forces, the re-politicization of the Arab scene brought back 
social actors (previously considered as passive or non-influential) to academic 
                                                            
2 Bourguibists together with liberal and left wing parties. The parliamentary election was held on 26 
October 2014. The presidential election was first held on 23 November 2014; as none of the candidate 
won an absolute majority, a second round took place on 21 December. 
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attention (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). This research goes in the direction of re-
discovering politics in neglected spaces. While the actors considered are primarily 
Islamists, the place of the politics analysed is that public space where non-official 
actors engage in general. This period of contention and institutional re-building in 
Tunisia is one in which social groups arrive on the public scene and struggle for 
power and inclusion. This research, analysing Islamist movements at the time of 
regime change in Tunisia, asks the question of how to analyse correctly the political 
changes in the region and how to explain the ‘Islamization’ of politics in an open 
liberalised political space.  Before going into the details of the academic debate and 
propositions of the thesis, however, some theoretical observations are necessary.  
First, the dissertation analyses the period from 2011 to 2014 as a period of 
democracy building. It considers however democratization in a rather different way 
from the traditional use in democratization studies. This brunch of political studies 
developed after the 1991 disintegration of the Communist block. Focusing on those 
countries ‘in transition’, they elaborated paradigms of political transformation that 
had as assumption the evolution of the political international system from 
authoritarian to liberal democratic. In my case, democratization means the inclusion 
of organized social groups into the public arena. As I will better develop later, 
democratization is better understood as a historical process of accomplishment of the 
national Tunisian project that accepts the social and political plurality of the nation-
state. I see the most recent political transformation as one in which old historical 
mechanisms function again after being ‘liberated’ from an oppressive regime.  
Second, in order for this process to be accomplished, the inclusion of Islamist 
movements is necessary. Islamist movements in fact should be considered as a 
consequence and part of the process of nation building. 
Third, Islamist groups (salafist jihadi included), should be looked at as social-
political actors. This is a logical development of the second premise, as Islamists 
movements play a key role in building the nation because they represent specific 
social groups.  
The research follows the evolution of the various Islamist movements (radical  
and institutional) for the period covered. The reason to focus on Islamists, and 
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specifically on Salafist-jihadis, is that they are the most significant social and 
political actor in terms of novelty and ability to bring new social groups on the post-
revolutionnary scene. In order to understand social change in the country, Islamist 
movements have to be the focal point of study, without however falling into the trap 
of essentialism.This complex phenomenon in fact be placed into its context. A 
horizontal, sociological type of observation was necessary to analyse the social 
dynamics Islamist movements emerge from, accompanied by a vertical historical line 
to link the present to the historical path. 
The dissertation is divided in four sections. In the first, the path of nation 
building until the present is described as a period of struggle between social groups 
that define and perform the struggle through the elaboration of the two encompassing 
ideological frames: nationalism and Islamism. In the second and third section, the 
period after the toppling of Ben Ali until the approval of the new constitutional text 
is examined in detail. In particular, the conflictual and radical stand of Salafist-
jihadis and the way they reacted to the process of democracy building are anlysed. 
The fourth part looks at the constitutional deal as a political synthesis of the conflict 
between the two main traditional blocs, represented by Nahda and Nida Tunis 
respectively. Salafists are kept out of this ‘deal’ in order to stabilise the system, but 
leaving them out also creates the premises for renewed future tensions.  
The political process summarised above must not be considered teleological, 
as the natural accomplishment of an inevitable process of democratization; but rather 
as one of building the polity in a set historical and geographical community. The 
question whether democracy is or is not the inevitable outcome of regime change or 
nation-building is beyond the scope of this research. The theoretical framework 
applied is intended to show the tensions inherent in building the polity and its 
location in the space in which specific social actors intervene. Employing 
nationalism and Islamism as the ideological frames of this conflicting process of 
nation building is at the core of this approach to understand political dynamics in the 
Middle East and North Africa. 
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The academic debate and the research question 
Between the 1980s and the 2000s, two academic debates characterised the 
Middle Eastern studies literature: the first focused on democratization and 
authoritarianism, the second on the evolution of Islamist movements. 
Starting from O’Donnel, Schmitter and Whitehead’s book on transition to 
democracy (1987), followed by Huntington’s study of the third wave of 
democratization (1991), political science debates on the region focused intensely on 
processes of democratization and their notable absence. The transformation of the 
global political order towards democracy after 1989, led political scientists to 
consider it as generalized and generalizable. Such an optimistic viewpoint was 
summarized in Fukuyama’s pivotal book “The end of history and the last man” 
(Fukuyama, 1992)3. Fukuyama saw the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy as 
the ‘end of history’. He postulated that liberal-democracy was the winning ideology 
as system of government after the defeat of the monarchical, fascist and communist 
systems. He proposed that liberal democracy could be “the endpoint of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the final form of human government” (Ibidem., p. 1). The 
Middle East and North Africa witnessed a period of political liberalization in the  
1980s. Academics of comparative politics and specialists of the region began thus to 
see the Arab world as a region in which theoretical models of democratization could 
be tested. Democratization studies in the region was born as a response to the flaws 
of modernization theories, increasingly interpreted as a justification of authoritarian 
regimes for the sake of industrialization and development. Because the Arab regimes 
appeared, after the 1970s, as stable authoritarian political systems, a discussion 
began on wheter to consider any relation between democracy and value-system. 
Should democratic values be the necessary premise for democratic evolution? One 
                                                            
3 Which found inspiration in the Hegelian reading of history proposed by the French Hegelian 
philosopher A. Kojève, (1980). 
11 
 
original theory that denies this link is the theory of the rentier state4.This theory 
postulates that democracy and accountability depend on taxation. The failure of 
democracy to take hold in the region is due indeed to the lack of taxation 
accountability. States that obtain their revenues from external rents (oil, international 
aid, royalties on military bases, remittances) would not ask citizens to provide the 
financial means for its existence and functioning. To the contrary, the resources 
available from the rent economy would give the state the means for patronage as a 
tool of governance and domination.The validity of this argument stemmed from the 
coincidence between the stability of regimes and the oil boom of the 1970s. The 
theory equally postulates that a decrease in rents places the stability of the political 
system at risk. From the 1980s onwards, coinciding with the fall in oil prices, 
regimes were put under pressure and social unrest exploded almost everywhere, 5 
suggesting that the democracy of the bread that rentier economies provided would be 
replaced with the democracy of the vote (Sadiki, 1997). The rise of mass 
mobilization led to liberalising concessions on the part of the regimes. Such 
concessions seemed to be the means the regimes used in order to negotiate with the 
social demands that could not be satisfied any longer with the distribution of rent. A 
more radical and straightforward confutation of any relation between values and 
democracy came from Ghassan Salamé. The Lebanese author stressed that 
democracy is the outcome of a stalemate between conflicting parties not necessarily 
committed to democracy (Salamé, 1994). The political struggle that occurred during 
the period of political liberalization saw the emergence of two main broad political 
factions: the old heirs of nationalist ideologies and Islamists (of various persuasions), 
both not necessarily intrinsically democratic. The compromise between non-
democratic actors did not occur however in the 1990s as one might have expected. 
The Algerian Islamic Front (FIS), for example, was poised to reach power through 
free elections in 1991, but a military coup prevented this from occurring in the name 
                                                            
4Maybe the most significant contribution Arab studies made to the general comparative politics 
literature. 
5 See in particular the so-called bred revolts in Morocco (1981), Tunisia (1983), Egypt (1987) and 
Jordan (1989). 
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of defending democracy, insofar as Islamism in power was seen as inherently 
authoritarian (Sadiki, 1997b). In short, the nationalists, in power through the coup, 
emphasised that Islamists once in power would not respect the rules of democracy. 
This Algerian scenario influenced politics throughout the region in subsequent years. 
The result was an increasing authoritarian re-organization of the old regimes. Just 
like in Algeria, in the 1990s, the fight against Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and 
Yemen, justified political measures that brought those countries in a situation in 
which free political expression became nearly non-existant. As we will see, the 
Salamé argument would eventually be proven correct in the case of Tunisia in the 
2010s.  
The 1990s bucked therefore the liberalizing trend of the late 1980s and all of 
the so-called transitions to democracy turned out to be processes of “upgraded 
authoritarianism” (Heydemann, 2007). The first wave of political liberalization in the 
1980s had been an important moment of political participation and contention 
(Waterbury, 1994), but it ended in the early 1990s with the reaffirmation of 
authoritarianism, although in a different guise (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). 
This first attempt at breaking the monolithic power system inherited from the 
independence movements highlighted two new political factors that would have a 
lasting effect on the politics of the region: the emergence of masses participating in 
politics and their ‘Islamization’ (Addi, 1991). 
The rise of political Islam as a potent force emerging from processes of 
liberalization caused for long time a political and academic issue, centring on the 
compatibility-incompatibility argument between liberal democracy and Islamism (H. 
Goddard, 2002; Esposito and Voll, 1996; Lewis, 1991). If political participation and 
contention meant Islamisation of the public space, should those dynamics let be 
expressed overtly or repressed (paradoxically) in the name of democracy? Inside and 
outside the region, most of the political elite and international western policy makers 
concluded that Islamism should be stopped. In Tunisia, part of the political secular 
elite, that first struggled against the regime for political space, backed afterword the 
crackdown against Islamists (Murphy, 1997; Perkins, 2014). In the academic 
community, the debate turned on the argument of an alleged Arab/Islamic 
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exceptionalism. The main argument was the incompatibility of the Arab and Islamic 
political tradition with western-style liberal democracy (Gran, 1998). Some 
considered Arab political thought and practices embedded into “Oriental despotism”, 
“Sultanism”, “Patriarchalism” (Lewis, 1993; Bromley, 1997) while others argued 
that Islam was the main obstacle.The incompatibility between Islam and democracy 
is allegedly that between Islam and  secularism, believed to be the premise for 
democracy (Lewis, 2002; Zakaria, 2004; Kedourie, 1992; Pipes,1996; Lakoff, 
2004).This debate was however quickly set aside and overcome thanks to 
comparative works that highlighted examples of Muslim countries (such as Indonesia 
and Turkey) where Islamist parties gained power within democratic rules (Stepan 
and Robertson, 2003). In addition, the second half of the 1990s witnessed the 
political integration of Islamist parties in the parliamentary life of several Arab 
countries, including Jordan (Schwedler, 2006), Morocco (Wegner, 2011) and Yemen 
(Durac, 2011). All this indicated that authoritarianism and its survival mechanisms 
were the problem and not Islam. 
The democratization and Islamist studies literatures focused therefore 
increasingly on the authoritarian features of Arab regimes. Democratization studies, 
in particular, had proven to be too optimistic (Albert and Shlumberg, 2004; 
Anderson, 2006; Hinnebusch, 2006; Schlumberger, 2007). The political changes the 
Arab regimes went through did not necessarily take a democratic direction. As most 
famously stated in the classic Tomaso de Lampedusa’s book ‘The Leopard’ (2002), 
things may change just to make sure that nothing will really change. The type and 
degree of change of Arab regimes proved that the political situation in the Arab 
region was not static, but that the dynamics of change were not simply a transition 
from an authoritarian to a democratic system. This approach has been accused of 
being teleological and influenced by other countries’ experiences (Schlumberger, 
2000). As a reaction to this democracy-spotting (Anderson, 2006), a rich literature on 
Arab authoritarian regimes and their ability to be so resilient flourished throughout 
the 2000s. It was at times called ‘post-democratization’ debate (Valbjorn, 2012) 
because the term captured both the fact that Arab societies were changing and not 
moving necesserely in the direction of liberal-democracy. 
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The state apparatus and the dynamics of upgraded authoritarianism came to 
the fore in academic studies. This new debate assumed the tone of an opposition 
against the neo-liberal ideological underpinnings of the democratization debate and 
the undisputed American hegemony in the world. In France, two leading specialists 
on Tunisia, Camau and Geisser (2003), proposed a specific version of the debate on 
authoritarianism, followed later on by Béatrice Hibou (2006), another French 
specialist on Tunisia. The latter took the ‘authoritarianism’ category to its extreme, 
arguing that the Ben Ali’s regime was a power system based on considerable 
consensus in society. This post-structuralist trend, very influential in France and in 
continental Europe at the time, informed the theoretical assumptions of both books.6 
While discussions on the persistence of Arab authoritarianism dominated the 
academic debate in the 2000s and overcame the rather dogmatic democratization 
studies tradition, by the end of the decade, the Arab uprisings seemed to contradict it 
(Pace and Cavatorta, 2012). The Arab ‘revolutions’ caught by surprise not only Arab 
leaders and international political practitioners, but the academic world as well 
(Gause, 2011). Implicit in the debate on upgraded authoritarianism as in 
democratization studies was the idea that political apathy characterised Arab 
societies, which were incapable of mobilizing against their regimes (Valbjorn, 2015: 
p. 221).Valbjorn, among others, pointed out that the academic and political debate 
had been too regime-centred and that what was occurring in wider society, or ‘below 
the radar’ (Lust, 2011), was left understudied. The Arab uprising contradicted the 
assumption of political apathy and showed, to the contrary, that society played an 
important role in change, highlighting at the very least the shortcomings of both 
democratization and authoritarianism paradigms. 
In parallel to this inter-paradigm debate, another important issue had 
developed, coming to the forefront of academic and political preoccupations: the rise 
of Islamist movements. Studies on Islamism developed along three main trends of 
                                                            
6 By post-structuralist I refer to that intellectual trend influenced by French authors such as Foucault, 
Deleuze and Derrida. It is generally considered a post-Marxist tendency that reacts to all of the 1970s 
structuralism and functionalist trends. This philosophical school influenced Political Science 
especially in what is the discussion about power. 
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research and overlapped with the general discussion on the nature of the political 
systems and the location of politics in the MENA region (Volpi, 2009). The first 
trend studied Islamist parties in the context of the moderation through 
inclusion/exclusion approach. Schwedler (2006; 2007), most famously, compared 
Islamists parties in Yemen and Jordan, where the political system opened for limited 
electoral participation, to countries like Tunisia and Syria, where even limited 
toleration did not exist. Schwedler and other scholars, including Browers and 
Kurzman(2004), Clark (2006) and Wegner and Pellicer (2009), demonstrated that 
where opportunities were provided, Islamist parties would accept to play the game of 
procedural democracy.  
The second trend employed social movement theory to study Islamism. In 
particular, Hafez (2003) and Wiktorovicz (2004) provided important contributions. 
These two authors opened a fruitful field of research, showing the political rationale 
of Islamist movements and parties in pursuing their actions. The importance of 
applying a social movement approach to Islamist studies was two-fold: on one side it 
allowed an analysis of Islamist movements in which the ideological Islamic factor 
was played down to focus on constraints and opportunities (as well as organisational 
structures);on the other,it looked beyond institutional politics like social activism, 
political violence and street politics.   
The third trend is the so-called post-Islamism debate. Bayat and Roy were the 
initiators of this trend. It should be underlined that their field of expertise was non-
Arab Muslim countries. This is an important aspect to underline because the Asian 
Muslim area was influenced by different developments, primarily the setting up of 
the Islamic Republic in Iran.Bayat, an Iranian scholar himself, coined the expression 
post-Islamism to frame the reformist Islamic trend in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
(1996; 2013). Olivier Roy, made first a theoretical confutation, arguing the failure of 
Islamic thought as a whole (1994); then, developed  a holistic theory of the Islamist 
movement on an international scale (2004). For him post-Islamism is the age that 
acknowledges the inconsistencies of the Islamic project of an Islamic State as a 
political alternative to the nation-state inherited by the post-colonial nationalist 
movements. Since the collective myth (“utopia”) of the Islamic state failed, it would 
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be surpassed by individualistic Islamist attitudes and practices such as dress code or 
pop/consumeristic behaviour instead of political expression (Haenni, 2005). Both 
authors agree that this process would lead to a secularisation of Muslim countries. 
For Olivier Roy, the Christian reformed movements in the USA provides a template 
for Islamism (O.Roy, 2004; p.181-4), while for both authors the Iranian reformist 
movement within the Islamic republic is already evidence of such tendency. The idea 
is that once Islam is in power, it stops talking about religion and is secularised 
through the mundane preoccupations of politics. The same argument has been 
provided to explain the behaviour and political choices of Islamist parties such as the 
AKP in Turkey, or the Justice and Development parties in Egypt and Morocco 
(Zemni, 2013)  once they entered government coalitions7. 
Studies on Islamism, just like the democratization and post-democratization 
ones, came under considerable scrutiny after the 2011 uprisings. While the 
‘revolutions’ did not have Islamist references, they developed very soon into 
widespread Islamist politicization. The post-Islamist debate, especially in its most 
radical conclusions such as the end of any Islamist credible political offer on the 
Arab institutional scene, faced a very different reality. As soon as authoritarian 
systems collapsed, old and new Islamist movements emerged, showing that the time 
for post-Islamism was still far into the future. The argument of the secularisation of 
politics in the Arab world through the normalization of Islamist parties was not 
completely erroneous because the post-Islamist analysis had been derived from 
countries, such as Iran, Jordan and Morocco, where political space for the 
development of Islamist parties did indeed push those parties towards a process of 
institutionalization. The flaw of this argument, however, as post uprising politics 
shows, was in the fact that in the majority of the Arab world, non-coopted Islamist 
parties were either outright forbidden (Tunisia, Libya, and Syria) or strongly limited 
(Algeria and Egypt). Even in those countries, like Yemen, Morocco and Jordan, 
where a greater degree of tolerance existed, Islamist parties were co-opted and had 
lost some of their credibility, liberating therefore a potential space that more 
                                                            
7 The same argument is applicable to the case  the  Islamist party Nahda in Tunisia during anf after its 
experience in government  (2011-2014). 
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opposition-minded Islamists could fill. Post 2011 politics in countries where the 
uprisings were successful and where the revolts degenerated into a civil war showed 
that traditional Islamist parties of the MB family were the most powerful and 
organized political force and that they were sufficiently mature to become leading 
actors in the processes of change taking place, particularly in processes of 
democratization. In addition, a new radical generation of Islamists had developed 
under the label of Salafists (Cavatorta and Merone, 2016).  
An entire new field of research opened up for researchers working on the 
region after 2011 because society was more complex and dynamic than previsouly 
thought and because the Islamist camp showed much more heterogeneity, complexity 
and ideological vivacity than believed until then. If Arab societies were well alive 
and ready to be mobilized, Islamist ideologies (moderate and radical – to crudely 
simplify) were again able to ‘frame’ new generations and new social groups 
demanding participation and needing representation.  
After the upheavals of 2011, the area studies literature began debating 
critically previous scientific assumptions (Kurzman, 2012; Gause, 2011; Volpi, 
2013; Goodwin, 2011; Bayat, 2013), taking this opportunity to re-establish itself 
(Valbjorn, 2015, pag 225). Two possible strategies were considered.The first one was 
updating the old paradigms in light of the Arab uprisings. A good example is the 
renewed debate between upgrading authoritarianism (Heydemann and Leenders, 
2014; Brownlee, 2012; Hudson, 2014) and renewed interest on democratization 
(Stepan and Linz, 2013) and transitology within the frame of a fourth wave of 
democratization (Cilento, 2014). These tendencies found justification in the 
development of the political situation in the post uprising political arenas with one 
trend or the other having more consensus according to events on the ground. While 
the enthusiasm for a fourth wave of democratization was indeed justified in the early 
days of the uprisings, neo-authoritarian subsequent political developments provided 
more arguments to the ones who were favourable to interpret Arab politics through 
the revival of the upgrading authoritarianism approach. 
The second strategy included those who believed in the necessity to move 
beyond the conflcit between the two paradigms and found more useful to combine 
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both in order to highlight the complexity of the phenomena at hand.This new 
approach did conceive the change in Arab politics, but without a pre-determined 
outcome (Valbjorn, 2012). Among those who argued strongly in favour of a mixed 
theoretical approach is Hudson. For Hudson, the two paradigms have merits but the 
uprisings undermined aspects of both. Therefore, we should turn away from this 
polarity and look for new tools to understand the new reality of the region. He 
highlights three areas: a) the Middle East regional system and its influence on the 
Arab Spring; b) social movements and civil society, and; c) the control capabilities 
and bureaucratic structures in addition to elite-relations (Hudson, 2014).  
Beyond these two strategies of coming out of the theoretical dead end, a  third 
way developed, which is the one in which this research situates itself. In the already 
cited article ‘Reflections on self-reflections –On framing the analytical implications 
of the Arab uprisings for the study of Arab politics’, Valbjorn, by classifying the 
different trends within the area Studies identifies LisaAnderson 2006 article 
‘Searching where the light shines’, as the symbol of a third way approach. According 
to the author, Anderson is part of a radical sub-current of post-democratization 
studies that criticizes both democratization and authoritarian resilience (Valbjorn, 
2015; 228-229). According to Anderson, both trends of studies are the product of 
American provincialism which looks at institutions typical of liberal democracy such 
as parties and institutions and applies its analytical tools to a region where a different 
context exists. This leaves us, according to the author, with an incomplete if not 
distorted understanding of where to look for the keys to political dynamics in a place 
like the Arab world. 
“Questions related to nation-building and identity formation, insurrection, sectarian 
and tribal politics, the resilience of monarchies, the dynamics of rentiers states, the 
role of the military in politics, the politics of informal economies, and transnational 
networks were dimensions of political life that might be not directly related to 
authoritarianism/democratization but were of crucial importance to Arab politics. A 
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focus on this would contribute to re-making political science into a “genuine science 
of politics”.8 
This approach asks whether it is time to go beyond the prevalent ‘democratization 
and authoritarianism paradogma’ (Valbjorn and Bank, 2010) and make studies of 
Arab politics into a genuine science of politics instead of being reduced mainly to 
topics of democratization and authoritarian resilience. To understand what is actually 
happening in the region, it is not only necessary to understand the dynamics of 
authoritarianism, but also what in fact is going on at the societal level. This requires 
that the post-democratization tradition begins a dialogue with more society-centric 
traditions and integrate their insights about social movements and political different 
traditions. Going beyond the democratization vs authoritarianism debate, this 
dissertation is a contribution for a new foundation of political science on the MENA 
region through an examination of social structures, the complex level of political 
participation and the strategic places where politics is done. 
Going beyond the authoritarianism vs democratization debate led many 
specialists to employ old analytical tools whose background is the question on where 
politics is really to be located. The assumption of the Arab population as being 
politically passive was contradicted with the popular uprisings and politics was to be 
looked for in street protests, social movements, Salafists and other forms of 
mobilization previously considered not inherently political-institutional. The state-
society relation is the main focus of my research, which aims to fills this gap in the 
literature on this specific aspect. As it will be further explained later in this chapter, 
the peculiarity of my research is in that it went to look for this locus of the ‘political’ 
beyond the official scene of institutional politics and proposes to use updated classic 
analytical tools, such as social class and nation-building, to examine and categorize 
the findings of the empirical work. 
This study addresses then the question of where politics in Arab countries is 
and what is the role of Islamist movements in it through the case study of Tunisia 
                                                            
8 Quoted in Valbjorn, pag . 228 
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during the process of social and political change in the period 2011-2014. The 
relevant analytical elements are: 
1/ The process of political change cannot be considered separately from the process 
of formation of social groups. 
2/ This process of change is conflictual and produces an ideological framing whose 
Islamism(s), in its moderate (Nahda) or radical (Salafist-jihadis) strands, is an 
important key factor. 
3/ This process of change is a social and historical one and tends towards the 
inclusion of social groups and their political organization into shared national 
institutions. The inclusive nature of such institutions depends on the outcome of the 
conflict. I agree with Rustow (1970) and Salamé (1994), that a democratic outcome 
is more likely in a situation of stalemate of the struggle. 
4/ The analytical frame in which the conflictual and historical process of institutional 
inclusion of social groups  is synthetized is the  nation-building category.   
 
 Understanding Islamism with Gramsci9 
This research deals with the nature of Political Islam and analyses it in the 
broader context of political change, as witnessed in Tunisia between 2011 and 2014.  
The analysis of the Islamist phenomenon during a period of radical change and 
political transformation highlights its role in the region as a mobilizing ideology for 
different social groups. Following the social movement theory approach10, I consider 
Islamism as an ideology and Islamist parties and movements as revolutionary 
political actors intent on providing a social (and political) consciousness to the 
constituency they refer to.They also offer an all-encompassing alternative worldview 
that aims attaking power and building a new society. The development of the two 
main Tunisian Islamist movements - Nahdha and Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST) - is 
placed in a larger sociological and historical perspective. They are considered in this 
                                                            
9For the analysis and references of the Gramscian text, I refer to the 2003 version of the classic: 
Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the prison Notebook edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (first print in 1971). From now on, I quote Gramsci, 2003. 
10 For a discussion on the social movement scholl applied to Islamist politics, see the section 1. 
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research as political agents of social actors that carry out, through Islamism, a social 
struggle with the national elites (or broader social groups) for the conquest of power 
and for integration into the polity. In this perspective, the paradigm of 
democratization is employed as an inclusive concept that implies the process of 
building up the political community within the imagined ethos of the nation (B. 
Anderson, 2004) 
The role Islamist movements play in the second half of the 20th century and 
early 21st is comparable to the one socialists and communists played in Europe a 
century earlier. While different in content - the two ideologies are indeed very 
different11 -, they are similar in that they both introduce the masses into politics 
(social and political awareness) and leadto revolutionary or integrationist 
strategies.Their political structure and agency are also very similar. Both were born 
as revolutionary movements that addressed political and social exclusion.Both set up 
revolutionary organisations with a dedicated leadership and a small party vanguard. 
Both, finally, under pressure from the surrounding political system, developed 
strategies that led to splits. In both cases, the point of divergence was the attitude 
toward repressive political systems and the issue of time and opportunity for 
revolution rather than reformist and integrationist strategies. Just like some socialist 
revolutionary movements in the 1970s degenerated into terrorist groups (Red 
Brigades in Italy and Bader Meinhofin Germany) violently confronting the state 
(Della Porta, 2006), during radical phases of confrontation between the state and 
Islamists in the Arab world, some among them degenerated into guerrilla groups 
dedicated to terrorist activities (Hafez, 2003). In other cases, the revolution 
triumphed, like in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan (Islamist), Russia, China and Cuba 
(communist); in many other contexts, former revolutionary groups integrated 
parliamentary systems and accepted liberal democracy. In most cases, the 
development of such movements went hand in hand with the accomplishment of 
nation building and the consolidation of an inclusive political community, in the 
                                                            
11 Both ideologies are against the liberal system. The communist ideology however bases its critic on 
a socio-economic analysis of the capitalistic mode of production while Islamism is a communitarian 
ideology whose critic is identity and ethics centered.   
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sense that the inclusion of Islamist political parties or groups was in parallel with 
political liberalization and democratization.  
Tunisia provides a good example of almost all these cases described above at 
different stages in its history. We have here a mass Islamist movement that after 
years of struggle and repression accepted liberal democracy and exploited the 
process of regime change to impose itself as a democratic and institutional player. 
We also have the development of a revolutionary Salafist movement that develops in 
part in consequence to the moderation of the main historical Islamist party and  in 
part  to the changing political dynamics. During the transitional period, opportunities 
are provided for a revolutionary social movement like Ansar al-Sharia. The 
repressive reaction of the state escalated tensions within the Salafist leadership until 
some leaders opted for a strategy of confrontation with the state (jihad).This parallel 
between the history of Europe and that, more recentely of the Arab world, helps to 
highlighten the way using Marxian categories is not in contradiction with its 
application to political movements of different tradition.  
Antonio Gramsci became internationally known at the beginning of the 1980s 
thanks to two academic trends known as cultural studies and subaltern studies 
(Chaturvedi, 2012; Nelson,Treichler, and Grossberg, 1992). The Italian author came 
to play a considerable intellectual role at a time when classical Marxism was being 
questioned and the traditional Marxist left weakened. To many intellectuals and 
practitioners Antonio Gramsci looked useful to overcome some of the structural 
rigidity of traditional Marxist interpretations (P.Anderson, 1976). His attention to the 
superstructure was particulary significant. In the aftermath of the consolidation in 
power of the fascist party in Italy, he analysed the defeat of the Italian communist 
party in the 1920s in terms of absence of ‘hegemony’. Following the example of the 
successful Leninist revolution in Russia, he emphasised the proactive role of political 
human agency against the deterministic Marxism of the Second International parties 
(Gramsci and Capriooglio, 1980)12. Inspired by Lenin, he used many of his concepts 
                                                            
12 In an article published in the socialist review L’Avanti in 24 November 1917, Gramsci analysed the 
success of the Bolschevikh revolution as the victory of political subjectivy, in polemics with the 
deterministic economicism of the socialist party than drawing from Marx’s capital was arguing that 
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and tried to follow his political strategy; however, he went beyond their classical 
understanding, charging those categories with new and innovative applications. A 
good example is given by the most famous of the gramscians’ concepts, that of 
’hegemony’. During the process of the long Russian revolution (1905-17), hegemony 
was intended to define the strategy a proletarian party should adopt in relation to the 
peasants’ class. Lenin proposed a front between the peasants and the proletariat, with 
the communist party playing the hegemonic revolutionary role. Starting from the 
same standpoint of a hegemonic strategy to be played by the Italian communist party 
toward the peasants in the South of Italy, Gramsci developed a concept much larger 
than its original Leninist one. He stated that hegemony is a strategu to be considered 
as part of a state-society relation. Political society is properly of the state and its 
locus is the repressive apparatus (domination with force); civil society is instead the 
locus of the hegemonic struggle, which is the struggle for consensus around 
dominant ideas. Gramsci, following Machiavelli, saw power as a two-headed 
centaur, exerting power through a mix of violence and consensus (Gramsci, 2003; 
169-70)13. A ruling class that holds the repressive apparatus of the state and, most 
importantly, gains consensus in civil society, is hegemonic. Civil society becomes 
therefore the new battlefield of the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic political 
struggle. 
By going beyond the traditional Marxist approach, the Italian thinker 
developed a new field of analysis useful for future social science. The Birmingham 
school of cultural studies in the 1960s, for example, studied the cultural influence 
and domination the power system exerted over subaltern social groups. Following 
this trend, an entire field of studies developed within the Anglosaxon Marxist 
tradition, called at times ‘cultural Marxism’. The hegemonic role of the dominant 
discourse and ideology became to be recognized in the first place as the origin of the 
                                                            
revolution will come out of the contradiction of the capitalistic economic system.  See:          
https://www.marxists.org/archive/gramsci/1917/12/revolution-against-capital.htm 
 
13 In this text, I will refer to the classical 1971’s English translation of Gramsci notebooks, edited by 
Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. In Italian is avalaible the most authoritative critical edition 
edited by the Istituto Gramsci (1971). In the last years, Columbiua Universisty (2011) has edited a 
critical edition of Gramsci works.  
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power system and not the economic domination of the capitalist class as classical 
Marxism recognised (Dworkin, 1997). 
The most innovative way to use Gramscian categories came from the Indian 
tradition of Subaltern Studies. Beginning as an editorial collective in 1982 with 
Ranajit Guha, this intellectual trend was initially influenced by the English school of 
historians - E.P. Thompson, Cristopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawn – who 
in the 1960s had started the so-called “history from below”. Historians such as 
Hobsbawn, for example, talked in Gramscian style of a “history of subaltern classes” 
when analysing British peasant society (Hobsbawn, 1971)14. The inspiration for these 
works was the famous analysis of Gramsci’s reading of the Italian Risorgimento - the 
Italian national movement of unification and independence - (Gramsci, 2003; p52-
120). By analisyng Italian history in a comparative perspective with the German and 
French ones, Gramsci argued that Cavour’s liberal party was able to gain hegemony 
within the Italian nationalist movement15. Gramsci scolded Mazzini’s Republican 
Party (partito d’azione) for its inability to bring the popular masses (the subalterns) 
within its party in order to form a ‘historical bloc’ (blocco storico), which would 
have the double aim of directing the peasants into the national building project on 
one side, and being hegemonic against Cavour’s strategy of unifying the southern 
landlords to the northern industrialists, on the other (Ibidem; p.57-80). His analysis 
of the subalterns acquired considerable importance when elaborated in the contexts 
of a revolutionary strategy for the party. Gramsci imagined, in fact, this party as 
being the leading political party of an inclusion strategy of the Italian popular masses 
(Ibidem; p.80). The revolutionary party must look for  political hegemony, merging 
into (or entering in alliance) with popular classes. In other words, the historical role 
of this party is to be ‘organic’ to lower social classes, becoming its tool for 
emancipation (Ib; p. 147-157). The Communist party, like a modern Machiavellian 
Prince, is a subjective, volontaristic political player that merges into popular classes 
                                                            
14 The term ‘subalterns’ is one of the most successful Gramsciancategory. It had a rapid success in the 
British humanities school in the 1960s, thanks to the Hobsbawn pivotal works 
15 Camillo Benso, count of Cavour (1810-61)  was the Italian prime minister that leaded successfully 
the Piedmont-Sardinia kingdom to head the process of Italian unification.  
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and through its intellectuals (organic intellectuals) make the subaltern classes aware 
of their own historical role of emancipation for the whole of society. The relation 
between the party and the subaltern groups had to be total, ‘organic’, emancipatory 
and not simply instrumental for achieving political power.  
The crucial point of the alienation of the nationalist elites vis a vis the masses, 
and the failure of the nationalist movement for independence in integrating the larger 
nation into an inclusive national ethos inspired the academic revolution in Asian 
studies led by the Indian scholars Sarkar and Ranajit Guha. The former published in 
1968 “the thought of Gramsci”16 , a book in which tries to think of Gramscian 
categories as being applicable in the context of colonial and post-colonial India. His 
student and follower, Guha, founded the historical project of subaltern studies at the 
beginning of the 1980s (Brennan, 2001). The concept of the ‘subaltern’ appeared to 
be useful in those countries of the ‘South’ where classical Weberian and Marxian 
categories of social class could not be applied easily. The Gramscian subalterns (the 
exploited and marginalized groups) had the same subjectivity and potential political 
agency Marxists traditionally attributed to the working class17. 
The Indian school, in contrast to the British tradition, emphasized the 
category of “subaltern” as a new paradigm to make sense of the separation between a 
colonial (and post-colonial) elite and the masses (S. Sarkar, 1984; R. Guha and J. 
Scott, 1999) and not only as a tool of contestation of the old colonial historiography. 
According to the first generation of subaltern scholars, post-colonial societies were 
split in two: the nationalist elites and wider ‘traditional’ society. The former 
employed the language and ideology of the colonial power and perpetuated a system 
of domination similar to the colonial one. 18 The latter had different forms of  
                                                            
16 Quoted in RK Thapa (2011). 
17 Without any Gramscian influence but with the same analytical and political preoccupations, Franz 
Fanon applied the category of the wretch of the hearth (damné de la terre) to those in colonial 
societies oppressed by the colonial system. Franz Fanon became much cited in post-colonial studies 
until he reached in France a young Iranian student and political activist, Ali Shariati, which referring 
himself to the Caribbean political analyst, applied the same concept into Koranic language. 
18  Later on, when the so called second generation of subualtern studies merged into the post-
structuralist debate in US, more focused on “discourse”, “Subalterns” became a category to show how 
the nationalist official tale had been constructed within a frame whose the larger part of the population 
was excluded from (Spivak, 1988) . 
26 
 
contention and agency, such as religion. One of the scope of such new theoretical 
approach was to give equally dignity to such political and social phenomena (R. 
Guha,, 1982; p 4; Chattopadhyay and Bhaskar Sarkar, 2005). 
In the Arab world, Gramsci began to enjoy a degree of popularity from the 
1970s onwards in both communist and Islamist circles (Manduchi, 1999). The 
perpetual solitude of the intellectual vis à vis the masses and the hegemonic role of 
authoritarian regimes were the context from which reflections on Gramsci’s 
categories emerged. Those using Gramsci accused the Arab intellectual to be 
detached from the masses and complacent to power. Gramsci had theorised the 
concept of ‘organic intellectual’ in opposition to the traditional one. The former had 
to be the agent of an effective, revolutionary and emancipatory strategy that included 
the subaltern groups. The Communist Party, for Gramsci, had to provide this type of 
intellectual, who would work together with militants and members for the awareness 
and emancipation of the masses. In the 1970s, some left wing Arab intellectuals 
accused leftist parties of being detached from ordinary people (T. Labib, 1994) and 
used the Gramscian frame for a fierce critique19. This trend, however, never became 
influential nor developed particular innovative analyses, with the exception of the 
Algerian writer Abdelkader Jaghloul, who argued that Islamists instead of the left, in 
the Arab world, were really ‘marching’ the masses into politics20. 
 Although the category of subalterns and Subaltern studies in general never 
developed autonomously in the MENA region, as it had happened in Latin America 
(Mallon, 1994), the book of the Franco-Algerian author Frantz Fanon “The Wretched 
of the Earth” (1961) is worth mentioning21. Anticipating in a way subaltern studies, 
Fanon identified the Algerian masses, engaged at that time in a bloody liberation 
struggle, as a political subject that was building its own historical subjectivity in 
opposition to the colonizer through armed struggle. It is not a coincidence that Fanon 
had some influence on the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati, who proposed in the 
                                                            
19 In Tunisia in 2008, Ettajdid, the heir of the historical Comunist Party organized a special seminar 
titled “Gramsci, la culture et les intellectuels”. See: http://ettajdid.org/spip.php?article120 
20 Quoted in LabibTahar and Brondino Michele (1994). For the role of Islamist thought and strategy 
as ‘organic intellectuals’ see also Rupe Simms (2002). 
21 For an attempt to a subulterns historiography in the middle East see : Cronin (2008). 
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1970s the fusion between Fanon’sanalysis of the wretched of the earth and Islamic 
categories. In the Koranic language of the Iranian intellectual, the exploited and the 
exploiter dialectic became that of the mustakhbarin and the mustadaafin (Shariati, 
1980; Abrahamian, 1982). 
Gramsci theoretical framework has been used in the region to study political 
Islam as well22, with a particular attention for the concepts of passive revolution and 
counter-hegemonic strategy. Asef Bayat and Hazem Kandil have analysed the case 
of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and their strategy of Islamization of society 
between the 1980s and the 2000s as a counter hegemonic strategy. For Bayat, as for 
Kandil, the Muslim Brotherhood, facing a political deadlock, chose to apply a 
counter hegemonic strategy in the manner of the Gramscian battle for conquering 
civil society. This strategy, however, failed in the sense that the MB never reached 
political power (at least before 2011 when the authors were writing) despite 
conquering significant social influence. The state reacted to this strategy and 
accepted many of the demands coming from Islamist actors in terms of further 
implementation of religion in the public sphere.Absorbing the request of Islamization 
of the political system allowed the regime to change some policies and continue its 
rule. In short, it reacted to the Muslim counter hegemonic strategy in terms of what 
Gramsci called a‘passive revolution’ (Bayat, 2007; Kandil, 2011). In this respect, this 
concept highlights the rulers’ strategy of making concessions without ceeding power 
and altering the balance between ruled and rulers. While Bayat wanted to compare 
the Iranian Islamic Republic, where a revolution occurred without a strong Islamic 
movement, with the Egyptian case, where a strong Islamist movement was not able 
to make a revolution, Kandil wanted to point out the shortcomings of the Gramscian 
strategy of the ‘war of position’. Following his analysis on hegemony, Gramsci in 
fact had elaborated a new revolutionary strategy for the party, which had to be able 
to be strategic and adapt to political circumstances. Just like the MB, the communist 
                                                            
22 The first to write anything in Tunisia about Gramsci at the beginning of the 1980s was a Nahda 
activist, according to Ajmi Lourimi, historical leader of this party. The author is today a professor in 
the USA. Contacted, he confirms the existence of an article, whose copy is however not findable 
today. 
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party in Italy in the 1920s, under strong pressure from the repressive apparatus, had 
to be able to distinguish between the moment for direct confrontation with the state 
(war of manoeuvre) from the one for a counter-hegemonic strategy (indirect 
confrontation), which had to be played in the realm of civil society (war of position). 
Kandil’s article scrutinises the MB counter hegemonic strategy of conquering all the 
positions in the ‘battlefield of civil society’. The author’s final conclusion is that a 
successful penetration of the social system (education, associations, Ngos, and 
professional unions) was not sufficient to take power because the authoritarian 
reaction was more effective. 
The most accurate and articulated application of the Gramscian frame to 
Islamist movements comes, however, from Thomas J. Butko in his 2004 seminal 
article ‘Revelation or Revolution: a Gramscian approach to the rise of political 
Islam’. He analyses Islamist ideology with the comparison of the Gramscian theory 
of revolution and the Islamist one through the lens of the three most authoritative 
Islamist authors in Islamist political thought: Mawdudi, al-Benna and Sayyed al-
Qotb. Butko highlights that Islamist parties have a clear political agency behind the 
cover of religious discourse and that they aim to conquer power – from which they 
feel they have been excluded - in order to create a fundamentally new social order 
(Butko, 2004: 60). Islamist political thought has a complete political toolbox similar 
to the one Marxists use. By comparing those concepts with the Gramscian ones he 
outlines consistentely the political meaning of Islamist actions but also the 
‘innovation’ provided by such theoricians of Islamism by actualising into an Islamic 
frame political contemporary concept such as leadership, vanguard, ideology and 
revolutionary strategy.  
After 2011 and the Arab Spring, there was a new wave of analyses that used 
Gramscian paradigms (Brustier, 2017). Most of those articles viewed the Arab 
revolutions as a new international trend. For a left wing approach to the Arab 
Revolutions, in particular the Egyptian one, Brecht de Smet’s book “Gramsci on 
Tahrir: revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt”, by developing the gramscian 
category of Caesarism (in order to explain the neo-authoritarian outcome of the 
Tahrir revolution), is probably the most original (De Smet, 2016). For a Gramscian 
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approach to Islamist studies is instead to be pointed out Gillian Kennedy’s “From 
independence to revolution: Egypt’s Islamist and the contest for power”. Gillian 
Kennedy’s work applies the category of cultural hegemony as previousely done by 
Bayat and Kandil. She focuses however on the ‘progressive’ Islamists that she 
opposes to the ‘radical’ and ‘conservative’ (G. Kennedy, 2017). De Smet and 
Kennedy both  look at the historical evolution of the Egyptian power system as a 
passive revolution. 
 
The philosophy of praxis23 
Before going into the detail of the research project, in this section I will 
briefely deal with philosophical Marxism, which underpins the methodology of this 
research24.While I am not dealing with socialist or working class movements nor 
with the neoliberal capitalist mode of production, Marxian sociological categories 
nonetheless inform this research. In particular, I chose to use the Gramscian method 
of analysis to understand the political change that unfolded in Tunisia during the 
historical events of 2011-2014. While in Tunisia the communist party is not a major 
political actor, I consider the Gramscian method useful and applicable for Islamist 
movements. In order to justify more convincingly such an approach, I discuss the 
peculiar Italian Marxist philosophical tradition and clarify afterward some of the key 
political sociological patterns used in this dissertation.  
What I call in this section ‘Italian Marxism’ refers to that specific tradition of 
Marxism that developed in Italy between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century. Gramsci himself in ‘Prison Notebooks’ brings out the idea of a specific 
Italian Marxist tradition (Gramsci, 2003: 378-472). By introducing this point, 
Gramsci places himself in that debate brought about by the Idealist Italian tradition, 
in particular Croce and Gentile, that reduced Marxism historical materialism into a 
purely historiographic method (Croce, 1922; Gentile, 1897; 1899). In that particular 
                                                            
23 ‘Philosophy of praxis’ is the expression Gramsci uses in the Notebooks to define Marxism; it is also 
an expression that he uses to define a specific Marxian philosophy. 
24For a further understanding of the method and epistemology, see section 7 of this introduction. 
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historical period between the two centuries, a neo-idealist25 wave invaded Italian and 
European culture. Both Croce and Gentile, influenced by Labriola’s work on 
historical materialism (Labriola, 2013; Dainotto, 2008)26, began their career against 
Labriola’s Marxism. Labriola was himself a particular kind of Marxist. In open 
dispute with the  Marxism of the second international, he dismissed the approach of 
these Marxists that read history as a deterministic succession of stages and refused 
philosophical materialism when reduced to an economicist dimension. Silvano 
Spaventa, a prominent Italian Hegelian, had influenced Labriola when the latter was 
a student at the University of Naples; in Labriola’s vision of historical materialism, 
the dialectic nature subject/object was the key. He borrowed from German Idealism 
(and the young Marx) the power of subjectivity and human agency as a factor of 
transformation. Finally, according to Labriola, Marxism was not a closed system of 
explanation rather a philosophical and analytical tool of critique. 
 Gramsci’s “philosophy of the praxis” was indeed part of an intellectual 
project of renovation of Marxism, inspired directly by the founder of Italian 
Marxism: Antonio Labriola. Gramsci’s originality was to apply a methodology of 
analysis to the Italian situation trough which he developed a larger intellectual 
project that used Marxism as a complex and rich analytical toolbox. First, he 
privileged the national dimension as a frame to understand the horizon of social and 
historical change. Second, he analysed the history of Italian unification and nation 
building - Risorgimento - as a struggle between social groups. Third, he was 
interested in the way religion, culture (folklore) and common sense (the ‘philosophy 
of the common people’) influenced the way people acted individually and 
collectively (Gramsci, 2003:p.326).  
 The nature and methodology of the philosophy of the praxis led Gramsci to 
explore areas outside the traditional Marxist frame. The Gramscian approach that I 
                                                            
25 By neo-Idealism, it is meant a new trend of interpretation of Hegelian philosophy. In Italy Croce 
and Gentile were the the most important representative. In particular, Croce becomes an intellectual of 
international fame (Gramsci, 2033:p.5-23). Gramsci engages  directly with Croce, hegelism, storicism 
in the Notebooks (Gramsci, 2003:p. 381-419)                                                                                              
26 Antonio Labriola published several publication in which he proposed its own understanding of 
Marxism. In particular, he proposed a philosophical reading of Marx that he called the philosophy of 
praxis, based on a neo-idealistic reading of historical materialism’s Marxian theory.  
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adopt to understand Islamism and social change in Tunisia, is indeed a methodology 
that allows the use of Marxian categories in order  to better explain the nature of 
social and political change (and its own specific ideological models) in a country that 
is neither Marx’s industrial society not contemporary Europe.  
As in Gramsci, the historical process is understood in this research as a 
dialectical movement in which factors of change (structure) and continuity (agency) 
influence each other. The worldview of people is considered essential to understand 
the ideological framing of the conflict.The main assumption behind this study is that 
that material life (not only economics) has a strong influence on the way individuals 
and social groups build up their consciousness of the world. Religion, in this case 
Islam, is the way people look at the world, in which a general abstract belief is 
accompanied by a series of practical attitudes and moral codes. In this sense religion 
is an ideology, and as long as no other secular political ideology can be sufficiently 
‘national’27, it can undestundable be the tool in which social contradictions and 
conflicts are better expressed. Islamism is in this sense a transformative ideology 
because it takes the philosophical language of the official ulemas to ordinary people 
joining high and low culture. This union is necessary for democratic modern politics. 
The use of Marxian categories in this research is essentially analytical. In 
particular, I’m interested in: 1/highlighting the tension the struggle social groups 
produce in the process of building a political national community; 2/ the way those 
groups become aware of their social being; 3/ how they build up ideologies in order 
to actively participate to the transformation of their social being. 
In the next three sections of this chapter, I go through  the way I apply the 
Gramscian method to the research. If I insist on the Gramscian method, here, is 
because  what I take from Gramsci is first of all his methodology. Just like the Italy’s 
Gramsci, Tunisia is a quite young country, living a step of an historical process of 
nation-building not yet accomplished and whose social classes are less defined by an 
                                                            
27 Gramsci uses the term national in the sense of ‘popular’. For him the Italian Risorgimento project 
was not national because masses did not participate to it (Gramsci, Il materialism storico, 1977; 231). 
He also talks about ‘national-popular’ when refering to a cultural expression which is not reflecting 
the popular concerns. 
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industrial economic system than a contradictory process of modernization.The 2011-
2014 period of dramatic political transformation highlights some shortcomings of 
this process. First, I explain the process of nation-building as one of struggle between 
social groups that fight for being included into the political scene. By social groups, I 
distinguish two historical middle classes (or petty bourgeoisie) that developed out of 
the education modern system and popular ones that entered into the public space in 
particular junctures of political crisis.  Just like the Italian Risorgimento, this process 
is dealt by ruling elites that are detached by popular masses. If, on one side, the 
desturian party, is a mass movement, it instrumentilizes the popular classes for its 
political goals, keeping them away from political participation. In the 1970s and 
1980s the contradictions of the system produced social unrest and campaign for 
political liberalization. I call this process ‘democratization’, but it implies the 
Gramscian idea of passive revolution because the change is never complete, but 
rather the result of  the absorption of elites.  
The process of political inclusion is one of class struggle. I compare Islamists 
movements to the Gramscian modern prince. Although I distinguish the Islamists of 
the Muslim Brotherhoods family with the contemporary Salafists, I argue that the 
way Islamists in general make politics (i.e. merging into social groups) is comparable 
to the way the organic Gramscian party was supposed to. The most important focus 
of the research is on the Salafist radical public of Tunisian urban areas. While 
studying this process, my theoretical preoccupation was to define those groups as 
conflicting social classes. Because not immediately related to the Marxian mode of 
production, the Gramscian category of subultern was indeed useful. In particular the 
way it was developed by the  Subultern Study school I described above. In order to 
describe the salafist social constituency I use in my own category, the muhammishun, 
but I have in mind the Gramscian paradigm. 
Finally, I argue in a more typicall Marxist scheme the issue of the nation as 
an ideological discourse of the new ruling class, the one that gained from the new 
political order. The constitutional deal, I argue, is the symbol of the new middle class 
deal, represented by Nida Tunis and Nahda. This is reflected by the constitutional 
preamble that reflects the new political and cultural order. This political deal 
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produces a new version of Tunisianité, which is the way the ruling elites historically 
framed the idea of the Tunisian nation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Democratization as a passive revolution  
Central to the understanding of Tunisia in this research is the concept of 
democratization. I conceive democratization 28 in this research as an inclusive 
historical path of nation building. The issue is how inclusive this process really is and 
how social groups are integrated into it. The way Gramscy dealt with the process of 
Italian unification (Risorgimento) inspired this research. As a conseguence, in the 
second chapter (after this introduction) the Tunisian case study is introduced through 
a critical analysis of three key moments of crisis in Tunisian contemporary history. 
First, the Ben Youssef/ Bourguiba struggle at the onset of independence; second, the 
social crisis of the 1980s accompanied by the first attempt of political liberalisation; 
third, the post-2011 period of contention and constitutional transition. By going 
through this crucial political junctures (Hogan and Doyle, 2007), the second chapter 
highlights both the path dependency of the most recent political transformations and 
the ambiguity of such long process of transformation. Those historical dynamics are 
useful to better understand the mechanisms of the democratic institutional building 
since 2011.The argument is that such periods of transformations determine change 
and continuity in the power structure as much as inclusion of new political actors and 
exclusion of others.This process is what otherwise Gramsci calls “passive 
revolution”29. 
                                                            
28 The relation-ship between Gramscian thought and democracy has inspired a vast debate within the 
Gramscian studies. Broadely speaking, the debate is split in between those who see Gramscian 
approach as a ‘Leninism for the West’ (Galli della Loggia 1977: 69; Salvadori 1977: 40-41) and those 
who hold the concept of radical democracy (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Giuseppe Vacca, 1999). 
29 For the use of passive revolution in post-arab spring politics see: Brecht de Smet, Gramsci on 
Tahrir: Revolution and counter-revolution in Egypt (2015). More broadely, there is a recent 
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The first crisis began during the two years of struggle (1954-56) between 
combatants (fellaghas) and French troops and between Bourguiba and Ben Youssef. 
Ben Youssef had been the secretary general of the neo-Destour during Bourguiba’s 
exile at the beginning of the 1950s. Then it was his turn to leave the country for 
Egypt, and when he returned in 1955, he found the fait accompli concerning the 
agreement of autonomy that Bourguiba agreed upon with the French authority 
(Ladhari Noe, 1956). The disagreement on the way to lead the struggle against the 
colonizer became a head-on confrontation between the two leaders until the Sfax 
congress of the neo-Destour, held in November of the same year, excluded Ben 
Youssef from the party (Toumi, 1989). This struggle for the leadership deepened 
existing cleavages in the country. With the assassination of Ben Youssef on 12 
August 1961, an authoritarian method of government was inaugurated and 
characterised Bourguiba’s time in power (1956-87) (Camau and Geisser, 2003). 
While described often as a political struggle for power between the two most 
important representatives of the national movement (Vandewalle, 1980), it was much 
more than that. First, with the partial exception of the“Jellaza uprising” of 191130 , 
the national movement was mostly the political activism of its leaders : Farhat 
Hached, HabibThameur, and Tlili (Mahjoubi, 1982; Camau, 1978; Rivlin, 1952) with 
no major popular mobilization until the 1940s. Second, its ideology had never been 
clearly elaborated beyond the necessity of complete national independence. The 
Bourguiba/Ben Youssef conflict showed the contradictions within the national 
movement. The Fellagha, the pro-Ben Youssef movement of armed resistance, saw 
the rural population of the centre and south as the protagonists of the anti-colonial 
struggle (Nouschi, 1990): the Youssefist struggle against Bourguiba gave an 
ideological tune to the confrontation, making divisions within the nationalist 
movement clear for the first time. Behind Bourguiba were the trade union and the 
                                                            
development of Gramscian categories of passive revolution in the study of IR.  See for example A.D. 
Morton (2007). 
30 A tramway accident that killed a Tunisian pedestrian was the spark of the events that led to the 
killings of several demonstrators. This event happened against the background of the debate on wheter 
Muslim Tunisian, naturalized French citizen, should be buried in Muslim cemeteries (TawfiqAyadi, 
1989).  
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new middle classes of the coastal regions; behind Ben Youssef a traditional trading 
middle class (often from the south), the old tribal sector of the south and central 
regions, and a section of the zeitunian elite (the traditional religious education system 
of the country). The violent end of this conflict, whose outcome was Ben Youssef’s 
assassination and the repression of his constituency, gave the birth to the 
authoritarian Tunisian system (Camau-Geisser, 2003). This conflict left the 
possibility of the emergence of socio-political pluralism out of the nation-building 
process. The political system Bourguiba imposed after independence was based on a 
social constituency that emerged victorious from the struggle for independence31. 
 The second crisis occurred in the 1980s. It was over a decade of social 
contention and political struggle (1978-1992). It began with the 1978 uprising32 and 
ended up with the crackdown of Islamists in the period between 1990-92. During this 
second crisis, the country experienced two, partially free, elections in 1981 and in 
1989; a major uprising in 1984 (bread riots); and a coup d’état in 1987. A critical 
historical analysis of this period has not been conducted yet33, it is indeed a key 
critical historical period for two reasons. First, it signals  the end of the deal between 
the liberal bourgeoisie and the ruling classes and the subsequent crisis of legitimacy 
within the same nationalist middle class. Second, it sees the coming on the political 
scene of the popular masses and their Islamization. It is in this critical period that the 
contradictions of the national project – hidden until then - emerged. By the time the 
Burguiba system began to show the first cracks in the late 1970s, the country’s 
political landscape had changed. On the one side, Islamists had built a coherent 
ideological alternative to Bourguibism (Burgat and Duwall, 1993.); on the other, the 
liberal elites left the nationalist bloc and focused their political struggle on 
democratization (Ayari, 2009). In 1981, the liberal MDS party ran in the first semi-
                                                            
31 The Bourguibian system, moreover, gained legitimization through the accomplishment of 
independence, at that point backed by French, who were afraid of losing an ally through whom they 
could maintain a degree of influence on the country  (H. Bourguiba, 1954) 
32In parallel with the lobbying of liberal circles (in 1977 Human Rights League is founded), a 
completely new cycle of contestation emerged. After the riots of 1978, in part as a consequence of the 
clash between the UGTT (the General Worker Union) of HabibAchour and the Destour party, 
Bourguiba held partially free elections. The elections were rigged and the Islamist party, which had 
made an official request for legalization, was denied the license.  
33 See however the pivotal sociological works of the Tunisian sociologist Abdelkader Zghal. 
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pluralistic elections (the Islamist party was not permitted to run), while the 1984 
bread revolt signalled the beginning of widespread dissatisfaction and social unrest 
(Seddon, 1986: 2). By 1986-7, political contention developed in parallel with a 
process of Islamization of public spaces, especially in the poor suburbs of the 
largeand middle towns34 . Ben Ali’s coup d’état prevented a major confrontation 
between the regime and the Islamists (Chouikha and Gobe, 2015: 48) while using the 
discourse of political liberalisation in favour of the liberal elite that had split from the 
Destour in opposition to the authoritarian degeneration of the late Bourguiba period. 
The third and last moment of crisis is the 2011 uprising and the constitutional 
process that followed. The constitutional dynamics of this period (2011-2014) are the 
continuation of the 1980s political liberalization described above. As Ben Romdhane 
argues, the political Tunisian elite had struggled for democratization since the 1970s 
(Ben Romdhane, 2011) and the Tunisian revolution was nothing but the continuation 
of a long struggle for its accomplishment; a further step in the process of 
democratization and inclusion (Stepan, 2012; J. Kinsman, 2011; Boose, 2012). In 
other words, the constitutional consensus was a new middle class compromise that 
accomplished a process of political emancipation that started from independence. 
While the liberal middle classes could partially participate  in the 1980s through the 
experience of the liberal destourians, Islamists emerged as an acceptable political 
actor only after 2011, with Nahda being one of the bargainer of the ‘pacted 
transition’ (D.A.Rustow, 1970). Before getting into a deal, however, the polarization 
Islamists vs nationalists of Bourguibian inclination shaped the post-revolutionary 
political conflict. In this sense the creation of Nida Tunis, a new party of former 
destourians, and its victory in the 2014-15 elections, proved the resilience of a 
specific political and social bloc. The novelty, however, was that Nahda was allowed 
to run for political elections, becaming the main competitor and second 
parliamentary group35.This process is what can be defined as the historical middle 
class compromise because along excluded social class that Nahda represented 
                                                            
34 Ghozzi, a historical Nahda member, Interview with the author. January 2017 (skype conversation) 
35 By the time I write at the end of 2016, Nahda became again the main parliamentary force, becouse 
of the split within the Bourguibian and modernist camp. 
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politically was finally integrated into national institutions. The compromise, 
however, implies inclusion and exclusion at the same time. Just like Rostow and Di 
Palma argued for transitions in Latin America, the bargaining is possible and 
successful thanks to the exclusion of the radicals (D.A. Rustow, 1970; G. Di Palma, 
1990). The process of integration into the nation (the democratic political space of 
participation) is therefore not completely accomplished because large social groups, 
engaged in contentious politics during and after the uprising, do not find institutional 
representation and pay the price of the compromise. Ansar al-Sharia, the radical 
Salafist group did represent these groups in the political juncture 2011/13, but in a 
way that was not acceptable to the new democratic regime. Exclusion from the 
insitutions and from the ‘nation’ is the outcome of their challenge.  
After the analysis of the three major political crises and transformations of 
modern Tunisia, the overall conclusion is that a long process of political awareness 
began since the national struggle against the French until the constitutional deal of 
2014. In this sense, the proper democratization process of 2011/2014 can be thought 
of as inclusiveness. The three crises described above led to a political evolution 
whose outcome - the inclusiveness of previously marginalised social and political 
actors - is less the product of a conversion to ‘democratic’ values than the synthesis 
of a social struggle (Salame, 1994).  
While I use democratization in the sense of a long historical path  toward an 
inclusive nation-building process, I consider Islamists as the main social and political 
actor through which new social groups come into the public scene.  I argue, in other 
words, that Islamist movements and parties are the political instrument that 
channelling the social contestation into a political project that demands institutional 
inclusiveness. In the next section, I examine the role of Islamists in shaping social 
participation, pointing out the differences between Nahda main stream Islamism and 
Ansar al-Sharia Salafism. In so doing, I will use the Gramscian category of ‘modern 
Prince’, arguing that the Islamist movement as a whole in Tunisia played the same 
role that Gramsci established for the Italian Communist Party. 
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The Islamist modern prince  
The main argument of this section and one of the key theoretical 
underpinnings of this research is that Islamism is a legitimate political expression of 
social groups and therefore an inevitable component for an inclusive process of 
democratization. Because Islamism is one of the ideological tool through which 
social groups participate politically, democratization implies a certain degree of 
“Islamization”. Islamism, however, is only a general category, that does not explain 
the different ways in which it can be translated. In other words, Islamism is 
multifaceted; the development of social Islamist movements in the last 50 years (in 
Tunisia as elsewhere) featured different political trends, schematically identifiable as 
moderate, radicals and revolutionaries. 
My thesis argues that a sociological approach to Islamism can help to 
understand how different social groups appropriate different features of 
Islamism.The following sections will illustrate how it happens and how Islamist 
movements succeed in merging into social groups. In the first part, I highlighten the 
role of the petty bourgeoisie and its coming forward as a social and political force 
through an Islamist political framing. In the second part, I emphasize the role of the 
Jamaa (Islamic community or society) in forming social class awareness. In applying 
this argument to Salafists, and based on the findings of the fieldwork, it is argued that 
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia represented the way in which a disenfranchised social 
class framed its social contention through a political Islamic project. 
 
 
The Islamic middle class 
Several works have shown how the Muslim Brotherhood is a political and 
social phenomenon of the religious middle classes (J.A.Clark, 2004; Fahmy, 1998; 
Rinaldo, 2008; Gumuscu, 2010). Middle classes however were not all ‘Islamic’ and 
the same definition of what is a ‘new middle classe’ may vary. Lisa Anderson, for 
example, uses the term “new middle classes” to define the educated petty bourgeoisie 
that emerged from the process of colonization and that stood for a nationalist 
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ideological frame very similar to the ideas and political concepts of western countries 
(L. Anderson, 2014). ‘Middle classes’ or ‘new middle classes’ is a loose sociological 
category that applies to rising social groups, different from traditional ones, that 
become dominant and impose their political domination through the elaboration of 
ideological frames. That frame was, at the beginning of the process of nation 
building and until the 1970s, nationalism. With the exception of Egypt, where a large 
Islamic jamaa emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, and was eventually crushed by the 
Nasser regime (Mitchell, 1993), in the Maghreb countries an autonomous Islamist 
expression of the middle classes did not appear until the 1970s. Before then, the 
Islamic trend was ‘hidden’ within the larger nationalist ideology of the years of 
national struggle. In Tunisia, in particular, Islamism and Arab nationalism were 
fused within the Youssefist political tendency until a specific Islamist party emerged 
in the 1970s (Entelis, 1974)36.  
In the 1970s, coinciding with the post-independence social and economic 
crisis, nationalism began to be challenged, and the opposition to the regime adopted 
new ideological repertoires, Islamism being the most influential. After independence, 
in fact, society developed a more complex structure (education and urbanization 
played an important role); a new petty bourgeoisie came on the scene and began 
opposing the social and political domination of the social group that held the reins of 
the political system. Islamism became the ideological frame of this contestation, and 
the opposition to the hegemonic apparatus (Althusser, 1976) was framed through 
cultural and religious values. 
In Tunisia, the evidence of the emergence of an Islamic public anchored in 
the lower middle classes has been highlighted in the pioneering work of the Tunisian 
sociologist Elbaki Hermassi (1984) 37 .The Islamic movement developed as an 
                                                            
36 In Morocco, for example, the Istiqlal party of Al Fassi emerged as an independent movement only 
after the socialist split (J. Benomar, 1988). In Algeria, the different trends co-existed within the same 
nationalist party (FLN), and the dominance of one trend over the other was only determined by the 
leadership of the moment (Mortimer, 1996). 
37Sociological works on Islamists are very rare.  I like to highlight however a turnaround in the 
sociological Tunisian school that makes reference to the Elbeki Hermassis’s pioneer study on the 
Tunisian Islamist movement in the 1980s. One of is most interesting follower today is the young 
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intellectual and political movement rooted in secondary schools and universities. As 
Hermassi reveals, however, these new Islamist intellectuals had a social background 
that linked them very closely to the working class.This is probably why the Islamic 
movement was able to be successful among those strata of the population38, by the 
time widespread popular contestation exploded in the streets of the country in the 
1980s. Islamist intellectuals and militants were better placed to be ‘organic’ than the 
other opposition political groups. The Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI, later 
Nahda) represented the political party that was able to frame this petty bourgeoisie’s 
demands into a coherent political project. Until the clash with the Ben Ali’s regime at 
the beginning of the 1990s, it played the role of the leading opposition movement 
rooted in the radical masses, mostly a disenfranchised public rising from the margins 
of urban areas. 
During the 1990s, Nahda disappeared from the scene and the Islamic public 
began to change. In her study of Islamic associations in Egypt and Jordan, Clark 
‘discovered’ a ‘new’ ‘new’ middle class (Clerk, 2004), composed of an economic 
counter-elite, able to provide financial resources, symbolic social status (showing off 
a puritan but clear status of social success) and cultural self-consciousness (not 
necessarily political)39. It was no longer the traditional and insular Ikhwani petty 
bourgeoisie. This new Islamic constituency was composed of social entrepreneurs 
with international connections and social and economic resources. 
As a conseguence of the policy of political normalization that lasted for 20 
years in Tunisia, this change was not clear until 2011. Although a general process of 
individualized piety could be perceived in Tunisia before the uprising (Cavatorta and 
Haugbølle, 2012), it was only after the revolution that a large Islamic public sphere 
emerged, similar to the one Clark described in Egypt and Jordan. The general call for 
political and social participation that came after 2011 from all sectors of society was 
                                                            
scholar Jihad Bel Haj.In particular see his work on the Salafi movement in Douwar Hisher, a Tunis 
suburb (manuscript, 2016). 
38On the social and political uprising of the 1980s see the previous section. 
39Proved in her work on Islamic activism in Egypt and Jordan, Islamism or Islamic values could be at 
the base of active engagement in civil society. She noticed as well that most of those Islamic social 
entrepreneurs constituted a web of relation-ships, whose aim was more social prestige and economic 
success than a direct political project. 
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translated in practice through Islamic values for many citizens (see chapter 3). The 
mobilization of charitable activities became the first indication of such a 
phenomenon and developed into a sophisticated and complex web of connections 
and resources: something similar to a ‘new Islamic civil society’ (Merone and Soli, 
2013)40.  
This active engagement in the public sphere after the 2011 uprising has taken 
different ‘Islamic’ forms. Some of those who newly engaged in civil society were 
often not politicized and their engagement stopped with the ethical imperative of 
‘helping the others’. For others, like old Nahda militants, social engagement comes 
as a consequence and evolution of their previous engagement. Since the 2012 IXth 
congress, in fact, the traditional Tunisian Islamist party had begun to separate the 
dawa mission of the party (preaching or engaging in social activities) from the 
strictly political activities (ICG, 2012), which implied for militants a choice between 
engaged social work or institutionalized politics41. A third faction of newly engaged 
Islamists was more radical and committed to a new Islamist political project that, as 
its Nahda predecessor in the 1970s, thought of Islamic engagement as a total-itarian 
(shumuli) revolutionary worldview. 
This general Islamic engagement was initially channelled in the first free and 
fair elections of October 2011 towards the only credible Islamist party on the scene: 
Nahda. Since then though the Islamist Tunisian landscape developed into different 
trends. Freedom of speech and post-revolutionary mobilization showed how varied 
Islamic and Islamist political and social engagement could be. Fieldwork for this 
dissertation suggests that the different trends of Islamist activism depended in large 
part on the social and material conditions of the people mobilized. While the middle 
classes relied on the traditional Nahda party or looked for a form of pietistic and 
political Salafism (Wiktorowicz, 2006), a new salafi-jihadi political project emerged 
on the scene, gaining support among the disenfranchised and poorer masses that had 
                                                            
40 See also the chapter 3of this dissertation. 
41 The process of separation of Dawa from politics has been finally completed in the May 2016 Xth 
congress. 
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been disappointed with and left out of the moderation process of the traditional 
Islamist party. 
 
The muhammishun as a social class and the Jamaa as class consciousness 
Until 2011 Nahda was the only Islamist party. After the mobilization of 2010-
13, the Islamist landscape became diversified and a new salafi radical organization 
emerged as its main competitor.  
The differentiation of Islamism in moderates (Muslim Brotherhood) and 
radicals (Salafists) emerged in other countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In Tunisia, 
Islamism had the opportunity to develop into the public arena only after 2011. The 
salafists, as they appeared into the experience of Ansar al-Sharia, are the expression 
of a radical, ‘revolutionary’ social movement that not only monopolized the 
contention dynamics during the period 2011-13, but also played the role of the 
‘modern prince’ for the marginalized social classes that did not recognise themselves 
in the political project Nahda offered. The latter had played this role in the 1980s, 
when it attempted to be a ‘directive’ party allied with popular, Islamized masses that 
confronted the regime. During the post revolutionary period, however, the traditional 
Islamist party renounced its transformative role and ‘dropped’ working class 
neighbourhoods and radical socio-economic demands, leaving the space for a new 
Islamic jamaa to develop.In the following section the dynamics of formation of a 
salafist jamaa (Islamic society), as emerging from the fieldwork conducted in 
Tunisia, are examined42 . Although ideological differences do exist with its MB 
precedessors, particularly when it comes to force Koranic categories on political 
radicalism43, the development of a salafist jamaa described below is not different 
from that of any other Islamist group in its infancy.  
The path of becoming a jamaa begins through both an individual and a 
collective move. The person ‘re-discovering’ religion is usually young and goes 
through a process of ‘objectification’ of being  Muslim: it is a first step towards 
                                                            
42See also chapter 3 of the dissertation. 
43 Radical Salafism is more influenced by Wahhabist literature compared to the MB. 
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consciousness that passes toward Islamic consciousness44.This moment of awareness 
corresponds to one’s ‘rebirth’. He (or she) will see him (her)self as someone who is 
realizing what living is for. He (or she) will see him(her)self as newly aware of the 
duties he(she) has in life towards him(her)self and the rest of the community. 
Becoming and practising ‘being Muslim’ means to have a permanent inner drive 
toward the fulfilment of religious duties. In these circomstances, Islam plays the role 
of activating an individual demanding of engagement. Religion comes therefore to 
the reborn Muslim as something that cannot just be ‘lived’ as repetitive practices the 
worship requires.This personal activation of a positive Islamic drive leads to a 
transition from individual to social behaviour. The personal duty to improve oneself 
becomes, within an Islamist mindset, an obligation or a duty to change society. In 
this case, the personal quest for a ‘true’ Islam, encountering collective duties and 
action (under certain conditions of social mobilization) may become a social and 
political project. Becoming a jamaa produces a separation with the rest of society. In 
a period of Islamic revivalism and contention, the jamaa becomes that religious 
frame providing the sense of this separation.  
This ‘new Muslim’ takes the first step towards Islamic consciousness usually 
through Internet forums, scholarly literature or satellite TV programs. Although he 
(she) speaks to some of his (her) peers, this first step is above all a moment of 
subjectivity. The path that leads from individual to collective consciousness is the 
one that brings the individual to the group, thus triggering the process of creation of 
the Jamaa. Becoming a Jamaa means to identify the self with a larger group, that, in 
its proper religious and social meaning, will become a‘special group’45. This stage of 
development of the salafist group is one of social empowerment. The group takes 
consciousness of itself by defining the ‘borders’ with all the ones outside of it.  
This process of group formation was clear in Tunisia in 2011-13. When 
Islamic revivalism came on the scene, it was obvious that the way it was translated 
from individual to collective, from purely pious to activist, depended on the social 
                                                            
44It is generally understood, especially in a period of Islamic revival in society, that being a good 
person (and a responsible member of the community) is being a good Muslim. 
45Al-Farqa al-Najiain Salafistvocabulary. 
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context it was embedded into. When this process of Islamization came on the scene 
in the social space of urban or sub-urban lower classes areas of the country, the youth 
joined the jamaa because it gave them a special identity (already implicit in their 
social space), providing them with a further feeling of belonging to a group whose 
social and material position was a radical one.To use Marxian language, the social 
group ‘in itself’ was already there, in the social environment of the ‘neighborhood.’ 
Through the process of becoming a jamaa, it realized its own existence and interests; 
it became a social group ‘for itself’46. Most of the youth that joined the Jamaa lived 
in a shared social system of relations and in very similar material and social 
conditions. This social group, otherwise defined as awled al-houma (the youth of the 
zone, a social definer of the group in itself), became a Jamaa in so far as adopted or 
was provided with an ideology (Salafist Islam in its jihadi or revolutionary tendency) 
that transformed social frustration into a socio-political struggle against the rest of 
society, perceived as oppressive. In joining the jamaa the individual understood that 
his (her) social marginality was not something to be ashamed of. On the contrary, 
belonging to a group helped the individual understand his(her) role in society and 
empower him(her) towards social action. The Islamic definition of the social 
‘border’, implicit in the idea of jamaa or (special group), makes sense in so far as it 
already exists in practice; shaping this border is the way the struggle is defined. In 
salafist/religious terms, the first individual stage is that of ‘purification’ (tasfia) and 
education (tarbia) around the idea of the oneneness of God (wahadat allah). The 
second is that of wala wa al baraa (obedience and distinctiveness), through which 
the ‘special group’ emphasises its loyalty to the religion (and the group) and its 
mistrust of all outside of it. 
The development from individually re-born Muslim to a collectively engaged 
one passes through social action.The moment of ‘praxis’ is explicit with the activity 
                                                            
46 The use of Marxian categories in this specific context may be confusing. The Marxist tradition 
would argue that class-consciousness regards the awareness of the relation of explotation into a 
capitalistic mode of production. This is not the case in the specific example of the jamaa. I volontarly 
use this category however, because the process of conscience is originally an Hegelian pattern of 
understanding the historical process; mankind become aware of its subjectivity through a dialectical 
praxis in which the contradiction (or the conflict) is the moment of consciousness. 
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called ‘commanding good and forbidding wrong’. While it may seem odd to consider 
this kind of activity as one of social engagement and militantism, the amr bil maaruf 
and nahi an al munker did historically provide an instrument in Islamic communities 
to be socially and politically engaged. By taking on their shoulders the responsibility 
to reprimand someone that is not fulfilling his(her)religious duties, the group or 
individual that performs it is stressing that Islam requires the responsibility (and 
duty) of each Muslim toward the entire community. This practice furthermore has 
political implications because it gives power to those who perform it to criticize the 
status quo and the ruling class (Cook, 2003; Meijer, 2009).   
In the case of Tunisia, salafist groups sprang up spontaneously and 
independently throughout the country. As connections were built through social 
networks (youtube and FB pages), small local groups came to perceive themselves as 
a jamaa distinct and opposed to those outside of it. The autonomous process of group 
formation to the local level of the neighbourhood gave to the Salafism process the 
material shape of a social group that was evolving into a political project of 
opposition and transformation of society based on social conflict: the religious/salafi 
process of   Jamaa formation masked one of social class.  
The Salafist constituency in Tunisia is composed of a leadership of lower 
petty bourgeoisie within a large urban lumpenproletariat. A common ideology 
(manhaj) and approach characterized the activism and organization of the local 
salafist groups. Ansar al-Sharia was the political religious group able to frame and 
provide a structure to this social mouvance during the post-revolutionary period 
between 2011 and 2013. In participating into the process of contention and becoming 
a social movement, Ansar al-Sharia offered successfully to the Jamaa an organisation 
with a political project. At this political juncture, AST played the role of a modern 
prince. It is the final stage of a process of awareness that from the individual moves 
to the group until the creation of an organization that transforms religious/social 
awareness into a project of political transformation.  
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Tunisianité as a conflicting frame of the nation 
After defining democratization as a historical process of nation building, 
greater consideration for what it means to be a ‘nation’ (and in the specific the 
Tunisian nation) is necessary in order to argue that tunisianité is its ideological 
framing. Following the theorization of nation building as a democratization process 
is the idea of nation as a bargained (political) space of inclusion into the national 
community. Political participation is what defines inclusion. Those who control the 
political system - the ruling elites - control ideology and hold the monopoly of the 
definition of what the nation is. The definition of being Tunisian depends on the 
ethics and ideology of the political elites who control power. When a new political 
order is established as the consequence of a new political bargain, the official 
rhetoric about the nation is adjusted. National rhetoric expresses itself in public 
statements or written documents, as in the case of the constitutional preamble.It 
appears as a process of political legitimization of the ruling classes in front of a 
national audience. The degree of acceptance of this ‘discourse’ depends however on 
the degree of representativeness of the ruling classes (Zemni, 2016).  
The terminology used in Tunisia to define the nation’s status is Tunisianité. 
This term, which means ‘Tunisianess’ in French (being Tunisian as something that 
defines the national personality in addition toother traditional distinctive elements of 
identity such as being Arab or Muslim), has been historically reformulated several 
times, as Hibou’s work (20090) highlights. It has been, and some argues still is 
(Marzouki and Meddeb, 2016), an ideological tool of justification for the 
authoritarian political system established at independence (Camau/Geisser, 2003). 
The fact that this definition of being Tunisian changes with time demonstrates that 
the definition of national identity, and indeed the definition of the Nation itself, is an 
ideological construct the dominant elite builds. Consequently, the argument of being 
‘Tunisian’, or the tunisianess of the nation, can be subjected to discussions once a 
new political deal is struck. One way to examine the changing discourse on 
Tunisianité is the analysis of the constitutional text. For this purpose, a specific 
reading of the national charter of 1988 had already been done (Anderson, 1991; 
Hibou, 2009). The focus in this section is therefore on the preamble of the 2014 
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Constitution, which symbolizes the middle class deal underpinning the new 
republican compromise around the newly established institutions.  
This compromise was the outcome of the struggle between the two main 
political and cultural trends on the scene after 2011: Islamist and 
nationalist/Bourguibist.Two parties, Nahda and Nidaa Tunis, dominated the political 
scene during the constitutional period. From an ideological point of view, Nidaa 
Tunis recalls the modernist heritage of Tunisia inspired by ‘Bourguibism’; it was 
born, in fact, in 2012, as a reaction to the Islamist predominance in the first phase of 
the constitutional transition. Nahda had re-emerged instead as an organized political 
party after 20 years in the doldrums. After significant social tensions and ideological 
polarization, the ‘conflict’ ended with a historical agreement.  
This “historical compromise” takes a political-judicial shape through the 
approval of the new constitution anda new pact of citizenship. The discussion over 
the basic issues and ‘shared values’ of the nation was stated in the preamble of the 
Constitution after debated and controversial discussions (Bendana, 2015, p. 8/174). 
Once approved, it came to represent the agreed ideology of the nation, underpinned 
by the new definition of being Tunisian (Tunisianité). The following paragraph well 
represents the political compromise described above. 
Expressing our people’s commitment to the teachings of Islam and its open and 
moderate objectives, to sublime human values and the principles of universal human 
rights, inspired by our civilizational heritage accumulated over successive epochs of 
our history, and from our enlightened reformist movements that are based on the 
foundations of our Arab-Islamic identity and on the achievements ofhuman 
civilization, and adhering to the national gains achieved by our people.47 
 
The preamble points out how the nation is rooted in the reformist movement, 
which is that trend in contemporary Tunisian history to build and modernize the 
nation-state. The link between being Tunisian and “reformism” is one of the most 
                                                            
47(Tunisian Constitution, translated in English by Yasmin foundation, pdf available at: 
http://www.jasminefoundation.org/doc/unofficial_english_translation_of_tunisian_constitution_final_
ed.pdf 
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critically discussed in the academic debate on Tunisianité. This debate was 
particularly vibrant in francophone political science circles, both in France and 
among the Tunisian elite. In a 2003 book, Camau and Geisser argued that Tunisianité 
is the ideological discourse of a specific Tunisian authoritarian “syndrome” the 
ruling elite perpetuates. Béatrice Hibou, in an influential 2006 book, and building on 
the work of Camau and Geisser, emphasised that there was a degree of acceptance of 
authoritarianism on the part of many ordinary Tunisians, especially the middle 
classes. In 2014, she came back again to this idea, insisting on Tunisianité as a key 
ideological tool to understand the ruling class justification of their power system 
(Hibou, 2014).  
While reformism is traditionally a heritage Bourguibists advocate, during the 
two years of constitutional discussions, Islamists developed their own particular 
‘reformism/tunisianité’ narrative. On this specific point, the harshness of the 
discussion in the constituent assembly proved how the theoretical definition of 
Tunisianess was a critical political one. The discourse reflected the identitarian 
underpinning of a deeper political and social struggle, where the Tunisian reformism 
had been used as a repressive tool for justifying crushing Islamism (or any altenative 
political and cultural expression). Several topical moments characterized the 
constitutional debate; the most critical one was the struggle over Article 1, in which 
the very definition of being Tunisian was formulated, and its specific relation to 
Islam set out (Feuer, 2012: p. 5). The agreement on Article 1 wasgoing to be the 
premise for the ideological formulation of Tunisianité in the preamble48.According to 
                                                            
48This article has been key since the first Bourguibian constitution. It declares: “Tunisia is a free, 
independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic, and its system is republican”. 
The definition of Islam as the religion of the state was considered from all analysts as the perfect 
juridical ‘cunningness’ Bourguiba found to secularize the state without taking Islam completely out 
(MH Chérif, 1994; L.Hajj, 2011; M.Kerrou, 1998). Jurists, however, in answering to particular issues 
raised by the application of law in sectors of not clear definition tended to interpret this article 
differently, making the reference to Islamic laws a constitutional constrain. For this reason, the most 
secular groups tried to obtain its revision in the new constitutional draft. Islamists, on their side, 
thought to modify it in the opposite sense, highlighting more explicity the reference to Islam. Thus, 
this article became the major point of struggle. The mediation was found in deciding tokeep it as it 
already was; in this sense this compromise was the key to open up the door to a shared vision of the 
‘nation’ that was the premise for drafting the preamble itself. 
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the text, its origins are to be found in the cultural heritage (civilisationnel) of the 
nation. This heritage is a shared one, “the teaching of Islam and the Arab-Islamic 
identity of the nation” being part of it. These principles become part of the new 
concept of reformism, which found its historical roots in the “enlightened reformist 
movement”.   
After the approval of the constitution and the end of the political struggle with 
a mutually satisfactory compromise, both the Islamists of Nahda and the 
Bourguibians of Nida Tunis claimed this reformism as part of their own tradition. As 
a consequence of the constitutional ethos of compromise, however, both sides made 
the effort to get closer to the perspective of the opposite side. BejiCaiedEssebsi, the 
leader of Nidaa Tunis, claimed its direct connection to the history and ideology of 
what he calls Bourguibism (Wolf, 2014), but specified in several public statements 
that this heritage was never meant to be against Islam49. The intellectual elites of the 
Islamist movement, for its part, re-elaborated the myth of reformism through Islamist 
lenses, arguing that the first historical attempt of modernization in Tunisia was in 
fact Islamic. In this respect, the Islamic genealogy of the historical reformist 
movement was now linking together Abdelaziz Thaalbi (the founder of the 
nationalist movement before Bourguiba) to Mohammed Tahar Ben Achour (the 
leader of the zeitunian religious reformist movement) all the way toNahda itself. 
New Islamic intellectuals, such as Sami Brahami and Noureddine al-Khadmi, 
charismatic leaders such as Abdelfetteh Mourou and Ghannouchi himself, triggered a 
debate within the Islamist trend about this reformist heritage50. The Islamic reformist 
heritage would be, according to this reading, the Zeytunian reformist movement of 
the beginning of the 20th century; its father and symbolic figure, Mohammed Tahar 
Ben Achour. This intellectual/ religious trend (which is part of the more general 
reformist movement at the beginning of the 20th century) revived in Tunisia an old 
medieval theological discipline, the Maqasid, which had never been developed after 
                                                            
49 For instance, continuous religious references characterised his 2014 presidential campaign, re-
adapting an old Bourguibian strategy of using religion as a tool to legitimize his power vis à vis the 
masses. 
50In part linking it to the intellectual debate within the movement during the 1980s followed by the 
split of the so-called progressive Islamic trend (Jorchi, 2015). 
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the Andalusian savant al Shatibi had proposed it in the 14th century.The claim of this 
prestigious lineage, rooted in the reformist movement, and linked to charismatic 
figures in the national movement, gave Nahda a reformist legitimization without be 
forced  to drop its main ideological tenet about the Arab and Islamic heritage of the 
country. The reference to Ben Achour (and the entire reformist Zeytouna tradition) 
reconciles the Tunisian Islamist project with the reformist policies formely identified 
with Bourguibism and attunes it to the modernist project based on Tunisianité, giving 
to it an Islamic connotation.  
Thus, the new ideological definition on the nation (tunisianité) is in tune with 
the perceptions of the social constituencies the two major political blocks in power 
represent. In this sense, tunisianité has partially expanded from its original 
constituency, which was mainly ‘modernist’ and anti-Islamist. This enlargement 
constitutes a step forward towards a shared national ideology of being Tunisian. 
 
Discussing Methodology 
This research is the outcome of three years of fieldwork from 2011 to 2014. In 
this section, I will first explain the methodological approach that guided it, 
developing the notion of positionality vis à vis the object of research. In the second 
part, I will illustrate how I dealt with the two periods of research: fieldwork and 
analysis of the data. The first period is divided in three phases during which I 
developed the choices related to my fieldwork according to the evolution of a volatile 
political situation that characterises processes of regime change. The second period 
was the time of critical scrutiny and theoretical development over the empirical 
material.  
 
Qualitative vs quantitative  
The choice of methodology in a research project is a function of the author’s 
epistemological approach. An introductory section on methodology should therefore 
justify the methodological choices and show awareness of the existing debates. Since 
the beginning of the developement of social sciences as a separate scientific field at 
the end of the 19th century, the debate centered on which approach would be better 
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suited for the understanding of reality, each implying a different epistemological 
frame. The discussion was first raised by Dilthey (1977) who, reacting to the 
positivist attempt at framing social sciences along the methodological lines of the 
hard ones (Compte and Durkheim), proposed an interpretativistic alternative in 
which, he argued, objectivity was an impossible target for disciplines dealing with 
human beings. As a consequence of this discussion, the academic debate on 
methodology split in two camps: those who supported a quantitative approach, 
considered ‘objective’ and built on the neutrality of the observer from the 
phenomenon observed, and those, following Dilthey methodology, applying a 
qualitative one (Benton, 2014). While these two positions are still visible today, the 
radical positions of those supporting one option over the other have been replaced by 
pragmatism (Tashakkori&Teddle, 2003), which is a compromise between the two. 
Max Weber was the first one to look for a conciliatory position. Weber argued that if 
it is not possible to demonstrate (even with qualitative methods) the objectivity of 
human behaviour outside the subjectivity of the inquirer, this should not be a 
justification for a priori excluding the possibility of truth. Notwhitstanding the 
ambiguity of the epistemological nature of the scientific truth, the researcher should 
try to reach a position as close as possible to a neutral one51. Later on in the 20th 
century, the matter was transferred from an issue of reciprocal de-legitimazation 
between the two sides to one of pragmatism, where the search for the more suitable 
instruments of investigation was at stake. The epistemological issue became 
secondary and its direct link with the methodological approach was downplayed 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). For Roberts (2002) the point is the reliability of each 
method for the proper research project.The perspective should be that the choice of 
the method to apply for the research would depend on the specific questions the 
research is asking.While the positivist approach believes that the real world is out 
there, independently from our subjectivity (observation and technical tools of 
investigation can produce knowledge of it), the interpretativistic approach, drawing 
from Kantian criticism, believes that what we can know is only the phenomena; i.e. 
                                                            
51The ideal types were the Weberian solution (Weber, 1978). 
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the appearence of the real world (Eisener, 1993; Philips, 1993). The real world, in 
itself, cannot be known. According to Roberts (2002: 13) however, employing 
qualitative methods does not automatically imply the renunciation to objective 
knowledge. Objectivity can be obtained with qualitative methods through the 
application of a procedural type of objectivity, making the research design explicit 
and allowing full inspection of the choice of method. In this case, objectivity is the 
aim to be reached by the research process through a critical subjective approach; this 
particular subjectivity is defined by Kvale as ‘intersubjectivity’ which is that space of 
‘truth’ achieved through the interview. According to this conception, reality does not 
exist outside our own interaction with it.Subjective is, according to this approach, a 
‘dialogical’ conception of truth and the interview a negotiated space of meaning 
between the interviewer and the interviewed (Kvale, 2006). 
This research employs a qualitative methodological approach. Qualitative 
research is preferred to the quantitative in most researches on the MENA region for 
several reasons (Pellicer et al., 2015). The first is the difficulty quantitative research 
finds in countries whose regimes are mostly authoritarian. In these contexts, the data 
are scarce or not credible (Clark, J., 2006).The second is the scarcity of reliable 
surveys and opinion polls. Even where such instruments developed over the last few 
years, serious problems arise in terms of the credibility of such data coming from a 
population that is often extremely skeptical and suspicions of state institutions. 
Tunisia after the Arab uprisings is an exception in many respects and it is improving 
both in official data collection and reliability. However, at the time of my research 
and specifically on the topic examined, it was not the case yet. First, my research was 
conducted in a turbulent and volatile period of regime change when available data 
were scarce and the statistical apparatus of the old regime was under severe criticism 
(Hibou and Meddeb, 2011). Second, the core topic of the research - the study of the 
salafi-jihadi movement - made it impossible to have any data or even previous 
references in the scholarly literature. The issue was new, and because of its 
‘threatening’ and ‘ideological’ nature, it was even more difficult to have any neutral 
interpretation and explanation of it from within the country.  
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The task of this research was to understand the social milieu this phenomenon 
was imbricated in and the interpretation Salafist players had of themselves as a 
transformative political/social/religious actor. The interpretative nature of my task 
led me to the only methodological choice available, namely participant observation 
and an analytical interpretation of social actors’ narratives. Going beyond the 
traditional struggle between quantitative versus qualitative approaches, the academic 
debate on methodology in political science and specifically in Middle East area 
studies assumes by this time that the choice of methodology depends on the purpose 
of the research. Michael Quinn Patton (2002: 264) explains how ‘the classic 
qualitative-quantitative debate has been largely resolved with the recognition that a 
variety of methodological approaches are needed and credible, and that the challenge 
is approprietly matching methods to questions rather than adhering to some narrow 
methodological orthodoxy.’ 
Tunisia was a difficult country to study before the revolution. Moreover, the 
societal space this research investigated is still largely understudied. In this sense, 
this research is a mapping study of an empty space of research that only observant 
participation and open-ended interviews could help filling. 
 
Interviews, positionality and ethics 
Interviews are a key component of this research for a number of reasons, the 
most important of which is the scarcity of alternative sources. When the field 
investigated is a poorly studied one, interviews can reveal insights that open sources 
and other second hand resources do not provide. In this case, the direct 
communication with the actors is the only instrument of knowledge available. In 
Tunisia, where political Islam in general has been an off-limit topic for decades, no 
much literature on MB Islamists existed and none at all when it came to Salafists. 
Interviewing in itself is however not sufficient and can be a problematic tool 
if not accompanied by a serious critical approach. Interviewing, both elite and non-
elite social actors, has in fact shortcomings. The most important obstacles to the 
collection of data and the comprehension of the reality during the fieldwork into a 
qualitative type of methodology is the crossing of what Erving Goffman refers to as 
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‘front stage’ and ‘back stage’ (1990). Each interviewee in fact tends to present the 
reality according to the position in which he/she sees the researcher. In most of the 
cases, the former will judge the researcher as an outsider, and the telling of the story 
will be inevitably selected and presented in a way that makes it impossible to test. 
The interviewer and the interviewee are separated by an ‘invisible line’, which can 
be crossed only with a long and deep observant participation. As Brian Moeran 
(2007: 14) puts it, ‘once you have crossed the invisible line separating front stage 
from back stage, things are never again the same as they were before. You, too, like 
your informant, can play both games according to context and social role. Your 
informants realise that you have learned the rules and know the difference between 
front and back stage games; as a result, they stop pretending when in your presence 
and allow themselves to be seen as they are. The knowledge of the context and the 
familiarity with social implicit truths make the contact with the informant and the 
dialogue on the reality he lives in deeper and, in a certain sense, more ‘true’.This 
kind of observant participation requires two specific conditions in order to be 
achieved. The first is the time spent in the field and the second is the reseracher’s 
own positionality. 
The ethnographic way of staying in the field has few formal rules and 
depends in large part on the experience and personal attitude (personality) of the 
researcher. This method, originally applied in antrophology, has since been used and 
ackowledged by the rest of the social sciences (Swartz, Turner, Tuden, 1979). The 
advantage of the method becomes clear when the researcher is exploring a new 
reality (object of research), about which neither previous literature exists or formal 
recorded material is available. The choice of this method in my case is indeed the 
consequence of the type and scope of the research and the type of knowledge the 
research aims to achieve. It appeared evident to me that this method was going to be 
the only real credible one for my own case study. The literature on the ethnographic 
methodological approach is not clear-cut about the sufficient time for a fieldwork of 
this type to be credible. The schedule time varies from a minimum of six month to 
one year. My particular situation as an insider/outsider allowed me a much longer 
stay, as I will later describe.  
55 
 
The second question that arises is the positionality of the reseracher vis-à-vis 
his/her object of analysis. If there are doubts on the validity of the data gathered 
through the interviewing method, the same can be said of the ethnographic method of 
observant participation. As a human being studying other human beings, the issue of 
the truth is much more complex than for any kind of natural scientist studying natural 
objects. The object of the research is human beings, which are not static and 
unchangeable. The interaction between the researcher and his object of study triggers 
a dynamic in which, both the studier and the studied change in the process (Mullings, 
1999), probably never reaching an ‘objective’ and ‘definitive’ truth. Interviewing or 
meeting people implies the participation of the researcher. By positionality, I mean 
therefore that variety of roles and positions in the research site each researcher finds 
him/herself in (Kingston, 2017). The positionality of the researcher does create 
several types of reactions (repulsion, sympathy, expectations, censures, information 
not shared) and can be depending in different degree to the social position the 
research occupies himself/herself, especially when the society studied is not the one 
the researcher belongs to. 
 Does the researcher born in the society he is studying have greater legitimate 
tools to understand it because he is perceived as an ‘insider’ or, instead, as argued by 
Herod, this idea is just a myth, and whatever origin the researcher has, he is always 
an outsider vis à vis the object studied? The “research process is a social one in 
which both interviewer and interviewee participate in knowledge creation and, 
consequently, although the ‘outsider’ and the ‘insider’ may shape this process in 
different ways, it make little sense to assume that one version of this knowledge is 
necesserely truer in some absolute and objective sense” (Herold 1999,p. 314). 
The position I was in with respect to the object of research was quite atypical 
and deserves to be further detailed. I lived in Tunisia for 12 years (from 2003 to 
2015) and merged deeply in society, having married a Tunisian woman and being 
embedded in a complex set of local social relations. In this respect, I considered 
myself an ‘insider’. While I developed a sense of understanding of the world I was in 
like an insider, I kept, at the same time, an outsider’s perspective because my 
background and basic cultural references are in Italy, the country where I grew up. I 
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brought my ‘external world’ into the new one that had become my own universe: 
thus I felt as much an ‘insider’ as an ‘outsider’.I agree to some extent with Herold’s 
statement that it is not necesserely your position as an insider that gives the 
researcher the ‘monopoly’ of the understanding of that society. As such, the process 
of research is always that of an exchange between yourself and the other. We could 
say that both being part of that society and external to it, vis-à-vis the object of the 
research, we are all the time in a dialectical position.More than that, I am convinced 
that being too much of an insider can bring problems and inconveniencies when it 
comes to research work. In the case of my study, for example, a major inconvenience 
of being ‘a total insider’ was the passionate involvement in a dramatic process of 
societal transformation, which can be a negative factor for understanding ongoing 
events. Moreover, being part of the society does never prevent the researcher from 
being an insider as well as an outsider. Societies are diverse and the researcher can 
only belong to a certain social group or live in a physical certain space. The level of 
education, life experience and/or the type of belief (religious or cultural or 
communitarian) are factors of differentiation that influence the way the allegedely 
internal observer may be perceived (as external to sectors of what is, nominally, his 
own society). This is particularly dramatic in post-colonial societies, in which the 
differences between the educated and uneducated, urban middle classes and lower 
classes (urban or rural) is usually significant. These differences are marked in 
Tunisia very dramatically by the use of the language. French may be a sufficient or 
sometimes more suitable mean of communication with some categories of bourgeois 
or middle class people while Arabic is preferable with Islamists and even 
compulsory with most Salafists (or more broadly with popular strata).  
 I advocate for my self the position of insider/outsider because of the 
particular condition I found myself in before and during the fieldwork. I could take 
advantage of my two-fold position: as an insider, I felt the force of the transformation 
process; as an outsider, I had enough distance to understand the social and political 
implications of the Islamist/Salafist movement without being involved into the 
existential struggle that its rise implied among genuine insiders. Because of the rise 
of Salafism in particular, the country has lived a dramatic split. In this kind of 
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situation it is difficult to analyse such a phenomenon while you are a Muslim and a 
citizen yourself (your own personal destiny is at stake). I make my arguments 
without introducing moral judgments while penetrating the social actor mind-set, 
applying analytical categories through a methodological interpretative approach 
(M.Weber, 1978)52.  
Not only had my double nature of insider/outsider influenced fieldwork, but 
the particular social context I was living in as well. My Tunisian family comes from 
an environment in which the myth of Tunisia as a modern, European/type country, 
happily moving towards European standards of modernity, was only an irony of the 
regime’s propaganda. They come from a small town in the Bizerte governorate 
where, very typycally, the young generation of the 1990s and 2000s worked for 
foreign offshore companies or, mostly, tried to emigrate to Europe.53 In this milieu, 
the social structure is divided between a narrow stratum of petty bourgeoisie (civil 
servants, schoolteachers, lawyers or doctors) and the rest of the population. The latter 
is composed by a large young population divided between girls, looking mostly for 
marriage as the more practical way for social and material emancipation, and men 
(supposed to provide this emancipation for their family and their future bride), 
frustrated with poor working conditions or unemployment.  
The sensibility I developed toward this social environment was coupled with 
the personal material situation I found myself in during my life in Tunisia. This 
particular situation made me feel sympathetic to the lower income strata of the 
population, as I could understand proprely the feeling of material and psychological 
despair that many young people felt toward their country and the 
political/hierarchical structure of that society. The difference between me and the 
people I ended up studying was, however, not only the resources that I still had 
because of my status as Italian, but my cultural background. This space between the 
material critical situation a person is in a given society and its coherent intellectual 
frame of understanding it is provided by what we can call ‘cultural references’. 
When I saw many of the young people of this social stratum making sense of their 
                                                            
52For a further insight on Weber interpretative method see : F. Ringer (2002) and I.B. Turner (2002). 
53The late generation was going to France the new one in Italy. 
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social position through the lens of Islam, I was able to distinguish between the 
background of social anxiety and political frustration and the culturalist/religious 
repertoire in which it was framed. Although I am not a Muslim, I developed a degree 
of ‘sympathy’ for the frustration of this sector of the population, which allowed me 
to grasp the social and political significance behind the rise of the radical Salafist 
movement. 
It should be added, that my experience of ‘staying in society’ was to be tested 
in the different situations during the fieldwork. Due to the focus of my reserarch, it 
was obviousely not the same to interview a journalist, an official cadre of a political 
party or an informal social actor (a Nahda, a secular, or a salafi-jihadi activist). While 
for the first category of people I was more tipycally confronted with the type of 
problems already illustrated in the section on the elite interview method; for people 
such as salafi youth, the most important factor of ‘expertise’ was the ‘management of 
the social and cultural situation’ and the empathy established with the informants 
(Ramaioli, 2017). 
This kind of particular fieldwork and my positionality toward it raised several 
ethical issues as well. Observant participation implies a high level of penetration, if 
not identification, with the group of people object of study. This particular position 
may become difficult to sustain on the long term. ‘Hanguing around' with the 
jihadists of the neighbourhood is not neutral. First, to have a degree of participation 
you should define exactely your role and identity. Each position that you take may 
have consequences on others. The first time I was introduced to the group of Ansar 
al-Sharia of Jamaa al-nour in Douaw Hisher, for example, I risked putting myself 
and my young informant in danger. While my facilitator declared that I was a 
Muslim, allowing young Salafists to become more open towards me, I had to make 
them aware instead that it was a misunderstanding and that my position was not of a 
new convert. For several weeks after this ‘incident’, I was told to watch out and the 
family of the person who helped me, allegedely was called in for clarifications. 
Another example  had to do with my main Salafist interlocutor in the neighbourhood. 
When the situation in 2013 precipiteted toward a more securitarian/repressive 
environment, Salafistswere observed much more closely and police informants came 
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back in the neighborhoods. This had as a conseguence that my Salafist friend, 
because of its spending time with me, was suspected to have a link with ‘foreigneirs’, 
bringing his case to possible judiciary consequences. As the prove that we were 
observed, I was called in the same period by  the responsible of the anti-terrorism 
special forces to come to relate about my presence in the neighbourhood. 
When staying for longtime in the field, sharing part of the experience with the 
same people you are supposed to study, at a certain point choices have to be made as 
to how much and how far is your participation going to. What is the information you 
are collecting all about? How much are they really useful for your purpose? In this 
sense, your role can have an impact on people’s life and your staying in the field can 
have implications much behind the purpose of the research. To avoid a confusion of 
roles, I tried therefore to apply a ‘double time’ approach. In the first stage, I put 
myself in the position of the neophyte joining a new group and showing interest and 
participating in all he is hearing and learning. In the second stage, I tried to be like 
the decanted activist that comes out from its first enthusiastic participation in the 
group and begins questioning all he/she has learned. Being an insider though keeping 
an outsider standpoint is the position I tried to keep in my fieldwork. I acknowledge 
however that a perfect situation of neutrality is impossible and that the human 
relations I had with the people I met during the long fieldwork changed me. The 
person that I am today is not the same that I was when I first started this research. 
 
The practice of the research  
The research is divided in two stages: the fieldwork proper (the fieldwork 
itself is divided in three sub-periods) and the analytical scrutiny. The first period is 
one of intense participation in the object of study, while the second is the moment of 
distance and analytical reflection of the empirical findings.  
 
First stage: three phases of fieldwork 
When the uprising broke out, I was immediately ‘in the field’. While my 
current PhD project had not been even thought about, I tried my best to participate in 
those historical moments. I was in Tunis, the capital city, and had to wait until the 
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last few days (11-14 January) before the fall of Ben Ali to be able to ‘see’ and 
‘participate’ in the revolution. What impressed me the most about the last days of 
upheaval in the capital city was not the famous 14 January demonstration in front of 
the Interior Ministry, but the sudden and violent attacks of youngsters against police 
stations and other symbols of private and public property (municipality buildings, 
banks, post offices, supermarkets).  The night of the 13th January, (when Ben Ali 
pronounced a conciliatory speech broadsted on TV) I crossed several areas of the city 
by car and noticed that the ‘revolutionary front’ was split in two. The bourgeois 
neighbourhood of Nasser, for example, was full of cars and people on the street 
chanting about the new hope of change while the working-class areas of the rest of 
the Ariana district was full of disappointed youngsters in the streets with sticks and 
stones in their hands ready to flood the main avenue of the capital (Avenue 
Bourguiba) the following day. During the days and months before the constitutional 
elections of October 2011, I participated in all the major demonstrations and political 
events in Tunis. I also visited several times the region of Sidi Bouzid, looking for the 
‘revolutionary cradle’ and its political and social main actors. While I was not 
officially engaged in PhD research, I met during this time many of the leading 
revolutionary figures. In Sidi Bouzid, I was ‘guided’ by a historical left wing activist 
engaged in organizing a network of associations, especially in the city of Menzel 
Bouzaiaene. I also met at this time a group of young people from Hay Ennour, the 
marginalized area of Sidi Bouzid where the famous Bouazizi came from. In Tunis, I 
met and discussed with most of the bloggers, considered at that time as the heroes of 
the revolt54. In the spring of 2011, I met Francesco Cavatorta, the person who hired 
me to participate in a research programme on Political Islam funded by the Gerda 
Henkel Foundation.  
The second part of the fieldwork is the period during which I 
‘professionalized’ my approach to fieldwork research and refined my theoretical 
interests. During this phase, I narrowed down my approach and applied the method 
of writing a journal article (or chapter) each time I felt one specific topic was taking 
                                                            
54 Among the most famous ones: Kalloutcha, Aziz Amamy, Ayary, Sofiène Chourabi, Lina ben 
Mehenni. 
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shape while doing fieldwork. The articles published in this period are included in the 
body of the dissertation and have to be considered as the elaboration of specific 
topics examined during fieldwork. Writing while doing research gave to my findings 
a form of open laboratory in which the main arguments come back repeatedly to be 
each time specified, or re-analysed in a more reflective perspective. While for 
example in the articles of the first period I was more concerned about the 
involvement of Islamist movements in the process of democracy-building, at the end 
of my research work I discussed the broader articulations of the different Islamist 
movements - Nahda party and Ansar al-Sharia - within the frame of the constitutional 
compromise. In the period between late 2011 until mid- 2013 I observed the growing 
jihadi movement and got close to some of the leaders of the new salafi jihadi strand 
of Ansar al-Sharia.  
The growing attention I gave to this phenomenon was the consequence of its 
success. While the political institutional process of the post-uprising period became 
focused on the constitutional debates and monopolised by political parties with an 
older generation of politicians at the helm, the working-class neighbourhoods of 
almost all middle and large urban areas of the country were organizing an alternative 
project. This movement was a consequence of the ‘Islamization’ of the social space. 
Following this phenomenon was the most natural consequence of my observant 
participation approach. During this phase, I also elaborated my PhD proposal, an 
ethnographic study of a group of young people who socialised during the revolution 
and had gone on to found a local section of Ansar al-sharia. I met for this purpose 
young jihadis (simple activists or leaders) and had more systematic discussions with 
them. I already had some experience with youth becoming jihadis in the region of 
Bizerte (Menzel Bourguiba and al-Aliya), but during this phase of systematic work I 
focused rather on Tunis metropolitan area. I visited El Omrane el Aliya, Hay el 
Khadra and Douar Hisher. The latter, in particular, became the area on which I 
focused increasingly because I met a young AST leader who became my conduit into 
the world of the young Ansar al-Sharia jamaa. This research project failed however 
because of the beginning of the violent escalation between the jihadi group and the 
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state until the outlawing of the group in 2013.  The security situation did not permit 
the continuation of the project.  
Due to security concerns and the development of political events on the 
national stage, with the highest level of polarization in society and the final deal 
between moderate Islamists and secular-nationalists, it became more useful for me to 
put the salafi-jihadi phenomenon into its context. This context was the normalization 
of political and social contention on one side and the accomplishment of the 
constitutional phase, on the other. The agreement on the constitutional draft came 
because of a historical compromise between political enemies. The rethoric and 
language of this agreement was clearly expressed in the preamble of the constitution 
that emphasised the signification of the nation, called otherwise tunisianité 
(tunisianess). This national ethos has culturalist-ideological underpinning, but it also 
hid a political struggle between two solid social groups, as I demonstrate in the 
research. With this idea in mind, I spent the last period of fieldwork (2013-14) 
travelling around the Southern regions of the country. I followed the electoral 
parliamentary campaign in Sfax in 2014 and witnessed the tension between two 
different middle classes and Nahda’s attempt to provide a counter-hegemonic 
strategy against the return of old nationalistic forces (chapter 4). I also spent some 
time in the regions further south (Medenine and Douz gouvernatorates) where I 
interviewed a number of political entrepreneurs, mainly from Nahda and CPR, to 
verify how much of a specific pan-arabist/Islamist feeling was shared by the 
historical heritage of the Youssefist movement. 
 
Second stage: Critical scrutiny and theoretical development  
In the final stage of the research, after the long period of field research, I 
spent one year to reflect on the material I had gathered and the theoretical intuitions I 
had along the process of data collection. While in the more methodologically sound 
approaches, it is suggested that fieldwork should be researching data confirming the 
hypothesis generated through theoretical elaborations (Flick, 2009), I was at the 
beginning more influenced by the field experience than any previous theoretical 
framing. The practical and the theoretical interrogated each other. For that, my 
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procedure is best defined as an open and evolving laboratory of thought. 
Nevertheless, I had to leave the country and cut any connection to it for a while in 
order to better make sense of all my data and experience. I consecrated this period of 
research entirely to the intellectual development of the intuitions I had on the ground 
during the previous years. The final approval of the constitutional in 2014/15 gave to 
the period I studied an ‘official’closure.   
 
Plan of the research and case study  
This research is a case study whose generalizations wish to contribute to the 
field of the Arab politics and Islamist studies. The usefulness of case studies as part 
of the qualitative methodology has been largely debated in the literature: in 
particular, the case-study approach has been critized because allegedely does not lead 
to any discovery that may provide useful information for the same class of 
phenomena under examination (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994). “General, 
theoretical knowledge is considered more valuable than concrete, practical one” (B. 
Flyvberg, 2006: p.66). The critics stress the idea that it is not possible to generalize 
based on a single case, thus not contributing to scientific advancement. While the 
shortcoming of the choice of a single case may be a sound argument, I argue 
however that the advantage of this approach is bigger than its defaults. The 
examination and in depth analysis of a single case can be much better suitable to 
produce knowledge, becouse closer to the reality. While the risk of staying on a level 
of not generalizable ‘narrative’ do exist, the coherence of the choice of the case and a 
correct relation to a general debate can overcome this risk. 
Another important critic addressed to the case study methodology is the 
reseacher’s biasis. It is argued that case study suffers from the problem of bias as the 
researcher may be involved personally in the case under examination and the 
evidence gathered as a consequence not objective. While there is little doubt that the 
social sciences in general suffer from the problem of bias, as I already explained in 
the previous section, it may not be true that the case study is particularly predisposed 
for it. The element of arbitrary subjectivism will be significant in the choice of 
categories and for a quantitative and structural investigation as well (Flyberg, 2006: 
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ibidem, p. 83). This type of research  remains, to the author’s point of view, very 
relevant not simply because it can be highly informative, but also because there are 
criteria of scientific rigour that can be applied to ensure that the examination respects 
the standards the discipline sets itself. 
All of what has been discussed previously in this introduction chapter is 
contingent on making an informed selection about the case study itself. Nevertheless, 
what are the reasons to choose Tunisia for this project? Tunisia between 2011 and 
2014 provided a very interesting case of regime change and post-revolutionary 
mobilization. The fact that the contention politics was translated into Islamic 
activism provided a further interest for a case study on Islamist polity.  
The dissertation is a collect of journal articles published between 2012 and 
2016. It is divided in 4 chapters (besides introduction and conclusion) that 
correspond to 4 different stages as to 4 different thematics. In the second chapter, I 
argue that the present situation of bipolarization and political development of the 
Tunsia after the 2011 Ben Ali topple down is the result of an historical struggle for 
the inclusion into the national politics. This conflict is framed ideologically, between 
nationalists and Islamists, and reflect a class struggle between social groups that 
strive for political and social inclusion. In the third chapter, I explain the emergence 
of an Islamic constituency and the research deals with the evolution of Nahda and its 
ideological underpinning. In the forth chapter, I deal with the radical Salafist 
movement of Ansar al-Sharia: the Salafist project emerges as a social movement that 
represent the laissés pour compte of the post revolutionary politics. The chapter 5 
correspond to the last period of the transition. After Nahda accepted the 
constitutional compromise with its nationalist rival, he must deal with the persistence 
of what the Islamist camp calls the ‘deep state’. The persistence of strong levearage 
of the old nationalist bloc on the apparatuses of the state posit an issue of survival for 
Islamists. In addition, the critical experience of government is under scrutiny.  In this 
chapter, by following the Nahda campaign for legislative elections of 2014 in Sfax, 
the thesis highlightens the attempt of Nahda of building a counter-hegemonic 
strategy throught the alliance with the local Islamic social constituency and part of 
the economic sector. 
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This research fills a gap in literature on Islamism and salafism in Tunisia. 
Most of the publications on Islamism in Tunisia refers to the 1980s politic 55 . 
Concerning Salafism, I provide a completely novel study. By providing a detailed 
case of a salafi-jihadi movement this research has an important add value in that it 
gives a unique case of close observation of the birth and development of a salafi-
jihadi movement. The way the research approaches this study provides an example of 
how an Islamic jamaa develops, and how its emergence encroaches with social and 
political contention. The period of post-revolutionnary poitics in Tunisia also 
provides a case usefull as an example for the larger regime change debate. 
 
Data   
 
Geographical division 
 
a. Governatorates 
 
Governorate N. Interviews 
Ariana 11 
DouarHisher (Mannouba) 25 
Ben Guardene 7 
Bizerte 5 
Douz 6 
Hamma (Gabes) 4 
Kasserine 6 
Medenine/Jerba 12 
Sfax 14 
SidiBouzid 11 
                                                            
55I like to highliten however, the next publication of Rory McCarthy study on the Nahda leadership in 
Soussa. The author spent one year, interviewed many of the local leaders, and through their 
witnessing, reviewed all the history of the movement. 
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Tunis/Ben Arous 72 
Tot. 173 
 
 
b. Macro-regions 
Macro areas Interviews 
South (Sfax-Medenine-Gabes-Douz) 43 
Center (Kasserine-SidiBouzid) 17 
North (Tunis-Ben Arous-Mannouba-
Bizerte) 
113 
Tot 173 
 
 
Disaggregate for categories 
 
a. Islamist/salafistdivision  
Affiliation Number 
Nahda (militant and cadres) 35 
Salafists (militants and cadres) 15 
Jihadis (militants and cadres) 30 
Islamic associations 20 
Tot. 100 
 
 
b. Islamists’ influence area cadres and militants 
Affiliation Number 
CPR 5 
WAFA 5 
Leagues 1 
HT 5 
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Tot 16 
 
c. Non Islamists militants and cadre 
Affiliation Number 
Al-Jumhuri (ex PDP) 4 
Ex RCD/Nidaa Tunis 6 
Ettakattol 1 
Watad 6 
Comunist Party 3 
Modernists/Qotb 5 
Tot 25 
 
 
d. Intellectuals (journalists and experts) 
Intellectuals (journalists/experts) Number 
Islamists 9 
Non-Islamists 5 
Tot 14 
 
 
Others 
Others Numbers 
Security experts and personnel 5 
Young unemployed 7 
Rappers 6 
Tot 18 
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Chapter 2 Nationalism and Islamism behind the Tunisian liberal compromise 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I employ historical sociology to account for the Tunisian 
institutional compromise of 2014, sealed with the approval of the Constitution. I 
argue that the relative success and the democratic outcome of the political 
transformation following the fall down of the Ben Ali’s regime must be explained 
within the frame of a historical struggle between social groups.  The two main 
contenders - nationalists and Islamists - represent two social middle classes that 
emerged during the process of nation building. Both classes enter into the political 
arena to impose their ideological view on the polity of the nation. This process of 
building a political community is made through a social struggle that produces 
ideological representation. In contemporary times, the national movement was the 
first moment during which a consensual ideology was produced and framed the 
political battle for independence. It was however a large frame within which different 
trends co-existed. The post-independence state saw  one specific trend emerge from 
within the nationalist ideology and impose its hegemony: Bourguibism (from the 
name of the leader of the nationalist movement). This hegemony was the 
consequence of the Bourguiba’s political victory over the other strong leader of the 
national movement, Salah Ben Youssef. The latter’s ideology, based on pan-Arabism 
and Islamism, opposed to Bourguiba an alternative vision of the national project. 
These two different ideological strands created a split within the nationalist camp 
that reflected different social and geographical cleavages. In addition to the 
traditional commercial petty bourgeoisie of the south of the country, the Youssefist 
camp gathered behind it the nationalist Zeitounian clerics and the southern tribal 
groups that had participated in the armed resistance against France; the Bourguibian 
camp was instead backed from the trade union and the emergent middle class issued 
by the French system of education. Bourguiba was able to impose his hegemony 
because of the legitimacy he gained in the nationalistic struggle. This dominance of 
the political system from an ideological point of view did not go uncontested and a 
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first opposition movement  developed from within the Destour (the historical 
nationalistic party) in the 1970s. A liberal trend emerged under the leadership of 
Ahmed Mestiri and early human rights activists. This political trend represented 
sociologically the old ‘medina’ bourgeoisie that, after being allied with Bourguiba, 
complained about the lack of democratization of the political system. Until then, 
however, political participation was the monopoly of social or intellectual elites 
(mostly as a product of the development of universities). The entrance in the political 
field of larger social groups came only in the 1980s following the demise of the 
implicit social contract between citizens and the post-independent state. The Islamic 
trend developed during those years. Rachid Ghannouchi, the charismatic leader of 
the first Islamic movement, was born in a region in the south of the country, where 
Youssefism had been very strong. The Islamist party represented in general a social 
and geographic constituency close to that of the Youssefist movement and Islamism 
played as the ideological frame within which new emerging middle classes came into 
the scene. Symbolic and political references to Islam had been marginalised under 
the Bourguibian/ modernist ideology and this is one of the reasons why a counter-
ideology that had to express a firm opposition against the ruling class of the 
independence generation appeared through Islam and its cultural references.  
The 2011-14 period of contention represented a third moment in the historical 
process of confrontation between those different constituencies. In the 1980s, the 
clash between the two sides ended only when the stronger of the two contenders - the 
nationalist state - prevailed. After 2011, the struggle began again; this time however, 
the two competitors came to a deal. The different outcome of the recent post-
revolutionary contention, compared to the one of the 1980s, is certainly due to the 
historical experience of the political actors; the conflicting parties understood that the 
more convenient solution to this struggle was democratic institutional building.  
The reason for this long-term conflict can be explained with the development 
of mass politics. This process developed in parallel with the emergence of new social 
groups and elites. By the 1980s however, larger frustrated social groups occupied the 
public space and became the strike force of the Islamist movement. The success of 
the Islamist ideology and the irruption on the scene of popular marginalized social 
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groups scared the traditional middle classes, the faithful constituency of the 
nationalist block.   
A middle class historically marginalized from power composed the first 
Islamist generation, represented by Nahda. When widespread discontent with the 
Tunisian regime took the shape of rioting masses in the 1980s, the Islamist 
movement reached the disenfranchised areas of the country and played the role of 
bridge between those masses and politics. In the post 2011 period,  Nahda decided to 
‘drop’ the popular masses and agreed to a liberal-democratic compromise with the 
nationalist camp. This move left a political gap of representation – political and 
ideological - in large working class areas of the country. While Nahda was busy in 
stabilizing the country and compromising with the nationalists, a new generation of 
radical Islamists took over. During the 2 years after 2011, radical Islamists gained 
strength in the urban areas of the country where most of the disenfranchised 
population was leaving. The rioting masses were transformed once again into radical 
Islamists. This led to the institutional inclusion of Nahda and the exclusion of the 
radicals.  
 
 
Enduring class struggle in Tunisia: the fight for identity beyond political Islam56 
 
Following the fall of Ben Ali, Tunisia has been undergoing a difficult 
democratic transition57. The final outcome of this process might not he the liberal-
democratic system that many external observers wished for, although the approval of 
a new constitution in early 2014 suggests that this outcome might not be as far-
fetched as it first seemed. Whatever the ultimate institutional outcome, the fall of the 
regime opened up spaces for the participation of citizens, political parties, civil 
society groups and social movements to mobilise and advance their visions of the 
                                                            
56 Published. Ref: Merone, F. (2015). Enduring class struggle in Tunisia: the fight for identity beyond 
political Islam. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1), 74-87. 
57  Alfred Stepan, ‘Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations’, Journal of Democracy, 23(2) 
(2012), pp. 89-103. 
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future. The country moved rapidly towards a new political and social framework in 
which freedom of expression, in sharp contrast with the past, is an untouchable 
hallmark. 
This change into a ‘democracy’ is however less than coherent and different 
outcomes to the 2011 revolution are still possible58.Similarly to the other countries 
that witnessed revolutionary changes, different political and social trends have 
appeared in Tunisia, often contradicting one another. From a regional perspective, 
there are a number of elements that stand out. The emergence of Islamist parties as 
the leading actors in the region has led to the creation of a coalition of 
differentpolitical and social forces to oppose them, some of which are still linked to 
the power structures of the authoritarian past, as the Egyptian case highlights. The 
persistence and even deepening of the economic crisis, together with the absence of 
immediate material benefits for large strata of the population, has led the parties now 
in power to be accused of incompetence and unaccountability, which is a point that 
also Hanieh makes in his contribution to this special issue59. A sort of longing for the 
relative economic stability of the pre-revolutionary period has also re-emerged. This 
occurs at a time of high volatility with members of the former ruling elite attempting 
to come back on the scene, claiming to be the only individuals capable of dealing 
with the inefficacious squabbling between the new political contenders. As 
mentioned earlier, the Egyptian case is the most extreme example of this dynamic, 
with the return of the military as ultimate decision-maker in the political struggle, but 
the Eibyan case also points to the messiness of post-authoritarian politics and the 
longing for a degree of stability and security. Thus, while much has certainly 
                                                            
58  Nouri Gana (ed.). The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). 
59 Emma Murphy, ‘The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy’, Mediterranean 
Politics, 16(2) (2011), pp. 299-305. See also: Adam Hanieh, ‘Shifting Priorities or Business as Usual? 
Continuity and Change in the post-2011 IMF and World Bank Engagement with Tunisia, Morocco 
and Egypt’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015). 
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changed following the fall of Mubarak, Ben Ali and other dictators in the region, 
there are also a number of continuities that affect states and politics.”60 
Tunisia has much in common with these regional transitional trends, 
demonstrating both change from and continuity with its past. This article makes a 
fundamental claim from which an analysis of both change and continuity derives. It 
suggests that the process of regime change with the institutionalisation of the Islamist 
party Al-Nahda is the outcome of a long nation-building process and that it might not 
as revolutionary as it first seemed. While the revolution gave the opportunity to a 
conservative middle class to be included within the structures of power through its 
political representative, Al-Nahda, marking a change with the past, this has come at 
the price of the continuing neglect of Tunisia’s disenfranchised, who remain 
excluded from power-sharing dynamics in continuity with the past. 
At the beginning of the 1980s, two broad different trends occupied the scene 
of the opposition camp in Tunisia: Islamist and liberal. Their ideological disputes and 
confrontations emerged in the context of the political struggle for democratisation, 
but the two camps did not manage to cooperate successfully to provide a viable 
alternative to the regime in place. By the end of the 1980s, the conflict between the 
two became in fact so intense that the self-defined secular liberal parties largely 
stood with the regime against the Islamists61. This confrontation between Islamists 
and liberals does not simply have an ideological dimension; it also coincided with a 
social class conflict. Different social classes in Tunisia have been struggling since 
independence to be included in the process of state building. In the nationbuilding 
process, class struggle does not only produce the domination of one class over 
another62. The dominant class also develops a national narrative for its own purposes, 
                                                            
60 Goldberg Ellis, ‘Mubarakism without Mubarak’, Foreign Affairs, Eebruary 11, 2011 (http://www. 
foreignaffairs.com/articles/67416/ellis-goldberg/mubarakism-without-mubarak, accessed September 
18, 2014). 
 
61 Rikke Hostrup Haugbplle and Erancesco Cavatorta, ‘Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please 
Stand Up? Opposition Coordination Eailures under Authoritarian Constraints’, British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, 38 (3) (2011), p. 335. 
62I refer here to Antonio Gramsci’s classical theory of hegemony, which examines how the dominant 
class builds an ideological apparatus in order to establish and strengthen its hegemony through 
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in order to secure its hegemony, engendering dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. In 
Tunisia, the modern nation state was huilt on the basic principle of modernisation. In 
order to realise it, the national leadership needed a unifying ideology in which 
national belonging was translated into a myth based on national identity, the 
tunisianité. Inclusion into the national ethos was and still is the condition for the 
success of the process of democratisation. Thus, the conflicting dynamics that 
emerged after regime change in 2011 must be explained as a process in which the 
new and old powers struggle one against the other; the new emerging powers fight to 
be included, the older ones to exclude the former. In short, the heirs of Bourguibian 
nationalism, allied with liberal and left-wing parties, have used the ideological tool 
of ‘modernity’ to exclude since at least the 1970s the ‘new kids on the block’—the 
Islamists—from shaping the national narrative and ethos of the modern Tunisian 
state, labelling them as ‘backward.’ However, through both electoral legitimacy and 
political moderation63, the Islamists have now entered the political system and in 
some ways accepted the concept of tunisianité, signalling a rupture with the past and 
striking an uneasy compromise with sectors of the secular left. 
The process of radicalisation of the disenfranchised youth, on the contrary, is 
part of the struggle of marginalised social classes to be included in the ‘Nation’64. 
Their exclusion from the nation-building process and institutions of governance, and 
particularly from the benefits of the economy, is the most powerful indicator of what 
has not changed in Tunisia. Thus, change and continuity can be explained in the 
                                                            
ideology. Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere. Gli intellettuali e l’organizzazione della cultura, 
Voi. II (Torino: Einaudi, 1948-1951), p. 9.  
63 AlayaAIIani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation: 1980-2008’, The 
Journal of North African Studies, 14(2) (2009), pp. 257-272; Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, 
‘Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Eundamentalist to 
Conservative Party’, Democratization, 20(5) (2013), pp. 857-875. 
64 Despite more recent findings on the middle class leaning towards radical Islamism, previous studies 
point to the connection between on the one side Salafism and radical Islamic movements and, on the 
other side, social exclusion and disenfranchised social groups. Gilles Kepel {Le prophète et Pharaon. 
Les mouvements islamistes dans I’Egypte contemporaine (Paris: La Découverte, 1984) explains, for 
example, how the emergence of radical Islamic movements in the 1970s was the effect of rural 
migration towards the city and consequent social exclusion. Patrick Haenni, L’ordre des Caids: 
conjurer la dissidence urbaine au Caire (Paris: Karthala, 2005) also reaches similar conclusions after 
his ethnographic research in one poor neighbourhood of Cairo. Por the case of Algeria, see Louis 
Martinez, The Algerian civil war, 1990-98 (Chicago: Columbia University Press, 2000). 
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framework of a transitional process whereby new and old actors are trying to find a 
deal to live with each other in a democratic country, where one can legitimately take 
part without annihilating the other. 
The notions of change and continuity are deployed to examine the Tunisian 
transition at both elite and grassroots levels. In the first part of the article, I follow 
the evolution of the inclusion/exclusion dynamic focusing on the middle class and its 
transformations throughout Tunisian history since independence. In the second part, I 
focus on Ansar al-Sharia, a radical Salafi movement that emerged in the aftermath of 
the Jasmine revolution. I propose that the conservative Islamist- leaning middle-class 
is keener on compromise and accepts continuity with the past for the sake of 
inclusion, whereas AST can be seen as a social movement working towards the 
mobilisation of the disenfranchised for radical change. 
 
 
 
Inclusion in and Exclusion from the Process of Institution-building 
Since the January 14th revolution, political elites struggled to find a 
constitutional solution to the vacuum of power caused by the departure of the 
president. A newly appointed government, which drew legal legitimacy from what 
has been defined as the ‘general consensus’65 elaborated a new institutional plan. 
Under the pressure of the revolutionary street, the old constitution, the ruling party—
the RCD—and the department of the political police were dissolved. The same 
revolutionary movement provided, in exchange, the necessary legitimacy for the 
transitional government to accomplish the mission of leading the country towards the 
foundational democratic election of the Constituent Assembly (CA).In parallel to the 
government, a representative Assembly for the realisation of the goals of the 
revolution (ISROR, its French acronym) was formed including a large spectrum of 
political views, guaranteeing a degree of pluralism in the process. Although the 
                                                            
65 The ‘general consensus’ was the expression deployed by Tunisian jurists to legally justify the new 
government and the new assembly’s mandates, which lasted longer than the two months provided for 
in the constitution. 
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attempt at framing regime change as a democratic process was not new in Tunisia66, 
this time a genuine democratic praxis was developed. In fact, through the first 
transparent elections in the country’s history, the election of the CA was the evidence 
of a radical change in the traditional process of Tunisia’s state building. As a nation-
state, Tunisia was born out of independence from France in 1956; the idea of nation 
was the ideological underpinning of the nationalist movement. Similar to other 
countries of the region, nationalism was the outcome of the liberation struggle 
against the coloniser. Those involved in the process of nationbuilding after 
independence came from the middle class and the French education system, which 
provided them with the ideological tools to build the new state. Chief among the 
dominant ideals this middle class held was modernity, understood as the overcoming 
of both economic and social underdevelopment, which was believed to be the 
product of backward institutions and social habits such as religious faith67. This new 
middle class constituted the backbone of the bureaucracy in independent Tunisia and 
utilised nationalism and a progressive idea of modernisation to legitimise the 
institutions of the state68.Bourguiba framed this drive towards modernisation through 
the marginalisation of Islam, relegating it to the private sphere, and through the 
injection of secular practices and Western- oriented economic and social institutions 
into the public sphere. Despite its authoritarian nature, which characterised Ben Ali’s 
time as well, many secular- modernist Tunisians shared the goal of developmental 
modernisation and felt that Islamism was an obstacle to it. In reality, the generation 
that struggled for independence against France was split in two factions, both of 
which were nevertheless committed to the idea and goal of modernisation. One 
                                                            
66 Lisa Anderson, ‘Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy: The Tunisian national pact of 1988’, 
Government and Opposition, 26(2) (1991), pp. 244-260. 
67 Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali (London: 
Paigrave Macmillan, 1999). 
68 James Bill, ‘Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernization in the Middle East’, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 3(4) (1972), pp. 417-434; Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Emma 
Murphy, ‘Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East’, Third World Quarterly, 17(4) 
(1996), pp. 753-772. See also Michael Ay ari. S’engager en regime autoritaire: Gauchistes et 
Islamistes dans la Tunisie indépendante (Thèse de Doctorat, Université Paul Cézanne Aix-Marseille 
III, 2009). 
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faction was led by Bourghiba and the other by Salah Ben Youssef 69 . The 
Bourghibian faction prevailed in this internal struggle and isolated its adversary. The 
visions these factions had for Tunisia’s future, however, had different cultural 
underpinnings, with Bourguiba’s faction looking to Atatiirk’s model and being 
influenced by French rationalism, whereas the Youssefist faction was aligned with 
pan-Arabism and looked at the experience of Nasser. After independence, Bourguiba 
got rid of Ben Youssef and the so-called ‘Zeitunian heritage’70,because it was in 
conflict with Bourguiba’s radically secular vision of modernisation. In fact, the 
Zeitunian sheikhs were considered the highest representatives of the old social order 
and as such they were perceived to be against modernisation. It followed that the part 
of the middle class aligned with Ben Youssef was marginalised from enjoying the 
spoils of power71. The transitional process of 2011 has included contestation of the 
Bourguibian conception of tunisianité 72 ,with the old Islamic/pan-Arabic ethos 
resurfacing and finding new legitimacy thanks to the arrival of AI-Nahda to power. 
Thus, while the social and political modernist-nationalist bloc73 seemed to be 
the real loser of the transitional process, the traditionally excluded Islamists became 
the largest political movement in the country. Partially reprising Ben Youssef’s 
nationalist discourse and agenda, they demanded a more democratic process of 
institution-building through Al-Nahda and, in part, the Congress for the Republic 
Party74.Thus, it seemed that the post 2011 democratisation process finally included 
those social groups previously excluded. 
                                                            
69 Kenneth Perkins, A History ofModern Tunisia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 
249. 
70 Interestingly enough, after the 2011 revolution, this representation changed and today the Zeitunian 
tradition is regarded as the first reformist movement of Tunisia. Malika Zeghal, ‘Competing Ways of 
Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition’, Constellations, 20(2) 
(2013), pp. 254-274. 
71 Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Haugbplle, ‘The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of 
Tunisia Under Ben Ali’, Mediterranean Politics, 17(2) (2012), pp. 179-195. 
72 Larbi Sadiki, ‘The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ah’s Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity’, Political 
Studies 50 (3) (2002), pp. 497-513. 
73I refer here to those people who took advantage from inclusion in the colonial system and were able 
to better interpret the need of modernisation as an essential aspect of the anti-colonial struggle. 
74 The party was founded in Paris in 2001 by the human rights activist Moncef Marzouki, who is 
today the President of the Republic. This party was the backbone of the political alliance that 
supported the Al-Nahda-led government. 
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The conflict between the nationalist middle-class (over-represented in the 
bureaucratic and repressive apparatuses, and enjoying an enormous ideological 
prestige) and the Islamic conservative middle class was the main obstacle to 
democratisation and inclusive state-building in post-independence Tunisia. The 2011 
revolution permitted a sort of reconciliation between these two ideologically 
different middle classes. It is the compromise between them that drives the Tunisian 
transition today. This compromise constitutes a genuine change with respect to the 
past because there is agreement, albeit implicit and at times contested, that the 
Islamist ethos has to be integrated and has to contribute to the new democratic 
Tunisia. 
The delicate balance between these two opposite forces—Islamic and 
secular— is in many ways the factor determining the balance between change and 
continuity in post-revolution Tunisia. One the one hand, there is continuity in the 
sense that despite pluralism, or possibly because of it, the struggle between Islamism 
and the French-inspired modernism with its emphasis on laicité is still very much 
present, as the debates around contested issues like individual freedoms show. On the 
other hand, there is also significant rupture with the past because traditional Islamism 
has become multifaceted and diverse, and the effort that Al-Nahda and the 
modernists are making to find a compromise to secure Tunisia’s democratic future is 
challenged by other powerful, more radical Islamist forces. These groups are not 
only challenging the contents of the compromise between Al-Nahda and the 
modernists. Crucially, they are by implication challenging the middle-class 
compromise upon which the new Tunisia is being constructed. This has resulted in 
the re-emergence of old repressive practices, representing continuity with the past, 
when it comes to dealing with challengers who claim that they are not included in 
this revised concept of tunisianité and are therefore excluded from both its material 
and identity benefits. 
 
The ‘Deep State’ and the Institutional Democratic Praxis 
In post-Ben All’s Tunisia, institution-building began with the experience of 
the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution. It was the first time in Tunisian 
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history that councils were gathering and discussing freely and democratically75. In 
addition to political representatives, human rights groups, feminist organisations and 
the bar association also participated, along with young bloggers and representatives 
from the ‘remote’ regions of inner Tunisia76.After the October 2011 elections, the 
ANC (the constitutional assembly) became the real arena of political conflict. In this 
phase of the process, and for the first time in the history of the country, all different 
cultural and political traditions gathered and debated foundational issues77. 
However, the institutional process of change engendered by the 2011 uprising 
was limited to a specific social class: the middle class. In part this reflects how 
negotiated political transitions work: dealing with rules and procedural mechanisms 
first to the detriment of regulating and solving economic and social conflicts. It 
would be impossible to deal with social conflicts in a democratising country, when 
the institutions of the state need to be rebuilt amidst great volatility; they are left for 
later, once the political system is stable. This type of transitions favours democratic 
liberty over wealth redistribution, with the middle class being both the protagonist 
and the beneficiary of it78. In Tunisia, the majority of the population was sidelined by 
this process, partly because material preoccupations were prioritised over debates 
about institutions and procedural mechanisms, and partly because the process itself 
failed to include them by focusing emphatically on identity and rules rather than 
economics. The revolutionary process expressed the frustration of both a new 
generation and a marginalised social class that remained on the margins of the 
institutional process of democratic transition. Most of those involved in Tunisia’s 
                                                            
75 Sami Zemni, ‘The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution 
Making’, Mediterranean Politics (2014. Available at:  
http://www.tandfonline.eom/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013. 874108#.VCmdGPldWpA 
76 Representatives from the regions of the interior were invited because of the important role they 
played during the uprising and because they represent the socio-economic divide existing in the 
country. Such developmental divide has been recognised as one of the main sources of social 
injustice. 
77 Rym Abidi, vice-president of a network of development associations, interview with the author, 
Tunis September 29, 2013. 
78 As also noted by Giuseppe di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
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negotiated transition79 either belong to an older generation or represented, like Al-
Nahda, those who wanted to compromise in order to be integrated into the national 
project. The collaboration between the liberals who opposed Ben Ali’s 
authoritarianism but not his secular modernisation project, and the Islamists started 
in the mid 2000s, when Al-Nahda’s moderation process intensified80. The institution-
building process in post-revolutionary transition has created the conditions for such a 
process of collaboration and compromise to be completed. Al-Nahda has become a 
conservative moderate party inspired by Islamic values81, shedding its radicalism. 
However, the uprising activated a new social subject, largely composed of 
radical, young disenfranchised people. The definition of this revolutionary subject as 
a specific political actor is problematic. In the aftermath of the fall of Ben Ali, 
debates about who would deserve the title of ‘revolutionary subject’ heated up. 
While it was agreed that society as a whole adhered to the revolutionary outcome, 
there was little doubt that the ‘youth’, or ‘the revolting generation’, was the 
protagonist of the uprising. More specifically, it was so for those who were in the 
streets during the uprising clashing with police. In fact, through physical 
confrontation with the security apparatus, they were the ones responsible for the 
collapse of Ben All’s regime82 . This specific group did not have a political or 
ideological frame of action, but was motivated by frustration. When the transition 
went on into the ‘normality’ phase, they were unable to find a party representing 
their interests, and in general they refused to engage in the institutional process83. 
Though they have not organised into a party or a formal movement, this group of 
marginalised youth continued to exist on the public scene and the revolutionary 
                                                            
79  Gianluca Parolin, ‘Constitutions against Revolutions: Political Participation in North Africa’, 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015). 
80Allani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation’, cit. 
81 Luca Ozzano, ‘The Many Laces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties’, 
Democratization, 20(5) (2013), pp. 807-830. 
82 Amin Allal, ‘Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tieni le quartieri’. Politique Africaine 1 (2011), 
pp. 53-67; Paola Rivetti, ‘The Journey of Protests in the Mediterranean and Beyond: A Discussion 
About and For Social Movements’, Jadaliyya, July 27, 2013, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/13051/the-journey-of-protests-in-the-mediterranean-and-b 
(accessed August 27, 2014). 
83  From now onwards, the article contains observations and statements resulting from my 
ethnographic fieldwork. 
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success they obtained provided them with enough confidence to think they could 
challenge the system. Thus, this new subject is composed of the revolutionary and 
marginalised youth that, in the post-revolutionary context, holds the rest of society 
accountable for not sharing the material and, equally important, identity and 
intangible benefits of the revolution. This new subject can be subsumed under the 
label of a type of activism that many Tunisians did not even suspect could develop 
locally, namely jihadi Salafism84. 
Despite representing a rupture with the past, the emergence of jihadi Salafism 
also highlights a point of continuity with pre 2011 Tunisia, in particular for the way 
in which those who dissent from the content and buzzwords of the mainstream, 
national project are treated by authorities. After the revolution, the middle-class 
compromise between former rivals on what modernisation and democracy mean for 
Tunisia, was under threat from those who dissent on the content and forms of such a 
political project. As before the revolution, the reaction of the establishment has been 
political marginalisation and repression. 
One example is representative of this repressive praxis. At the end of August 
2013, the Interior Minister declared Ansar al-Sharia (AST, the jihadi Salafi group) a 
terrorist organisation85, highlighting a number of practical and symbolic continuities 
with Ben Ali’s regime. First, the Interior Minister referred to the antiterrorism 
legislation, an instrument that had been prominent in ‘legalising’ Ben Ali’s 
repression against the Islamists and, more generally, political opponents. Second, the 
whole scene reminded many of a similar press conference held in 1992, when 
representatives of the security apparatus showed evidences of Al- Nahda’s 
involvement in terrorist activities and outlawed it. The labelling of AST as a terrorist 
organisation resulted in a ban on its public activities and made its membership 
                                                            
84 Fabio Merone, ‘Salafism in Tunisia: An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia’, Jadaliyya, 
April 11, 2013. http://www.jadaliyya.eom/pages/index/l 1166/salafism-in-tunisia_an-interview-with-
a-member-of- (accessed August 27, 2014). 
85  Perrine Massy, ‘Ali Laàrayedh: ‘Nous avons décidé de classer Ansar al-Charia comme une 
organisation terroriste’, Nawaa/Politics, August 27, 2013. http://nawaat.org/portail/2013/08/27/ali-
laarayedh-nous-avons-decide-de-classer-ansar-al-charia-comme-une-organisation-terroriste/ (accessed 
August 27, 2014). 
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illegal86. Symbolically, the old bureaucracy was ‘showing off’ and taking revenge on 
the protagonists of the revolutionary change. 
 
The Same Old Story: Pragmatic Islamists and the Modern Middle Class versus a 
New Mobilisation 
As described in the previous section, street mobilisation demonstrates that 
elements of change and continuity overlap, as Paola Rivetti suggests in the 
introduction to this special issue87.The demand for democracy is nothing new in 
Tunisia’s history, as the tentative democratic process of late 1980s demonstrates88. 
The liberals were part of the generation and social class that shared the ethos of the 
Bourghibian national project based on tunisianité, and had benefited from 
independence. Later, this group was joined by the old Marxist-Leninist generation, 
converted now to liberal-democracy. Until 2011, political struggles took place within 
the same social class and did not entail any deviation from the ‘modernisation 
project’, as inspired by rationalism and secularism with an emphasis on Tunisia 
being different from the rest of the Arab world. Ben Ali came to power in 1987 
promising that the process of nation state-building would not derail from such 
developmental modernity, including democratisation and the protection of liberties. 
Therefore, the process seemed to evolve towards its ‘natural’ outcome: the 
consolidation of a democratic system based on a deal reconciling the two opposite 
parties within the same social class, sharing a similar vision of the world. Ben Ali’s 
objective was to formalise a democratic social contract, a goal which had been 
frustrated in the past by Bourguiba’s autocratic resilience. 
The apparently linear evolution of this middle-class reconciliation was 
interrupted by the Islamists. They emerged as a major political force in the 
                                                            
86 Perrine Massy, ‘Ali Laàrayedh’, cit. 
87 Paola Rivetti, ‘Continuity and Change Before and After the Uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Morocco: Regime Reconfiguration and Policy-making in North Africa’, British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015).  
88Lisa Anderson, ‘Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy’, cit. 
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moderately free elections of 1989, but the regime, refusing to grant them political 
legitimacy, decided to repress them with the backing of the majority of the other 
political groupings. The marginalisation of the Islamists was framed as ‘a struggle 
for civilisation’; the Islamists became the obstacle to the evolution of the modern 
state and the deployment of any means against them was justifiable. More than two 
decades later, Al-Nahda’s big opportunity arose in the context of the revolutionary 
process of 2011, which was followed by a transparent electoral process and the 
formation of a new government with the party at its helm. 
Doubtless, the victory of Al-Nahda constitutes a change, but not a 
fundamental one. It also represents the accomplishment of a long-term political 
process, as the party members had already internalised the concept of tunisianité. 
When the Nahdaouis came to power, they were representatives of an old generation 
with little to no radical strength89. By the time it won the elections, Al-Nahda was no 
longer representing either the rebellious, revolutionary young generation or the 
project of establishing an Islamic state. Indeed, the moderate Islamic party represents 
a conservative social middle class that has always been keen to support and 
assimilate to the national project in exchange for material benefits and some 
references to their Islamic, conservative values. Of course, from an institutional point 
of view, Al-Nahda’s electoral victory represents a big shift in the balance of power 
within the national political elite. However, socially it was not the real novelty. As 
mentioned earlier, the actual change is that the uprising allowed for the mobilisation 
of new and rebellious street actors that stand out as new social and political subjects. 
The revolutionary process was the consequence of a deep split within society 
along a social class divide90, and the generational cleavage overlapped with it to a 
                                                            
89 According to Zied Krishen, chief editor of the daily newspaper al-Maghreb, ‘the revolution saved 
Nahda from a sure political death’ (Interview with the author, Tunis, Winter 2012); Graham Usher, 
‘The Reawakening of Nahda in Tunisia’, MERIP online, April 30, 2011. 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero0430117utm_ source=twitterfeed&utm_medium = twitter (accessed 
August 28, 2014). 
90 Although bloggers constituted a challenge to the regime and their actions came to international 
attention, the ‘real revolution was in the streets while we were behind the screen of a PC’ (interview 
with the author, Sofiene Bel Haj, Tunis, Spring 2011). While most of the people that took part in the 
clashes overwhelmingly represented the lower strata of the society, the urban middle/high class 
participated in different types of mobilisation. They did not share either political sensibility or 
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significant extent. More than suffering from the absence of democracy, young people 
from lower social classes suffered from what can be described as social exclusion. 
Although they emerged as a visible actor during and after the uprising, this 
disenfranchised youth has however been present on the public scene for a decade, 
thanks to its role in contesting the regime. Under Ben Ali’s rule, these youngsters 
were known by the security apparatus for clashing with police during football 
matches91, and it is no coincidence that the first songs of freedom, defiant of the 
regime, were shouted without fear in stadiums92. These young people expressed their 
rejection of the system by rioting with the police when the circumstances made it 
possible or by escaping from the country, dreaming of the European Eldorado. When 
they talked about freedom, they did not think of freedom of elections or multi-party 
politics, but the freedom to realise their dreams that sometimes are as simple as to 
have enough money to get married93. Most of their hatred was directed against the 
police because it represents both repression and corruption at the same time. 
Policemen or RCD’s local patrons were present in their lives as living symbols of 
what kept the repressive system working and of corruption. It should not be a 
surprise that this cohort of young people was not really interested in the 
establishment of a democratic system after the revolution. Neither were they 
interested in the strengthening of a democratic, gradual integration of the moderate 
Islamic party Al-Nahda into the institution-building process, as the party did not 
interpret or represent their radicalism. In addition, they were not interested in the 
dehate about tunisianité, with its corollary of the reification of tolerance and 
pluralism as characteristics inextricably linked to what it means to be Tunisian. Most 
                                                            
material concerns. These key differences emerged after the fall of the regime, when limitations to the 
establishment of a cohesive and unique revolutionary front became evident. See also Rivetti, ‘The 
Journey of Protests in the Mediterranean and Beyond’, cit. 
91 Larissa Chomiak and John Entelis, ‘The Making of North Africa’s Intifadas’, Middle East Report, 
259 (2012), pp. 8-15. 
92 Revolutionary and revolting artistic expressions, such as rap and break dance, or the organised 
presence of football fans in stadiums seem to be the typical ‘venues’ for the disenfranchised youth to 
express frustration and unhappiness with the status quo. 
93 Wassim, a young man from Khetmine, Bizerte province, an area where emigration to Italy has been 
very strong in the last decade. Interview with the author, Khetmine, November 2010. 
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of them found a way to express their political and anti-system radicalism in the 
salafist mouvance. 
This radicalisation and class divide are not new in Tunisia, because the 
processes of nation and state building themselves entail class struggle. Each period of 
transformation in the recent history of the country has corresponded to attempts on 
the part of a specific social class to enter the political game in order to share the 
national contract and, at least partially, power. This was the case for the Intifada of 
1983, the so called ‘bread revolt’, when ‘for the first time lower classes entered 
national history’94. This same tumultuous group was in the background during the 
last period of Bourghiba’s rule and in the early 1990s, when the clash between the 
Islamists and the state took place. It did not mature, though, as a social movement 
until the opening up of the public sphere after the fall of Ben Ali. The success of the 
uprising, symbolised by the collapse of the dictatorship, and the emergence of a new 
Islamic paradigm after the revolution, gave them the chance to become a social and 
political movement. 
If we look at post-revolutionary social and generational cleavages, there is 
little doubt that so far the transitional institutional process has failed in integrating 
this disenfranchised social group. The ones that took over the political scene belong 
to a different generation (the one of the 1980s) and to a different social class, 
representing in some ways a factor of continuity with the past. The basic political 
request of the middle class in power today was democracy and not material benefits, 
which, comparatively speaking, they never genuinely lacked95. As explained above, 
in the context of Tunisian modern history, they represent a generation who has been 
waiting for decades to join in the process of building the modern Tunisian nation-
state. In order to do so, they learned that there is nothing better than democracy. This 
                                                            
94This is according to Heithem Chabouni, former member of the Communist party, today Nidaa party. 
Interview with the author, Tunis Spring 2011. 
95 During the 1990s and 2000s, there was a consensus on the fact that the growth of the middle class 
was one of the outcomes of the economic growth. However, this was only partially true and lasted 
only until 2008, when the international financial crisis began to impact on Tunisia too. 
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belief is shared by liberals, leftists and moderate Islamists alike96. Because of the 
failure of this democratic-oriented process in the 1980s, the country suffered from 
two decades of frozen social and political activities. The revolution made it possible 
for these actors to return to the scene and resume their roles, while others were left 
behind. Once again, it is worth highlighting that there is nothing odd about the 
Tunisian transition insofar as the requirements of ‘crafting democracy’ demand that 
social conflicts are frozen in favour of an almost exclusive focus on mechanisms and 
procedures to ensure liberty, as Gianluca Parolin also makes clear in his contribution 
to this special issue. 
Those who participated and still participate in street politics and those who 
took the power after Ben Ali’s departure are not the same. They do not share any 
common ground socially, geographically or generationally. The low electoral turnout 
at the October 2011 election suggests that the youth and a significant part of the 
society were at least sceptical of the liberal democratic process, largely unknown to 
them. Indeed, in parallel with the institutional process, another social dynamic 
developed to ‘include’ a chunk of this socially marginalised youth. A large and 
spontaneous process of Islamisation of society, which had already begun to he 
evident in the later years of Ben All’s regime97, emerged from below. If different 
degrees of Islamic belonging fitted different social groups, the one that best 
interpreted and represented the antagonism and the radicalism of disenfranchised 
youth was Jihadism. Jihadism is not representative of a social class in the Marxist 
sense, and this youth cannot be equated with working class either because it does not 
have an organised political relevance, but is an expression of subalternity and 
alienation98. 
 
                                                            
96 This became evident in 2005, when modernist. Leftist and Islamist groups came together to form 
the Democratic Front. They shared a common interest in a democratic reform of the system. 
97 Rikke Haugb0lIe and Lrancesco Cavatorta, ‘Beyond Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in 
Tunisia’, Middle East Report, 262 (2012), pp. 20-25. 
98I refere here to Spivak’s conceptualisation of subalternity, see Gayatri Chakravortty Spivak, ‘Can 
the Subaltern Speak?’, in Rosalind C. Morris (ed.). Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the 
History of an Idea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 21-77.  
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Ansar al-Sharia as the Expression of a New Social Movement 
 
Ansar al-Sharia (AST) is the new youth social movement that emerged from 
the revolutionary process99. It inherited, from the past decade, the ‘mythological’ 
enterprise of Al-Qaeda’s mujahedeen, but it adapted it to the new liberal and 
democratic scenario of post-Ben Ali Tunisia. As surprising as it may be, the jihadi 
movement is not a novelty in Tunisia. Even though the dictatorship had been 
particularly repressive of Islamic radicalism, a new generation of Islamists resurfaced 
in Tunisia since the beginning of the 2000s100. Despite the lack of awareness of its 
existence among ordinary Tunisians, who discovered their own radical Islamists after 
the revolution, jihadism was a form of identity for the latest generation of the 
revolting youth. As argued by Stefano Torelli et al., the events of Soliman in 2007 
were a powerful reminder of this 101 . A group of jihadist coming from Algeria 
penetrated into Tunisia and got logistic support from a relatively large network of 
people in Sidi Bouzid, Sousse and Tunis. Even more significant was the participation 
of an important group of Tunisians in the international jihadi movement. Many of 
them were imprisoned under the anti-terrorism law of 2003, which was supported by 
the US administration and swiftly adopted by Ben All’s regime. AST originated from 
Tunisian detention centres as a project incubated over a long period of time102. It 
indeed represented a factor of continuity with a struggle that part of the Tunisian 
youth had consciously undertaken for over a decade. However, despite its earlier 
existence, this jihadi project was transformed by the unexpected uprising in 2011. 
                                                            
99 Anne Wolf, ‘An Islamist ‘Renaissance’? Religion and Politics in Post-revolutionary Tunisia’, The 
Journal of North African Studies, 18(4) (2013), pp. 560-573. 
100  Daveed Garteistein-Ross, Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia’s long game, ICCT Research paper, 2013. 
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102 Hassen Breik, responsible for Dawa in Ansar Al-Sharia. Interview with the author, Yasminette 
October 10, 2012. 
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Thus, a completely new Islamic radical project was founded, rooted in dawa (call) 
instead of qital (fight)103. 
The large Islamic wave that came out from the post-revolutionary process 
was an explosion that hurst out as a consequence of the long-standing repression of 
all forms of organised Islamism, whether political or not. Islamism was the 
expression of this disenfranchised youth that appeared in the aftermath of the 
revolution, which had succeed in revolting and toppling down Ben Ali hut failed to 
turn its radicalism into a political project. During the first two years of the transition 
and until the attack on the American Embassy in Septemher 2012, the control of the 
state was rather weak, and this exposed lower-class neighhourhoods to a new type of 
socialisation that empowered Salafi youth 104 . Further frustrated hy the lack of 
material henefits deriving from the revolution they contributed to bring about, this 
youth found a strong spiritual motivation in Salafist militancy. The territorial identity 
of Salafists is rooted in neighbourhoods, where a strong degree of solidarity between 
them and the inhabitants is detectable, despite the fact that groups of radical Salafists 
may interfere with the private life of the people and with their traditional creed105. 
This identity overlap between the Salafists and the people from lower class 
neighbourhoods is further strengthened by the repression the central state is carrying 
out against Salafism. This was the case for the Minister of Interior’s campaign 
against AST, a move that motivated the supporters of a big soccer team to declare 
                                                            
103 See: Merone, ‘Interview with Hassen Ben Brik: Islamic state but not through violence... for now’, 
September 24, 2012, in Italian (http://nena-news.globalist.it/Detail_News_Display7ID—35486&typeb 
— 0&24-09-2012- Intervista-Hassan-Ben-Brik-Stato-islamico-non-con-la-forza-per-ora-, accessed 
August 28, 2014). In this interview, Hassein Breik, AST’s person in charge for Dawa, expresses this 
idea very clearly. 
104 I have witnessed this process myself since 2011 during my heldwork. This is especially true in the 
outskirts of Tunis, in areas such as Dahwar Hisher, Ettadhamen, Ibn Khaldoun, El Kram, and 
Yasminette, or in other cities such as Sousse, Menzel Bourghiba, Sidi Bouzid, Kasserine, and 
Keirouan. 
105  The most disturbing practice of these groups of puritans is the so-called vigilantism or, in 
theological terms, the ‘amr bil maarufwa annahi an al-munkef (‘bidding the good and forbidding the 
evil’). In the aftermath of the revolution, actions such as disturbing theatre representations or 
punishing particular behaviours in the neighbourhood, created a wide discontent among the 
population. After a debate over the opportunity of encouraging or discouraging such activities, the 
leaders of AST forbade the Salati youth to commit such actions. 
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their support for AST with a statement106, despite the apparent contradiction between 
soccer fans and Salafists’ expected behaviour. More than religious group, AST was 
in this case perceived as a movement representing the youth coming from a specific, 
lower-class socio-economic background107. This young generation of Tunisians is 
looking for instruments of political expression, yet avoiding all institutional and 
conventional ones: ‘civil society’ associations and mainstream political parties are 
indeed perceived as too distant. 
Then, it appears rather indisputable that AST was the group that most 
benefitted from this activism, which is and remains outside of an institutional 
framework. Indeed, most of the AST members have that same social background: 
they do not speak in the name of the disenfranchised, they are part of them108.The 
daily practices of social life in the neighbourhoods, which generally are male-
dominated and gender segregated spaces, made it easier for these young activists to 
accept 
AST’s ideological framework. The AST movement sublimates the strong 
masculine relationships typical of those social spaces, and charges them with further 
spiritual value. The mosque comes to replicate the social function of the cafés in 
these working class neighbourhoods109. The male groups of young people hanging 
around for hours in the neighbourhoods were transformed into the jamaa, explicitly 
referring to the first pious Muslim community. Such identification with a ‘special 
group’ of elected individuals allowed these young men to finally overcome the 
                                                            
106 Les supporteurs de l’EST et du CA au congrès de Ansar al-Charia, Direct Info, May 16, 2013. 
http://directinfo. webmanagercenter.com/2013/05/16/les-supporters-de-lest-et-du-ca-au-congres-
dansar-al-chariaa/ (accessed August 28, 2014). 
107 See Mosaiquefm ‘Ansar al Sharia prevoit des confrontations avec la police avec le support des 
supporteurs de football’. May 16, 2013, in Arabic. http://goo.gl/Nx5ePt (accessed August 28, 2014). 
108 There is an on-going debate on whether the AST represents a specific social class or not. Although 
the AST members I met during my fieldwork do not generally recognise a specific social class 
background and dislike the term muhammishun (which is utilised to as a pejorative by the rest of 
society), there is no doubt that most of them come from specifically poor urban areas. Of course, as 
the Jihadi Salati trend is an ideological one, virtually anyone could adopt it regardless of social class 
belonging. In fact, we are not using this category as a deterministic one. Attempts to reach more 
educated and middle class constituencies are strategically advanced by AST. However, the fact that it 
has been isolated after the crackdown, with no support by any other class but constituencies from 
lower class neighbourhoods, strongly suggests that up to now, AST’s interclass reach is weak. 
109 Spending time in the cafés with friends is a widespread social activity in these neighbourhoods. 
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enormous social complex they suffer from vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie, which had 
treated them as backwards and failed men110. 
While this process of Salafisation contains elements of change and continuity, 
the reaction of the state and political elite to it has to be fully ascribed to the category 
of the continuity with the past. When Ali Laraayedh (the then-Prime Minister and 
one of the most prominent leaders of Al-Nahda) declared AST a terrorist 
organisation, there was concern but not surprise. Indeed, since the demonstration in 
front of the American Embassy that degenerated into the assault on 15 September 
2012111, security preoccupations have been prioritised over freedom of expression. 
One of the consequences of the unique climate of freedom that Tunisia had 
experienced for one and a half year following the fall of Ben Ali, was the 
strengthening of the tension between the people’s right to freely express their 
political and religious beliefs, and the institutions’ duty of safeguarding the general 
public interests. The jihadist phenomenon, because of the genuine security concerns 
it created, was considered the perfect scapegoat, providing the old authoritarian 
apparatus with an opportunity to return to the scene and take action. Although 
Tunisia seems today more mature for a democratic evolution, there is still the 
temptation, as occurred 20 years ago, to order the security apparatus to manage the 
social and political conflict. Change and continuity are the two key elements that 
explain these two co-existing tendencies towards, on the one side, open debate and, 
on the other side, repression, both of which have interfered in the ongoing 
transitional process. 
Conclusion 
The Tunisian democratic transition that began in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprising is another step of a long process of state building. The main actors of this 
process represent those political and social groups that emerged from the 1980s and 
                                                            
110 Interview with a leader of Ansar al-Sharia, Tunis. Because he is under surveillance from the 
security forces, I cannot state either his name or the place of the interview. 
111 Sandro Luty, ‘Un an après I’attaque de I’ambassade des Etas Unis à Tunis, les doutent subsistent’, 
Huffington Post Maghreb, September 14, 2013.  
http://www.huffpostmaghreb.eom/2013/09/14/attaque-ambassade-etats- unis-tunis_n_3926696.html 
(accessed August 28, 2014). 
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struggled to participate in the management of national institutions, namely the 
liberals and the Islamists. Nevertheless, as this article argues, further fragmentation 
has taken place and new social actors emerged in the aftermath of the revolution, 
along with the unfolding of the institution-building process. Indeed, the main 
contention of this article is that behind the political struggle there is class struggle. 
Sharing the ideology of tunisianité, the official national rhetoric invented by 
Bourguiba, implies accepting cultural references typical of a new middle class that 
appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century. Tunisianité was the mantra of 
Tunisian nationalism, and it was understood as a positive identity factor that pushed 
the middle class to assume the leadership of the nation-huilding process. This 
leadership had historically been the outcome of a political conflict, symbolised by the 
two characters of the liberation movement, Bourghiba and Ben Youssef. 
The post-revolutionary process is also one of ‘street politics,’ in the sense of 
the participation of social movements not conventionally organised into civil society 
associations or political parties. Once again, we see factors of continuity and change 
overlapping. The concept of street politics is useful to explain the emergence of the 
Jihadi Salafist movement, which appeared during the transitional period as a new 
social and political actor. It represents a completely new generation that has little to 
no relation with the Islamic movement represented by today’s moderate, Nahdaoui 
middle class. However, jihadism and radical Islamism represent in today’s Tunisia 
those disenfranchised social classes that find themselves at the bottom of the social 
ladder. AST is also the largest social and youth movement on the national scene. It 
represents a factor of continuity in modern Tunisian history, as it is the heir of radical 
Islamism, which was already present and repressed under Ben All’s rule, but it also 
represents a rupture with this radical tradition. Thanks to the 2011 uprising, it had the 
opportunity to organise into a proper movement, occupying most of the public space 
in working class neighbourhoods of Tunisian biggest cities. 
The nation-building process is the general framework in which factors 
associated with change and continuity take on an explanatory value in understanding 
the Tunisian transition. Ultimately, Tunisia’s transitional process will only be 
accomplished when all social classes will find a way to express themselves without 
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being perceived as threatening to the society and the state. This is not only a power 
struggle but also a process of class inclusion and exclusion. 
 
 
 
 
Post-scriptum 
The main interest of this research is the evolution of the Islamist 
phenomenon. Nahda is the historical Islamist party in Tunisia.  Although repressed in 
the 1990s, it emerged in the aftermath of the revolution as the main political player. 
In the next section, I deal with Nahda and its political evolution in the period of 
constitutional building. Two main theoretical debates characterize the discussion of 
Islamism: moderation through inclusion/exclusion and post-Islamism. The previous 
section framed the historical context and explained the origin of the conflictual 
nature of the opposition between nationalists and Islamists. In the next section, we 
will see how the debates on post-Islamism and moderation through inclusion can be 
used to understand the evolution of Nahda.  
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Chapter 3. The emergence of an Islamic Public and the reborn of Nahdha party 
 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the rise of an Islamic public sphere in the period 
between 2011 and 2013 and the evolution of its main political reference, the Islamist 
Nahda party. One day before Ben Ali escaped from the country, there was apparently 
no such Islamic public. Few months later, the Nahda leadership, emerging from the 
interior of the country or returning from exile, reshaped thepolitical organization of 
the party and won the constitutional election with an impressive score (October 
2011). The successful experience of free elections and the development into a party 
that fully participated in the government of the country with secular parties 
challenged and stimulated the traditional academic debate over Islamist parties. In 
the first article presented here, I explain the evolution of the Islamic party from 
fundamentalist to conservative through the lens of the ‘moderation through 
exclusion’ paradigm. In the second, I pay more attention to the ideological 
underpinnings of the Islamists’ evolution and discuss the academic debate on ‘post-
Islamism’. 
In the first section, I argue that Nahda went through a process of moderation 
since its inception and that this was the consequence of exclusion. While the typical 
debate of the moderation through exclusion/inclusion regards the moderation process 
as a reaction to political exclusion (or inclusion), I argue that exclusion and inclusion 
can be also the result of social acceptance or refusal of the political and militant 
group. This means that if on one side the Islamist party gained in popularity, on the 
other some of its radical practices and views, as a certain style of dawa, have been 
perceived by broader society as strange, unusual and, crucially, unsuited. This is part 
of the explanation of why popular masses failed to rise in their support when the Ben 
Ali regime crushed them. 
The second section discusses post-Islamism. In the 1990s two prominent 
authors, Asef Bayat and Olivier Roy, initiated an academic debate on the fate of 
Islamism. Bayat believed that the Islamist trend had abandoned the ‘revolutionary’ 
idea of the Islamic state. This author noticed that Islamist parties were increasingly 
93 
 
adapting to parliamentary politics. Olivier Roy was instead sharper in his analysis. 
After having critically scrutinised the Islamist ideology, he concluded that Islamism 
failed and that it was never a credible political alternative. This idea was consistent 
with what was occurring on the ground in the 1990s and 2000s, when Islamist parties 
were weakened by the repressive action of Arab regimes.  
The coming back in force of Islamist parties after the ‘Arab spring’ proved 
that this theory, at least in Roy’s version, was inaccurate. Islamists disappeared 
because of political repression. When given political opportunities, they were in fact 
still able to represent a large constituency (a social block). In the case of Nahda, I 
show how post-Islamism may be a potentially useful interpretative tool to consider 
that Islamism evolves and adapts to the changing political circumstances. I argue that 
Islamist ideology has evolved and not disappeared. I show, for example, how the 
Islamic state as a political objective has not disappeared but rather changed of 
perspective and content. In the new democratic perspective, the Nahda leadership 
assumed that the principles of the Islamic state are guaranteed by the new 
constitutional and institutional system.  
A new intellectual trend developed, within and outside the Islamist 
movement, justifying the aims of an Islamic society through an interpretative reading 
of the juridical Islamic sources, called “Maqasid”. The new Islamist 
theology/ideology meets therefore with the old Tunisian reformist tradition through 
the mediation of the Zeitounian cleric Mohammed Tahar ben Achour, the first to 
reactivate in contemporary history the studies of this branch of religious studies. The 
revival of this prestigious  reformist figure is very important because it is the main 
venue for Islamists to connect with the reformist tradition of the country. Ben 
Achour comes from an Islamic tradition but that of the reformist  trend that is 
accepted and partly vindicated by the country’s modernist tradition.  
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Moderation through exclusion? The journey of Tunisian Ennahdha from 
fundamentalist to conservative party” 112 
 
On 23 October 2011, the Tunisian Islamist party Ennahda (Renaissance 
Party) completed a most remarkable comeback on the country’s political scene. After 
having been banned and heavily repressed for three decades with its leaders and 
cadres either in exile, in prison, or marginalized in society, the party was legalized on 
1 March 2011 following the fall of the dictatorship and proceeded to win the first and 
free elections the country ever held with an impressive score, taking 89 seats out of 
217 in the Constituent Assembly.(1) The victory, or at least the size of it, was a 
surprise for many Tunisians and for the international community. After the elecctions 
Ennahda went on to form a three-party coalition government with two centre-left 
parties whose ideological references are far removed from its own, highlighting what 
Ozzano, in his contribution to the special issue, considers an important trait of 
conservative parties.(2) Both the party’s electoral victory and its decision to form 
cross-ideological alliances should not be interpreted as surprises. A closer analysis 
reveals in fact that Ennahda has gone through a profound ideological transformation 
over its forty-year history that no longer makes it anti-democratic;  quite the 
opposite.(3) These moderate stances might not be genuine or fully internalized and 
are certainly not accepted in many left-wing and secular circles: in particular after the 
assassination of the left-wing leader Chokri Belaid in February 2013, when Ennahda 
was accused of betraying the revolution and working for the construction of an 
authoritarian theocracy.4 However, what Ennahda has done over the last few years 
strongly indicates change. In any case, and despite what a number of Tunisian 
commentators argue when pointing at “its double-speak”,(5) Ennahda can be said to 
have become what Luca Ozzano categorizes in his framing contribution to this 
special issue as a conservative party.(6) 
                                                            
112 Published. Ref.: Cavatorta, F., & Merone, F. (2013). Moderation through exclusion? The journey 
of the Tunisian Ennahda from fundamentalist to conservative party. Democratization, 20(5), 857-875. 
This article is a two-handed work. Based on my fieldwork, we shared the theoretical reflections and 
the writing.   
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In his contribution, Ozzano also claims the categories of religiously oriented 
parties that he proposes are far from being watertight: parties therefore can move 
back and forth through these different categories. Accounting for the possibility of 
change and explaining how this comes about is an important part of the story of 
many such parties in the Arab world, where the liberalizing trends following the 
Arab Spring are affording them the opportunity to win power through the ballot 
box.(7) Focusing on the case of the Islamist Ennahda, this article examines the 
mechanisms that explain how a religiously oriented party “travels” from one 
category to another and the influence this has on the democratization of Tunisia. 
Specifically, it analyses the very dramatic change that Ennahda made from 
fundamentalist to conservative party during its existence. From being an anti-
democratic and illiberal movement with a tawhid-based (principle of unity) vision of 
politics and society determined to impose religious law over democratic electoral 
decisions in the 1970s, it has travelled towards the acceptance of the procedural 
mechanisms of democracy in the context of a pluralistic vision of society by the late 
1980s. The literature on Islamist parties and extremist parties more broadly defines 
this shift as moderation, whereby the term is synonymous with acceptance of the 
triptych of democracy – mechanisms to select governing elites, fundamental liberal 
rights, and market economy. The principal variable to explain this shift can be 
resumed in “moderation through inclusion”, whereby the progressive inclusion of 
radical and anti-systemic parties into the political system forces them to 
“compromise” with their original extreme views in order to be able to compete in a 
pluralistic environment where shared rules have to be designed and where the 
constraints of participation inevitably force a review of strict ideological positions to 
attain at least some of the political goals the party has.(8) In authoritarian settings 
this is accompanied by the realization that cross-ideological alliances with other 
opposition parties are also necessary to defeat incumbents. 
  What is interesting in the case of Ennahda, contrary for instance to the full or 
partial inclusion of Islamist parties elsewhere,(9) is that inclusion into the political 
system never really occurred and acceptance of the party from large sectors of 
Tunisian society materialized very slowly. Thus, moderation through inclusion does 
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not really explain the very significant change in Ennahda’s ideological and political 
positions and this speaks to the take on moderation that Christophe Jaffrelot has in 
his article in this special issue.(10) It follows that a different explanation is required 
and the article explores what can be labelled “moderation through exclusion”. For the 
majority of the literature exclusion is synonymous with the repressive violence that 
the state perpetrates against opposition political movements and strictness of rules 
imposed on those wishing to be involved in the political system.(11) The Tunisian 
case certainly reflects this type of exclusion against Ennahda – and its previous 
incarnations as Jamaa and Mouvement Tendence Islamique (MTI). In the early 
1990s the state heavily repressed Islamism in the name of safeguarding the country 
from an obscurantiste ideology and then from 2001 onwards repression was 
conducted in the name of fighting terrorism. However exclusion can be also defined 
more broadly to include the social rejection of political projects that are perceived to 
be alien to mainstream society, which can reinforce and to a certain extent underpin 
and legitimize state’s repression. The hypothesis here is that the harsh repression 
against the party at the hands of the state, the imprisonment or exile of its leaders and 
cadres together with the strong rejection the party faced in large sectors of Tunisian 
society for quite some time made it possible and necessary for Ennahda to entirely 
re-elaborate how political Islam could contribute to the developmental trajectory of 
the country. From this re-elaboration flows the acceptance of the dominant discourse 
of democracy, liberalism, and market economy without which the party would not 
have been able to find much space in Tunisia. Ultimately it is about maintaining 
religious values simply as references and not as guiding principles of public policy-
making, as Olivier Roy also recently pointed out.(12) Building on this thesis of 
“moderation through exclusion”, the article offers an analysis of the intellectual-
ideological introspection that Ennahda went through to be able to find acceptance in 
the institutional game and, crucially, in wider society. This analysis is based on the 
examination of the scholarly literature on the party and interviews with many of its 
leaders. 
While it is always difficult to derive generalizations from a single case, the journey 
of Ennahda can point to significant trends within political Islam and its party 
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expressions at a time when processes of democratization are taking place in the Arab 
world, albeit amidst considerable difficulties. The linkage between the religiosity of 
political actors and democratization is usually problematic because such actors are 
often perceived to be inimical to many fundamental liberal rights and because of 
their ideological rigidity. The case of Ennahda provides evidence that this might not 
necessarily always be the case and that democratization can benefit from the positive 
input of religiously oriented parties. 
 
Ennahda ... in moderation 
  In post-revolutionary Tunisia, Ennahda plays a central role in the process of 
democratization having committed its considerable resources to the construction of a 
new plural democratic political system that would respect civil liberties and human 
rights.(13) This political positioning of Ennahda has come under criticism from some 
sectors of secular civil and political societies such as women’s rights organizations, 
parties of the extreme left and the new political formation of Bourguibist inspiration 
Nida Tounes that perceive in the embracing of democracy on the part of Ennahda 
some sort of ruse to obtain uncontested power and then proceed to implement the 
construction of an exclusionary religion-based state.(14) In many ways contemporary 
criticism of and accusations against Ennahda resemble the traditional ones that 
secular Arabs, or seculars tout court as the introduction to the special issue makes 
clear, held against Islamist parties since their inception, although in the Tunisian case 
this criticism is no longer as widespread as it was in the past, as the alliance between 
Islamists and secular and socialist figures such as Moncef Marzouki and Mustapha 
Ben Jaafer indicates. In any case, this normative view opens an endless and rather 
trite debate about the genuine commitment of Islamist parties when it comes to the 
procedures of democracy and human rights.(15) This article does not intend to 
second-guess Ennahda and its actions, preferring instead to focus on its political 
praxis. Much like in Alaya Allani’s work on Ennahda, there is the acceptance that the 
party has come a long way since its foundation in terms of its attitude towards the 
fundamental principles of electoral democracy and basic human rights.(16) 
98 
 
When one attempts to trace the political positions of the party over time with respect 
to the institutional system, economic choices, and social set-up, what emerges 
suggests a profound shift towards moderation. When looking at Ennahda, its political 
trajectory is inevitably intertwined with Ghannouchi’s intellectual history and the 
way in which his understanding of the role of Islamism in politics evolved.(17) Thus, 
there is no doubt that the party is very much influenced by the development of 
Ghannouchi’s political thinking. However, it would be erroneous to conflate the 
trajectory of the party entirely with Ghannounchi because other leaders such 
Abdelfattah Mourou or Mohammed Khouja have also been important activists and 
thinkers. The outcome of the development of Ghannouchi’s thinking, together with 
the internal debate between different factions within the party – such as the moderate 
wing of Mourou or the more radical one linked to Salafism that Khouja (the current 
leader of the Salafist party Front of Reform) embodied – has been one of increasing 
moderation. There are a number of aspects that seem to confirm such moderation. 
  First, on the issue of the nature of the Tunisian state, there has been a 
seachange in the Islamist movement’s position since the 1970s. Under the influence 
of the more militant ideology of the Muslim Brothers of the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s, the movement Rachid Ghannouchi(18) led subscribed to the 
creation of an Islamic state whereby the application of sharia law for the whole 
society reflected the unitary vision embodied in the principle of tawhid. In this 
vision, there is a perfect and unquestioned overlap between the state and religion. 
This principle of unity influenced a Manichean view of society and politics whereby 
“belief” should replace “unbelief”: this simple shift would eventually heal all the 
social and political conflicts in society. 
By the early 1980s Ghannouchi had begun to think about the nature of the state in a 
different manner and the party progressively abandoned this vision. This did not 
occur seamlesly, as the party went through a significant split in the late 1980s, when 
a radical fringe left Ennahda to remain on a more uncompromising position related to 
the necessity of building an Islamic state. The party has arrived at a point where it 
currently supports the creation of a “civil” state (dawla madaniyya), openly 
subscribing to the idea that references to religion are purely identity-based and not 
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sources for public policy-making.(19) Thus, in the debate over the drafting of the 
post-revolutionary Tunisian constitution, the party has been able to compromise with 
the secular sectors of society on a provision that reflects this principle. This has a 
practical impact on the strategy of alliances that Ennahda undertakes with some 
secular parties, refusing implicitly to be the sole representative of the people by 
virtue of its religious references.(20) In addition, party leaders emphasize that 
subscription to democratic procedures and values characterizes the party internally as 
well. Ali Larayedh, member of the Executive Committee of the party and now Prime 
Minister, stated that democratic decision-making informs the party at all levels.(21) 
This issue of internal democracy is obviously disputed and might not correspond to 
the reality, but what is interesting to note is that prominent Ennahda leaders feel they 
have to employ pro-democracy rhetoric to appear as legitimate interlocutors. This 
profoundly contrasts with Tunisian Salafists for instance, who instead have no 
qualms about condemning liberal-democracy.(22) 
Second, on the issues of fundamental human rights and equality we also 
witness a profound shift from the early 1970s onwards. This is the continuation of 
the re-elaboration of the principle of tawhid in so far as imposition of mores of 
behaviour is justified within the framework of that principle, but once this is 
transformed into support for a civil state, a different understanding of human rights 
flows. This is most notable on women’s rights and, specifically in the case of 
Tunisia, on the egalitarian Personal Status Code introduced by Bourguiba in 1956. 
Despite the virulent opposition that Ennahda still engenders in secular feminist 
movements such as Femmes Democrates because of its conservative positions on 
gender relations, the party claims that it fully accepted the liberal Personal Status 
Code in the 1980s. As mentioned, this does not mean that the party has abandoned its 
socially conservative views about the role of women in society and about gender 
relations more generally, which should be centred on the absolute primary role of the 
family in society. Of course, such acceptance might have been purely instrumental 
and tactical in order to benefit from the inclusion into the very brief liberalizing 
period of late 1980s, but the point is that Ennahda did not go back on it when 
repression hit the movement and when a more radical attitude could have been 
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expected given that there were no benefits to be gained by this position of tactical 
moderation. 
Third, and in line with other Islamist movements, Ennahda started off with 
little interest for economic matters to develop a critical attitude towards capitalism, 
particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution through the influence of Ali 
Shariati, as recognized by Ghannouchi himself.(23) Ill at ease with socialism as well, 
the party searched for a third way between the market economy of the imperialist 
West and the command economy of socialist countries. However, it can be argued 
that the critique of capitalism dominated the economic agenda of the party during the 
1970s and 1980s. Thanks to the intellectual input of the Iranian revolution in 1979, 
the leadership was able to make the connection between the promotion of the 
material interests of the disenfranchized and religious principles, proposing the 
establishment of an economic model that would eliminate the shortcomings – read 
profound inequalities – of the capitalist system. While the party maintains in some 
ways that this third way is still potentially pursuable,(24) it is quite evident that it has 
moved significantly towards the acceptance of a market economy integrated into the 
global neoliberal system as the only way for Tunisia to develop. There has been for 
instance no real debate about the free trade agreement that links Tunisia so closely to 
the European economies and even though the party seeks to attract more Gulf 
investment into the country, the neoliberal logic is the same given that the Gulf 
economies are fully part of the process of neoliberal globalization. It is revelatory 
that today the constituency of reference of Ennahda is largely composed of 
merchants, traders, and business people rather than the fully disenfranchized 
(mouhammishin) who find instead representation in the extra-institutional Salafist 
movements or in marginal leftist groups.(25) 
Finally, the anti-imperialist dimension of Islamism has been over time 
considerably diluted. Although there is nominal support for the Palestinians as there 
was indignation for the 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq and therefore a degree of 
anti-Americanism, these attitudes are widely shared among Tunisian political parties 
of all ideological persuasions. Currently, the party displays a significant degree of 
pragmatism on foreign policy matters and has for instance acceded to American 
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demands for a crackdown of Salafist activism in the aftermath of the attack on the 
US embassy in Tunis in September 2012. Ghannouchi and other leaders have been 
very reassuring with the United States and the European Union about their intentions 
on foreign policy matters when it comes to US and European interests in the region. 
There is a sense that the policies Tunisia pursued in this respect under Ben Ali will 
not be much altered.(26) 
As one can therefore note, the journey towards moderation the party has 
travelled since the 1970s until its arrival in power in 2011 has been quite a long one. 
It is a journey towards moderation in so far as it accepts the dominant values and 
discourses that the majority of the international community subscribes to. Thus, 
following the two dimensions that Ozzano offers to categorize religiously oriented 
parties, Ennahda, certainly under the impulse of its leader, changed both 
ideologically and practically. The question though remains as to what made the party 
undertake this journey. 
 
The inclusion-moderation hypothesis 
 Islamist parties have been central to academic and policy debates of Arab politics 
since their forceful emergence in the 1970s. More specifically their presence has 
affected debates about democratization and authoritarian resilience in the region. 
More often than not the religious orientation of such parties was held to be an 
insurmountable obstacle to the demise of authoritarian rule, preventing processes of 
tentative democratization from succeeding.27 In the 2000s, the debate on Islamist 
parties changed because it became noticeable that, increasingly, a number of such 
movements had begun to adopt and subscribe to the language of democracy and 
human rights, taking part in participatory politics whenever the opportunity 
arose.(28) Over time and despite the scepticism surrounding them both domestically 
and internationally, a number of them progressively shifted their most radical 
positions in order to be able to construct cross-ideological agreements with non-
Islamist opposition forces with a view to becoming an alternative bloc to the ruling 
coalition.(29) Crucially, they also tended to accept invitations to participate in 
regime-sponsored initiatives of limited political openings despite the realization that 
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such openings would not lead to policy-making power. The literature examining 
these shifts follows largely the incipit of Olivier Roy’s 1992 work in which he 
pointed to the failure of political Islam as an ideological project alternative to the 
dominant values of liberal-democracy, suggesting implicitly that Islamism would 
have to find and elaborate new categories of thinking and action if it wished to 
remain a relevant political actor.(30) 
Given that the dominant international discourse of political legitimization 
since the end of the 1980s across the globe rested on the three pillars of 
representative democracy, liberal human rights, and market economy, many Islamist 
parties began to utilize such categories, although through an indigenous re-
elaboration based on the scriptures and interpretations of Islam. While this was 
occurring, a narrative developed through which mainstream Islamist parties began to 
be examined according to the notion of progressive moderation(31) with a focus on 
the different ways in which such moderation was understood.(32) This followed the 
findings of the inclusion-moderation theory as applied in Europe to extreme left-
wing parties and religious parties in the aftermath of World War II. Post-World War 
II societies in Western Europe were more inclusive than the authoritarian regimes in 
which Islamist parties operated, but Arab regimes have been experimenting with 
liberalization for quite some time and therefore the literature has attempted to use the 
hypothesis of moderation through inclusion in such contexts as well. The principal 
idea of this line of inquiry is derived from the assumption that increased political 
participation in consensual institutions, whether with the regime or with other 
opposition parties, leads to the moderation of the Islamist position regarding the 
nature of the state and the extent of liberal rights. Thus, through continued interaction 
with other political actors, Islamists learn to moderate and they are socialized into the 
mechanisms of compromise and bargaining, the very foundation of the liberal-
democratic game.(33) Within this larger literature, two types of studies can be 
distinguished. On the one hand, we have analyses explaining the “progressive 
moderation” of specific Islamist parties such as the Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (AKP) or the Moroccan Party for Justice and Development (PJD). They have 
come to embody the very notion of political moderation  and acceptance of 
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democracy and human rights together with a market-oriented stance on economic 
matters and a pragmatic one on sensitive strategic issues of importance for the 
West.(34) On the other hand, there are studies that highlight the similarities of the 
Islamist journey towards moderation with the one that other extremist radical anti-
systemic parties travelled in the past, such as the communist parties of Western 
Europe.(35) 
The moderation through inclusion thesis has a number of advantages. First, it 
contributes to providing the theoretical tools necessary to explain the choice of 
moderation that many Islamist parties did indeed make given that inclusion and 
cross-ideological alliances have been a trait of Arab politics in a number of countries 
over recent years. There are a number of cases where progressive inclusion, no 
matter how stop-start and limited in nature, did indeed allow Islamist parties to come 
to accept ideological compromises and endorse pragmatism in order to participate, at 
times marginally and at others more substantively, in political life. Second, it has the 
merit of challenging, from a policy-making perspective, the validity of the choice of 
relentless repression of political expressions based on religious prescriptions. Finally, 
it has the benefit of “normalizing” Islamist parties and their attitudes on a range of 
issues because it provides a parallel with other contexts and ideologies that 
demonstrate how the Arab world might not be so “exceptional” in terms of its 
apparently culture-specific rejection of democracy and human rights. 
 However, the “moderation through inclusion” thesis has a significant 
shortcoming, which undermines in part its applicability and validity across all cases. 
Crucially, there is very little thinking about the possibility that exclusion might have 
led anti-systemic parties to revise their ideological tenets and political strategies 
towards moderation in cases where there was no inclusion to speak of. There is a 
rather widespread assumption that repression of anti-systemic views provokes further 
radicalization and ultimately anti-systemic violence as a reaction. A number of 
studies highlight how it is the violent repression of the state that is responsible for 
radicalization, which, in turn, prevents not only moderation but also democratic 
political change.36 However there is, at least in theory, the possibility that the vast 
majority of those who are repressed and rejected in large sectors of society might end 
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up critically revisiting their activism. Thus, rather than opting for radicalization, they 
might instead choose to re-formulate the ideological tenets and strategies that 
brought about repression and social rejection to moderate their stances and demands. 
While this might certainly not hold true for the whole of the movement or party 
being targeted for repression – with the outcome of creating splits – it might be true 
for a sufficient number of leaders and cadres to see that their radicalism has failed to 
make headway, leading them to think about ideological and concrete changes. It is 
this aspect of moderation through exclusion that the following section explores, with 
a focus on the Tunisian case. It is always problematic to generalize from one case 
study, but the conditions that led to the moderation in the Tunisian case can 
potentially be present in other Arab societies. 
 The case of Ennahda is interesting precisely because the dominant narrative 
of moderation through inclusion does not apply given the almost relentless state 
repression and widespread social rejection it faced over the last four decades. Despite 
exclusion, the party has certainly moderated more than sufficiently for  key actors on 
both the Tunisian and international stages to deserve to be treated as possibly the 
most moderate and pragmatic Islamist party in the Arab world.(37) 
 
 Ennahda’s long march 
As mentioned earlier, a number of cases such as the Turkish AKP or the Moroccan 
PJD or the Yemeni Islah confirm the validity of the moderation by inclusion thesis 
whereby there is a strict correlation between the progressive institutionalization of 
Islamist parties and their acceptance of democratic constraints. The Tunisian case 
offers a rather different perspective on the mechanisms of moderation. Having 
established that the Islamist movement in Tunisia came a long way, inclusion and 
progressive institutionalization in the political system cannot be said to have been the 
principal explanatory variables; quite the opposite is true. In fact the Tunisian 
specificity is that the Islamist movement faced a double exclusion: from the state and 
from large sectors of Tunisian society. It is at this juncture where the novelty of this 
analysis resides in so far as we tease out the meaning of exclusion to make it a more 
fluid concept than simply state-led repression. On the one hand was the traditional 
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type of exclusion linked to state repression and specifically the outright refusal to 
integrate any religious movement into the political system. This type of exclusion 
was quite relentless throughout the dictatorships of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, 
although there were a couple of very small openings during the 1980s.38 This 
exclusion brought down significant violence on the Islamist movement with its 
leaders and ordinary members periodically arrested, imprisoned for long periods, or 
exiled. On the other hand there is the exclusion of the Islamists coming from society, 
particularly in the 1970s, 1980s and, although less intense, into the 1990s. Tunisian 
understanding and practice of Islam was certainly a value of reference for many 
ordinary citizens, but they perceived it quite apolitically. It follows that the 
politicization of religion that Islamists brought to the fore was largely alien to their 
political and social vision and struggles. Rachid Ghannouchi also recognizes this 
when he talks about the place that Islamism had in Tunisia in the 1970s: “Islamist 
militants felt a sense of alienation from wider society”(39) because they sensed 
rejection and not only because they were dissatisfied with the place of religion in 
Tunisia. 
 The analysis of the evolution of the Tunisian Islamist movement from 
fundamentalist to conservative has to take into account both types of exclusion as 
explanatory mechanisms for the re-elaboration of the theoretical and ideological 
underpinnings of the Islamist project in the country, away from the rigidity of an 
Islamic state imposed from the top to the acceptance of a plural civil state. What we 
have is a dialectic mechanism whereby the movement initially – and the structured 
party later – has to change from within because of the conditioning from without. In 
some ways the mechanisms of exclusion catalyzed some of the internal ideological 
debates that were naturally occurring in a heterogeneous movement. Particularly, the 
focus should be on the impact of the mainstream ideological and cultural vision of 
society, referring to the understanding and acceptance of categories of modernity 
embedded in the Tunisian national consciousness. These are embodied in a tradition 
of tolerance and religious reformism of the scholars of the Zitouna. In short, 
according to Sami Brahim, a leading Islamic intellectual,(40) Tunisia is characterized 
by the predominance of what he calls “an implicit social consensus”, whereby 
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extremisms, including religious ones, are largely rejected in society. This means that 
forms of social organization that do not fall within this consensus remain marginal 
and minoritarian. Brahim gives the example of polygamy, a practice perceived to be 
illiberal and anti-women, to illustrate this point in the sense that Tunisian society has 
integrated, across its social milieux, the refusal of such practice, although this is 
permitted in the literalist understanding of the scriptures. This refusal generates a 
political consensus that includes the vast majority of Islamism. The main argument is 
really about Tunisian society as a natural limit to extremism, which is a point that 
comes across in discussions with younger members of Ennahda as well. For instance, 
they do not genuinely understand radical Salafist literalist positions and perceive 
them as alien.(41) 
If one traces the history of the movement back to its early jamaa stage and its 
later incarnation as a political party, it is possible to detect change towards 
moderation not as the product of inclusion but of conflict with a society that used to 
reject Islamism and embraced it only when it became fully “Tunisian”. The first real 
encounter with wider Tunisian society and its attitudes took place on university 
campuses in the 1970s. Until then the jamaa was concerned with the organization of 
discussion “circles” (halaqat) in mosques and schools where a type of Islamism 
anchored in the readings and experiences of the Qutb-inspired Egyptian Brotherhood 
dominated. Within this context, there were in the jamaa simplistic beliefs and 
assumptions of how Islam could be politically activated in society, according to 
Ghannouchi.(42) The categories through which they operated had to do with the 
conflict between “belief” and “un-belief” that they perceived in Tunisian society. 
Once Islamist students began to be active on university campuses, they realized quite 
quickly that the left dominated the political scene and that, more broadly, social 
mores were heavily secularized. Islamism was therefore seen as somewhat alien 
among the activist youth and in both working-class and bourgeois circles, not 
because the religious practices were alien to ordinary Tunisians, but because the 
problems and issues that society faced as a whole could not be solved and even 
conceived of in the simplistic categories of belief and unbelief. In addition, all this 
was occurring at a time when the Bourguibist secular political project was the state’s 
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ideology, which the Islamists were also up against. Among Islamist students, there 
was the sudden realization that they had very little or nothing to contribute to the 
national debate about the direction Tunisia should take economically, socially, and 
politically, because for a long time the categories used for such debate were framed 
through secular ideologies. This came as a shock to many of them and in this phase it 
is important to underline that their lack of success and sense of alienation were not 
the product of repressive exclusion, because state authorities were actually quite 
tolerant of their activism on campuses; it came about because of societal exclusion. 
The socialist and Marxist left occupied almost entirely the public space in 
universities – and was able to mobilize the youth because it seemed to be the only 
political project alternative to Bourguiba’s. It was, however, just as secular as 
Bourguibism. Islamist students on campuses had intense debates with leftist students, 
which the left won hands down in so far as it became the protagonist of the 1978 
general strike on the part of the trade union ‘Union Generale Travailleurs Tunisiens 
(UGTT) against Bourguiba.(43) This was a turning point for the Islamists because 
they were faced with the irrelevance of their categories among those who opposed 
the regime in place. While they still thought in terms of belief and unbelief, society 
was either on a leftist revolutionary path or behind the secular Bourguiba. Thus, 
Islamists had to decide whether they wanted to go back to their discussion circles and 
become marginalized or change direction to be appealing to the politicized masses 
entering the scene against the regime.(44) In short, the limits of social representation 
of the Jamaa at this stage lay with the inability to offer a political programme that 
addressed the social issues at the core of the 1978 strike and the bread riots of 1984, 
although the movement did grow somewhat during this period of social tensions. 
What is interesting to note is that large sectors of the trade union UGTT still today 
have a very difficult time reconciling with Ennahda, although their ranks also include 
many Ennahda members and sympathizers.(45) 
 
Taking different paths 
 
From the crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the movement evolved in three 
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different directions. First, a group of liberal Islamists such as Ennafeir and el Jorchi 
began working for a cultural reform within Islam and subscribed to the idea of 
referring to a specific Tunisian Islam based on the traditional reformism of the 
Zitouna, which would be by its very nature closer to Tunisian society. Second, a 
group of radicals such as Mohammed Ali Hurath and Mohammed Khouja left and 
began to pursue either a dawa-inspired activism in society or armed violence. 
Finally, the larger group, which is usually identified with Rachid Ghannouchi and 
Abdelfattah Mourou, went on to form a political party in order to measure the appeal 
of a renewed Islamist project in a competitive political environment. It isthus that the 
MTI came about on 6 June 1981. What is interesting in this respect is the mechanism 
that drove the creation of the party and this has to do with the explicit admission that 
the previous theoretical categories borrowed from the experiences of the rest of the 
Arab world did not apply to Tunisian society, which had gone through a radically 
different process of socio-economic, historical, and intellectual development. 
Ghannouchi and Mourou recognized that one size did not fit all. As also recognized 
from within Ennahda today, the acceptance of the challenge of institutional politics 
as a mechanism to respond to the demands of the masses through categories they 
could easily recognize was the product of a theoretical re-elaboration that brought 
into Tunisian Islamism some of the concepts of the Iranian revolution. Unlike what 
critics of the party usually point to,the most important import from Iran is not the 
idea of the theocratic state, but the conflict between mustadaafeen (the 
disenfranchized) and mustaqhbareen (the arrogant). It is not so much the work of 
Khomeini that makes a difference for Ghannouchi and the leadership, but the 
analysis of Ali Shariati on class.(46) They discover that the notions of 
disenfranchized and privileged can have a religious connotation and this is sufficient 
to include them in a new theoretical repositioning of the party that corresponds better 
to the demands of anti-Bourguiba Tunisian society for class representation in 
politics, particularly at a time when the left was slightly beginning to wane through 
the massive repression of the state and the broader loss of appeal of socialism. In the 
words of Ghannouchi, “the movement took a step towards society and society took a 
step towards the movement” because the religious connotations of the two categories 
109 
 
of mustadaafeen and mustaqhbareen are reassuring for those conservative sectors of 
society that need political ideals to be embedded into religion. In addition to this, the 
Islamists were examining with interest the “success” of the Mestiri-led Mouvement 
Democratique Socialiste (MDS) as the largest opposition party in the country 
because it forced them to be confronted with the “liberal” idea of democratic 
mechanisms in so far as the MDS criticized one-party rule in the name of the 
inherent pluralism in Tunisian society.(47) All these re-elaborations are obviously 
not only the direct outcome of external conditions because exclusion from society is 
not occurring in a vacuum: in the movement itself there was already a debate taking 
place about the nature of its political and social engagement through the categories of 
Islam. In some ways rejection serves the purpose of catalyzing debate and is at the 
root of the splits highlighted earlier. 
This phase of exclusion continued in the early 1980s and this time it was a 
much more traditional form of exclusion through state repression and violence that 
targeted not only the radical and a small armed faction that had broken with the MTI, 
but also the MTI itself. Thus, the gains in society that the movement had made 
through the incorporation of new theoretical categories and the decision to form a 
political party seeking institutionalization were offset by repression. Superficially, it 
may appear that the repressive campaign and the imprisonment of the leadership 
pushed the party towards greater moderation. It is for instance in jail in the early 
1980s that Rachid Ghannouchi produced the theoretical work that is now the pillar of 
the attitudes and policy positions of the party with respect to public freedoms in the 
direction of cementing democracy as the only viable political system. The repressive 
campaign in and of itself did not, however, directly influence the theoretical 
reflection and production of Ghannouchi. Such reflection for instance was not shared 
by all Tunisian Islamists, indicating that other Islamists equally repressed still 
subscribed to a different ideological framework. Nevertheless, Ghannouchi’s 
intellectual work still constituted a significant development because it would inform 
and constrain the actions of militants from this point onwards, as such reflection 
would be increasingly discussed and eventually accepted from within. It should also 
be highlighted that according to Ghannouchi himself repression was a problematic 
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interruption in what was a natural progression towards the acceptance of democratic 
procedures and basic human rights.48 In short, it is not jail that makes Islamists more 
moderate, but the realization that, with or without imprisonment, they had to confront 
a society that was still not at ease with the Manichean views that Islamists had in the 
1970s and early 1980s. As Ghannouchi argues when talking to his own constituency 
to convince them of the necessity of a transformation within the frame of religion: 
“religion prospers within democracy; it is within dictatorship that it fades. Look at 
what happens to Muslims: they escape dictatorships in the Muslim world to look for 
freedom in established democracies. As Mawdudi and Qutb said, Islam is in its 
essence a revolution of liberation for mankind from slavery and constraints (within 
the limits God Imposed) ... It is both spiritual and social freedom”.(49) 
After a brief democratic opening in the late 1980s under the premiership of 
Mzali, who seemed to accept the commitment of the MTI to pluralism, a new 
repressive campaign began under then Minister of Interior Ben Ali.(50) Once the 
latter became president in 1987 he launched a political pact that would introduce 
political pluralism in Tunisia and the MTI changed its name in order to take part in 
the construction of what they believed was going to be a new Tunisia and genuinely 
demonstrate its commitment to the civil nature of the state given that they dropped a 
clear reference to religion when the party became Ennahda.(51) Ennahda was not 
officially recognized as a political party, but its candidates were allowed to run as 
independents. However a number of factors, both domestic – the better than expected 
results of Ennahda – and international – the civil war in Algeria – prevented the 
consolidation of the Tunisian process of liberalization and a new repressive 
campaign against Islamists began in earnest in order to avoid an Algerian scenario of 
violence. 
Once again, this rupture is decisive for the journey of the party towards 
moderation because it will engender an internal debate about the necessity of 
building bridges with ideological rivals in opposition that were shunning Ennahda. 
Once again it is exclusion broadly conceived that is the explanatory mechanism. In 
addition to the repressive policies aimed at the annihilation of the movement, it 
should be underlined that the secular sector of society, represented by secular 
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political parties and civil society groups, compounded the harsh exclusionary policies 
of the state against the Islamists. Secular parties and social movements were far from 
convinced of Ennahda’s self-representation as moderate and democratic. There are 
solid reasons for this new social impetus against Ennahda that concerned this sector 
of society. First, it should be admitted that the progressive, moderate, and democratic 
theoretical elaborations of the leadership had a difficult time filtering down to an 
Islamist popular base that was incensed by repression and radicalized by 
international events such as the Algerian civil war or the attack against Iraq. It is 
clear that the process of internal change of the party towards the acceptance of 
democracy, women’s rights, and pluralism that found its most significant expression 
in the signature of the national pact of 1988 had a difficult time imposing itself on 
the Islamist popular base. Second, the internal split within the party, symbolized in 
the isolation of the moderate and rather liberal co-founder Mourou, seemed to 
suggest that a more radical anti-systemic attitude was winning out internally, with an 
ambiguous attitude towards political violence emerging. Finally, the popular gains 
that the Islamist movement had made throughout the 1980s after their first rupture 
with their jamaa past had forced Tunisian secular parties to come to terms with the 
popularity of doing politics through religion. This turned them against any 
expression of political religiosity, whether moderate or radical, because this would 
fundamentally alter the secular nature of the state. 
With this in mind, many secular Tunisians remained silent if not supportive of 
the exclusion of Ennahda throughout more than a decade. The tacit consensus for 
repression on the part of secular society is more significant for the second phase of 
theoretical re-elaboration of the party after 1991 than imprisonment or exile. For 
quite some time this secular fight on two fronts – against the regime and against 
Islamists – was a trait of most Arab societies(52) but it often ended with an uneasy 
support for authoritarian incumbents.(53) In any case, the isolation of the 1990s 
pushed the party even more in the direction of what were quickly becoming the only 
internationally legitimate pillars to operate on the political scene: democracy, human 
rights, and the market. It was only the common destiny of repression(54) that 
developed during the later years of the Ben Ali era between all genuine opposition 
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mplayers that permitted the creation of a united front against the regime that includes 
Ennahda. It was figures such as human rights activist and leader of the secular party 
Congress for the Republic Marzouki who moved first, suggesting that democracy in 
Tunisia would come only through an agreement with Ennahda and not against it. The 
progressive exclusionary repressive policies against all forms of dissent and the 
absence of public freedoms during the Ben Ali era pushed the party to accept at all 
levels the necessity of democracy and allow it to strategically form alliances with 
equally repressed secular political forces in the name of change. Crucial in all of this 
was the “final submission” to the idea that social pluralism needs to be 
accommodated. As Riadh Chaibi, member of the Ennahda national assembly, argued 
in 2011: “we are not a dogmatic party, we are a pragmatic party. We realise that 
Tunisia is a plural country and Europe is very close to us not only geographically. 
Tunisian society is similar in many ways to European societies and this is a given 
and we do not want to change that”.(55) The necessity for democracy finally found 
its highest coordination point in the 18 October 2005 Collectif, which can be 
considered the moment when Ennahda no longer faced widespread rejection from the 
political and social representatives of many sectors of Tunisian society; moderation 
is recognized as having been attained. 
 
 Conclusion 
The 2011 power-sharing agreement with two centre-left parties to guide Tunisia to 
multi-party democracy and the recognition of the pluralism of Tunisian society 
seemed the obvious destination of the Islamist party Ennahda, which has moved 
away progressively from its anti-democratic and illiberal position to become a much 
more traditional religiously oriented political party. Much of the literature on Islamist 
parties that has gone through a similar transformation explains this shift over time 
with the moderation through inclusion thesis. This does not apply to the Tunisian 
case because in a strict institutional sense, the Islamist movement was never 
genuinely afforded the possibility to participate in the political system and cross-
ideological cooperation never occurred before the mid to late 2000s. Its moderation 
therefore needs to be accounted for differently and “moderation through exclusion” 
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can provide an answer. The reference here is not only to the state’s repression of the 
movement through imprisonment and exile, although this occurred on a large scale. 
The reference is more to a sort of societal rejection whereby the specificities of 
Tunisian socio-political development meant that the Islamist movement had to go 
through a profound re-elaboration of its initial political categories in order not to be 
perceived as alien and irrelevant. In particular, it had to come to terms with an 
implicit social consensus shaped by Bourguibism and a tradition of Islamic 
reformism. 
 The Tunisian Islamist movement developed from the early 1970s as a critical 
reflection of Western modernity according to the model that Bourguiba, strictly 
following the secular tradition of France, imposed on the country.(56) This 
widespread and thorough critique of what was at the root of the Tunisian nationalist 
sentiment and ideology became progressively less central and by the late 2000s there 
was an almost complete turnaround of judgement on it, which is explicit in the 
documents of the ninth congress of the party held in the summer of 2012. This does 
not imply that Bourguibism is judged positively but there is recognition that the 
process of construction of a moderate, nationalist, open, and Muslim Tunisia is 
possible because its source is a tradition of religious reformism that comes from the 
experience of the Zitouna and that is specifically Tunisian. The fundamentalist vision 
of Islam that the party had in the 1970s progressively disappeared because society 
rejected it and this exclusion forced the party to re-elaborate the way in which it 
wished to engage it. Over time the scale of rejection in society decreased and the 
party made significant inroads, but in order to do so it had to accept stances and 
attitudes that comforted the nationalist self-image of Tunisians, a “country that is 
both Muslim and open by virtue of its history and its geography”.(57) The necessity 
to engage for instance with the vast politicized sectors of a unionized workforce that 
began to appear within the party in the late 1970s and early 1980s required the party 
to construct new categories of thinking and to abandon simplistic sloganeering. The 
realization that Tunisia has a multi-layered identity and expresses a high degree of 
social pluralism also affected the party and provoked an internal debate as to how 
better take that factor into account. 
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 The concept of exclusion carried also a narrower connotation: state 
violence.There is no doubt that the experience of jail and exile had an impact on the 
members and activists of the party and profoundly informed the views of many of 
them who come into contact with leftist prisoners or with freer European societies. 
From a general point of view, exclusion as repression simply slowed the process of 
introspection that the party went through in light of societal exclusion. One of the 
principal characteristics of the Tunisian transition to democracy is that it links the 
political and ideological debate about the nature of the state and state-society 
relations to what it was in the late 1980s and even earlier to the struggle for 
independence. It is this inevitable mutual recognition and its institutionalization on 
the part of Islamists and seculars of the plural moderate Muslim nature of Tunisian 
society that will make or break Tunisian democratization. 
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Post-Islamism, ideological evolution and ‘la tunisianité’ of the Tunisian Islamist 
party al-Nahda”113 
 
The electoral victories of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Moroccan Islamist parties 
following the Arab uprisings, together with the central role they played in Libya and 
Yemen, have placed once again Political Islam at the centre of the scholarly and 
policy-making debate (1) For some time before the uprisings, increasing neglect of 
Islamist parties and movements and how they changed characterized the scholarship 
on the Arab world, although there were very notable exceptions to the trend(2) This 
widespread neglect had two reasons. First, the thesis of ‘upgraded authoritarianism’ 
began to dominate studies of Arab politics and society.(3) The dominant research 
questions were how authoritarian Arab regimes managed to remain in power in the 
age of globalized democracy and what were the specific mechanisms allowing them 
to survive in the face of widespread popularillegitimacy. Answers to these questions, 
however important they were, monopolized much of the attention of scholars of the 
region, shifting the focus away from opposition actors and the ideological and 
organizational changes they might have gone through. Second, the thesis of post-
Islamism, which finds its roots in the works of Asef Bay at and Olivier Roy, hecame 
the theoretical framework through which Islamist politics and activism were being 
reinterpreted away from more traditional studies of political parties and associations 
with political goals.”(4) The main research questions dealt with the different 
articulations of Islamism present in society and how they differed from traditional 
state- centred Islamism focused on the creation of an Islamic state and adherence to 
sharia law. 
These two strands of research have greatly contrihuted to the understanding of 
Arab politics and societies, but they have both come under criticism since the Arab 
Awakening. The paradigm of ‘upgrading authoritarianism’ has been accused of 
                                                            
113 Published. Ref: Cavatorta, F., & Merone, F. (2015). Post-Islamism, ideological evolution and ‘la 
tunisianité’of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda. Journal of Political Ideologies, 20(1), 27-42. This 
article is a two-handed work. Based on my fieldwork, we shared the theoretical reflections and the 
writing.   
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implicitly suggesting that authoritarian rule in the region would not be challenged in 
a meaningful way for a long time and the uprisings suggested instead that there was 
no validity in such a thesis given the rapidity and intensity of the revolts. The reality 
might yet turn out to support the thesis of enduring authoritarianism, but there is no 
doubt that its credibility has suffered considerably.(5) The post-Islamism thesis 
suffered initially a similar fate because the main beneficiaries of the uprisings, where 
they succeeded, have been Islamist parties of the Ikhwani tradition, seemingly 
demonstrating that Islamism was far from finished and, crucially, far from being 
articulated in many different ways; the Tunisian al- Nahda received 37% of the votes 
cast and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 37.5%. Thus, Islamist party politics was 
alive and well. The electoral results and the arrival in power of the Islamists have 
generated a considerable amount of scholarship questioning previous knowledge of 
and assumptions about Islamism,(6) with the post-Islamism thesis becoming a target 
of scholarly criticism. 
More broadly, the success of Islamist parties and their centrality in the 
construction of new political arrangements has led to a collective effort to try to 
rethink Islamist politics.(7) This article is part of that intellectual effort, and through 
a critical re-examination of the thesis of post-Islamism it attempts to explain the 
internal mechanisms through which Islamist parties have dealt with the ideological 
challenges of participating in pluralistic politics. Specifically, we use the case of the 
Tunisian al-Nahda to discuss how the experience of transitional politics, with its 
inevitable corollary of compromise and coalition-making, shaped the internal 
ideological debates of the party and how, in turn, such debates have influenced the 
party’s strategy. In practical terms, these internal discussions led al- Nahda to adopt 
a strategic behaviour that resulted in the party signing up to a constitution that does 
not create an Islamic state in the traditional sense and that does not include any 
reference to sharia law. The contention here is that this should not be interpreted 
necessarily as a failure of Islamism, as Roy would, for instance, suggest. Rather, it 
would point to the changing nature of ideologies and ideological commitments,(8) 
which in turn spark disagreements and debates within parties and movements, further 
opening up the space of Islamism. As the articlehighlights, the changing ideological 
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references of al-Nahda in Tunisia have served to underpin the progressive 
transformation of the party and at the same time have contributed to the rise of 
competing forms of political Islam. In particular, there seems to he a renewed focus 
within Islamism on the differences between those who have a national focus and 
those who have a much more pronounced internationalist one. 
 
 
Post-Islamism and its validity 
 
The post-Islamism thesis was put forth as an answer to the changes in Islamist 
politics and activism that occurred in the 1990s. It is a theoretical framework that 
finds its origins principally in the works of Bayat, who coined the term Post- 
Islamism, and Roy. There are two different, but interrelated, conceptualizations of 
post-Islamism. In the first conceptualization, post-Islamism postulates that the 
political experience of Islamism—as a coherent and absolute ideological project to 
take over state power and transform both politics and society through religion- 
inspired reforms—had run its course. Thus, in Browers understanding of Roy’s 
work, ‘Islamism had failed, both intellectually and politically’(9). This had two 
consequences. On the one hand, Islamism retreated into new articulations of Islamist 
politics away from the fixation with state power and towards private expressions of 
religiosity, as for instance through economic success in a market economy.(10) On 
the other, it dispersed in society as a ‘non-movement’, a non- traditional 
understanding of popular mobilization against authoritarianism, whereby individual 
piety stood as an expression of political dissent against the authorities(11). The 
second conceptualization of post-Islamism does not see Islamism as a total failure, 
but argues that the mid 1990s represented the end of the ‘mythical revolutionary 
phase’ of Islamism—the arrival of Khatami in power in Iran is the paradigmatic 
example of the loss of revolutionary drive—and began a move towards reformism 
and compromise with ordinary politics and, crucially, politicking. For Bayat, post-
Islamism ‘is an attempt to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on its head by 
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emphasising rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular authoritative 
voice, historicity rather than fixed scriptures, and the future instead of the past’(12). 
The validity of post-Islamism has been called into question on two specific points. 
First, far from being politically exhausted, Islamist parties proved throughout the 
2000s that their electoral appeal was still powerful and that political power was still 
the goal despite the necessity to tread carefully in the face of state 
repression(13).Repression and strong constraints in electoral rules did not prevent the 
Egyptian Muslim Brothers from performing well in the 2005 legislative elections. 
The Moroccan Party for Justice and Development also performed well throughout 
the late 1990s and 2000s and could have done even better in terms of seats if the 
party had not decided to run candidates in a limited number of constituencies in 
order not to appear threatening to the monarchy(14). 
A similar scenario could be applied to the Kingdom of Jordan. In fully liberalized 
political systems Islamist parties of Ikhwani persuasion came to power with rather 
large majorities, as the cases of the Turkish Justice and Development party and the 
Palestinian Hamas proved. It should also he underlined that the Yemeni Islah party 
was a memher of the ruling coalition for a number of years on the hack of its 
electoral strength. Elsewhere in the Arab world—Libya, Algeria, Syria and 
Tunisia—only repression seemed to be able to keep Islamists out of political power. 
Finally, even the Lebanese Hizbullah progressively improved its electoral results and 
acquired greater prestige. In this respect, therefore, it seemed that Roy’s death knell 
of Islamism had been very premature. 
Second, the Arab Awakening clearly demonstrated that Islamist parties were the 
real protagonists of political life and that the assumptions behind the notion of the 
influence of ‘non-movements’ might have been exaggerated. Once political 
liberalization occurred, the real actors on the scene were the political parties with an 
Ikhwani tradition, soon followed in a number of countries by increasingly politicized 
Salafis. Islamist parties moved quickly and efficiently to fill the institutional gap and 
organized extremely successful electoral campaigns. The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and al-Nahda in Tunisia in particular mobilized members, sympathizers and 
voters according to the traditional arsenal of political parties: putting in place clear 
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structures across the country, planning the media campaign, selecting candidates and 
focusing on the development of a political manifesto. 
It follows from the two previous points that the very idea of post-lslamism had lost 
most of its appeal and its validity and usefulness began to be questioned. However, 
this criticism of the post-lslamist thesis should not detract from a crucial insight that 
the paradigm provided, namely that over time Islamist parties have abandoned many 
of their core demands and that, particularly after the Arab Spring, they have come to 
terms with the requirements and necessity of compromise in a pluralistic political 
environment. In the past, the classic dilemma of what would Islamist parties do in an 
open political system had remained largely theoretical, but following the 2011 
uprisings scholars and policy-makers have had the opportunity to test their 
assumptions. Rather than continuing to subscribe to the ideological absolutism of 
‘Islam is the solution’, Islamist parties have had to work towards the discovery of a 
much more pragmatic manner of conducting politics. While Roy might have been too 
quick and too definitive in dismissing the entire Islamist political project as a failure, 
the progressive reformist élan that has characterized Islamism for at least two 
decades and that is embodied in the second conceptualization of post-lslamism is a 
very useful device for understanding the evolutionary process of Political Islam. Far 
from being simply instrumental or hostage to the ‘moderation through inclusion’ 
theory,(15) which places all of its emphasis on the notion of contingent pragmatism, 
there is a process of fundamental ideological revision at work within large sectors of 
Ikhwani Islamism. It is, for instance, not a coincidence that Ikhwani reformism 
occurs at the same time when the banner of genuine ‘Islamism’ is picked up by an 
increasingly politicized Salafism.(16)Thus, the evolution of Ikhwani reformism is a 
dialectic conversation between praxis and ideological innovations, which mutually 
influence each other depending largely on national contexts. 
 
 
al-Nahda’s ideological evolution 
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The political moderation of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda has been one of the 
most hotly debated topics in both academic and policy-making circles since the 
legalization of the party in March 2011 following the collapse of the authoritarian 
regime.(17) In the context of the discussions held over the role al-Nahda would play 
in the Tunisian democratic transition, moderation was equated with the acceptance of 
democratic mechanisms, the respect for fundamental liberties and for the personal 
status legislation and, crucially in the Tunisian environment, the absolute formal 
support for the creation of a genuinely civil state. For some authors, the party led by 
Rachid Ghannounchi, a prominent Islamist thinker and intellectual in his own right, 
had already significantly moderated well before the Arab uprisings when very few 
believed it possible for the party ever to come to power.(18) Thus, despite a degree 
of both domestic and international scepticism, it was not entirely surprising that the 
party displayed a strong willingness to compromise and accept consensual solutions 
distant from its original Islamist ideological tenets. The time al-Nahda spent in 
government and in the Constitutional Assembly since its victory in the October 2011 
elections has often been controversial and at times outright confrontational against 
secular political parties and movements, but, ultimately, it has led to the fruitful 
conclusion of the first phase of the Tunisian transition. 
Despite the successful score in the election, the party went through a difficult 
process of political legitimization. As had happened at the end of 1989, when a 
tentative process of liberalization occurred under the watch of the newly installed 
president Ben Ali, the political success of Islamists was extremely problematic. The 
1989 partial electoral victory suggested that the party represented a large and 
significant sector of society, but its good performance at the polls frightened both the 
secular camp and the regime. It was almost inevitable that a crackdown would take 
place and it duly did, with the authoritarian state repressing all forms of political 
Islam and eventually widening its repressive measures to the liberal and secular 
sectors of society who had tacitly supported the political elimination of Islamists.(19) 
The 2011 elections and the show of electoral strength of al-Nahda generated similar 
fears, but the absence of authoritarian constraints allowed for party politics and state-
society relations to be conducted in a much freer political environment, leading 
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certainly to confrontations and moments of crisis—notably after the assassinations of 
two prominent left-wing politicians in 2013—^but, ultimately, to the inclusion and 
legitimization of the Islamists in national politics and institutions.(20) The new 
Constitution, approved in January 2014, signals the successful conclusion of the first 
phase of the Tunisian democratic process and the success is in large part due to the 
fact that al-Nahda has given up on its core Islamist principles and accepted the 
liberal-democratic game and rules. Party officials refer to the period between 
October 2011 and the summer of 2013 as the time when the party exercised its 
‘national responsibility’. Not only did the party privilege coalition politics and 
accepted leaving power in the name of the national interest to allow for the formation 
of a technocratic national unity government, but it also accepted the notion of a civil 
state and the inclusion of freedom of conscience in the Constitution. If one adds that 
the party did not question the validity of the personal status code that protects 
women’s rights and accepted that references to sharia would not appear in the final 
constitutional text, it emerges quite clearly that there does not seem to he much that 
is Islamist in the Islamist party. It would thus appear that Roy’s point about the 
political and ideological failure of Islamism is correct in so far as there is an Islamist 
party in Tunisia today only in name and not in practice, because it has simply 
accepted the political categories of liberal-democracy. If the measuring stick is the 
idealized Islamic state of the 1970s, there is little doubt that Roy’s point should be 
taken on board because it seems to point correctly to the intellectual poverty and the 
political naiveté of an ideological project based on religion-inspired understandings 
of state-making and institutions-making. In short, while religious categories might 
have been useful to construct a populist political project while in opposition, they 
now revealed their uselessness and lack of broad appeal when an Islamist party is 
confronted with the harsher realities of everyday politicking and compromising in a 
pluralistic environment. 
However, it would be too simplistic to argue that the Islamism al-Nahda in 
Tunisia subscribes to is simply now an empty shell and that the party has very little 
to do with Islamism. Such an interpretation closes the door firmly on the notion of 
ideological evolution, which, if carried out through proper criteria and references, 
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can ensure that a degree of ideological coherence with an early Islamist project can 
remain.(21) Ideologies are not fixed and constantly interact with the political and 
social environment within which they are produced and reproduced, suggesting that 
dogmatic and static adherence is often an exception. If one takes post- Islamism to 
mean reformism and not failure, it permits one to take seriously and examine 
critically the ideological positions and declarations of members of al-Nahda 
regarding the concrete political choices they made and the ideological context within 
which they were made. What is innovative here is to place ideology and ideological 
claims—and their evolution—at the centre of the analysis of the Tunisian Islamist 
movement to explain its development rather than fully subscribing to the influence of 
political pragmatism for the sake of obtaining or remaining in office. It is obviously 
important to underline institutional and political constraints as well the 
instrumentality of the specific policy choices and behaviour that have characterized 
at times al-Nahda" s political action since the revolution, but such choices do not 
occur in an ideological vacuum. There is a conversation taking place where political 
constraints dictated by the reality within which one operates influence the ideological 
positions and evolution of the party, but the degree of acceptance of such reality is 
due to the outcome of an internal ideological debate. This discussion renders in turn 
such choices possible and plausible in the context of a self-image and self-
representation of the party as an Islamist one. 
When one examines the discourse of the leadership of the party, it emerges that 
the Islamist references remain strong and intact even though critics, particularly 
within the Salali galaxy that has emerged as a powerful social force in the country 
(22) claim that there is little that is ‘Islamic’ left in al-Nahda. For instance 
Ghannouchi claimed that giving up on a reference to sharia in the constitution does 
not determine the degree of ‘Islamism’ of the party because the mission of an 
Islamist party today is to realize the broader objectives of sharia, which are, 
fundamentally, justice and liberty. He continues his argument by stating that in other 
Arab countries there are references to sharia in the constitution and in legislation, but 
in such countries Islam is not fully realized because there is neither justice nor 
liberty. In Ghannouchi’s view, Tunisia today is much more of a genuine Islamic 
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state—it fulfils the promise of justice and liberty—than Arab autocracies where 
rhetorical commitment to sharia is in fact rendered void by the absence of both 
justice and liberty (23). Statements such as this would be easy to dismiss as purely 
instrumental, self-serving and designed to appease party members still linked to an 
Islamist ideal that the party incarnated for a long time. Salali critics of the party 
claim indeed that al-Nahda has sold out Islamism.(24) However, this can and should 
be seen as the philosophical outcome of a complex process of ideological revision 
and soul-searching that uses religious categories and intellectuals to legitimize the 
evolutionary process. In turn, as mentioned earlier, such a process influences daily 
politicking and is influenced by it. The question thus arises as to how al-Nahda 
evolved ideologically towards what can be labelled Islamist reformism. 
Historically speaking, two coexisting ideological trends can be found in the Tunisian 
Islamic party: Ikhwani and Tunisian. They are not typical party factions, but they are 
two different understandings of the way in which Islamism can and should contribute 
to the creation of a new Islamic society. They are different in so far as the intellectual 
sources of inspiration for political action rest on interpretations and discourses that, 
particularly at crucial moments of crisis when a bold decision needs to be made, can 
come into conflict with each other. In some ways, these divisions affect all Islamist 
parties across the region, including the Muslim Brotherhood(25) and the Front 
Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) of the early 1990s in Algeria, with its 
djazairi (Algerian) nationalist soul imbued with local sociopolitical practices and its 
more international one linked to the rigidity of the project of the absolute Islamic 
state.(26) In its early stages, the Islamist movement in Tunisia was largely Ikhwani 
since the group’s members were in profound admiration of the international Muslim 
Brotherhood and its main scholars.(27) In fact, at the time, in one way or another all 
Islamists across the region were fascinated with the intellectual work of Ikhwani 
scholars, and most notably Sayyid Qutb, although Tunisian Islamists did not formally 
and entirely subscribe to his views.(28) Qutb is central because in his attempt to 
modernize Islamism he becomes the symbolic figure of what can be termed an 
Ikhwani sentiment. He had analysed society as being an unjust one; in religious 
terms, a society of ‘jahilyya’ (pre-Islamic ignorance).(29) In his thinking, the jamaa 
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(group) had the mission of bringing society back on the truth path of Islam. The 
modernity of Qutb took the language of the Koran, so familiar to all Muslims, to 
interpret the frustration of all Muslims, not only Egyptians, against the post-colonial 
Arab state. Thus, the state and the ruling elites became the taghout (apostate) and the 
Muslims backing them were reduced to the status of unbelievers, leading to the 
inevitability of jihad to reconstruct society.(30) Qutb’s analysis and solutions for the 
ills of Egyptian society applied more broadly to all Arab states and therefore being 
Ikhwani largely meant being linked to a transnational political project, with an 
international ideology based on the notion of one Islamic ummah. In this context, 
national differences, and therefore the entity nation-state, are simply contingent 
historical products that can and should be reversed at some stage in favour of a 
political project that will eventually lead to the creation of a single political 
authority; a pan-lslamic state where sharia reigns. This does not suggest that there 
was a clear political programme destined to fulfil what clearly remained an 
aspiration, but it indicates a fundamentally rigid application of the requirements of an 
Islamic state for all Arab countries without much regard for the national political, 
social and, crucially, religious environment. This is not to suggest that Qutb can 
stand in for all Ikhwani because the influence al-Banna or Hudaybi had on the 
ideological development of the Brotherhood has been extremely significant. The 
scholarly efforts that Hudaybi made to tone down Qutb’s radicalism should be 
specifically underlined as the subsequent attempts to make the Brotherhood a 
national Egyptian political actor.(31) All this notwithstanding, the fascination that 
Qutb exercised across the region should not be underestimated also because al-Banna 
himself did not have much sympathy for what can be referred to as narrow 
nationalism(32). In any case, for many young Islamist activists of the 1970s, Qutb’s 
ideas were broadly equated with Ikhwanism. Thus, its main tenets were therefore 
adopted across the region, including Tunisia. The problem is that such a process of 
Ikhwanization led to a certain extent to the marginalization of more locally based 
interpretations of what it meant to be an Islamist in a specific national context, and to 
what kind of reading religious precepts should be subjected, when employed for 
political mobilization. In Tunisia, the most prominent figure of the ‘Tunisian’ strand 
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was Kami da Enneifer, born in a family of traditional ‘Zeitounian sheikhs’—linked 
to the Zeitouna mosque and centre of religious learning—who raised the question of 
Tunisian specificity already in the 1970s in a rich debate largely documented.(33) He 
eventually left the Islamist movement, but the question remained as to what kind of 
Islamism the movement first and the party later would subscribe. Over time, political 
necessities, rejection from large sectors of Tunisian society and new cultural 
influences redirected the party away from Qutb’s Ikhwani strand and towards the 
Tunisian one: the tunisianité that, paradoxically, Bourguiba, the traditional enemy of 
Islamism in the country, had been building since decolonization. The tunisianité of 
the Islamists, however, differs from the modernist, nationalist and Western-looking 
one that Bourguiba promoted because in accepting pluralism and modernity 
Islamism finds its roots in the religious tradition of the country and not in what it 
believes are Erench-imported notions. Thus, what emerges is that there is no need to 
rely on foreign models to have a workable modernity; it can be done because the 
seeds of such pluralistic modernity—with the inevitably democratic political system 
that comes with it— were sown by Islamist intellectuals even before the Erench 
arrived with their ‘civilising mission’. In a sense, the evolution of the party’s 
discourse into a national shared narrative with religious undertones becomes the 
condition for the success in integrating the national political scene. al-Nahda’s 
Islamists in Tunisia have come to accept the idea of a Tunisian sense of belonging to 
a nation that cannot he easily replaced with a transnational project based solely on 
the ummah, as the multiple identities of many ordinary Tunisians have to be 
accommodated. In short, the internal ideological revisions have led the party today to 
embrace what can be termed Tunisian reformism. 
The most important figure of Tunisian reformism is Mohammed Tahar Ben 
Achour, who developed the Islamic science of Makasid(34). This particular 
discipline aims at interpreting Islamic law away from its traditional normative 
rigidity and, with its emphasis on literalism, towards a more flexible understanding 
where the broader objectives of Islam have to be the guiding principles. The most 
significant objectives are justice and liberty, which are precisely what Ghannouchi 
argued in his statements about the achievements of the party in the post-Ben Ali 
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transitional phase.(35) The ‘opposition’ between the Ikhwani political thinking and 
the specific Tunisian one linked to North African intellectual production emerges 
quite clearly in the public rhetoric of the party, which promotes it, for instance, 
through its social media.(36) This development in thinking is not unique to 
Ghannouchi, but what is relevant is the insistence of the fundamental importance of 
the Makasid in the Maghrebi tradition as an anchor to a tradition that ‘nationalizes’ 
Tunisian Islamism, as the ideological programme of the party also indicates.(37) The 
role of Tahar Ben Achour’s thinking on the Makasid fits in with the work of the most 
famous of the rationalists of the historical movement of Islamic renaissance, 
Mohamed Abdou. The Egyptian writer, more than his successor and pupil Rachid 
Ridha, was interested in a revolution of mentalities or a cultural renewing of the 
Islamic world. He thought that the Islamic civilization had proved historically its 
willingness to be open to ‘contamination’ and its ability in making use of aql 
(rationality). He opposed rationality to the dominant trend of adapting the social and 
political life to naql, the passive repetition of what jurists (fakih) had applied as 
solution of the daily problems. In some ways, there is an explicit critique of a 
juridical tradition that had ‘suffocated’ Islamic reformist thought until it was no 
longer capable to innovate and struggled in finding new solutions for its historical 
evolution (ijtihad). It is in a sense going back to Islamic history and reopening the 
theological discussion. The relation between aql and naql was the core question of an 
older philosophical and theological debate. For Sami Braham, a prominent Tunisian 
Islamist intellectual, ‘we need to reopen that discussion’, in order to look very 
seriously for an ‘Islamic reformation’ in some ways inspired by the European 
protestant one.(38) Reprising Tahar Ben Achour in such terms allows al-Nahda to be 
part of a historical conversation that takes place within Islamism and does so through 
the categories of religion, suggesting therefore that post-lslamism should be seen as 
evolution, not failure. Of course there is a self-serving dimension to this intellectual 
rediscovery because it is instrumental in supporting a political strategy with which 
many in the party disagree. In addition, large sectors of secular Tunisian society do 
not believe that this process of rediscovery is genuine or that it makes any difference 
to what they perceive as the attempt by al-Nahda to Islamize both the institutions of 
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government and society as whole. There is an element of truth in this and the fear of 
Islamist doublespeak is genuine, hut it should also he admitted that the concrete 
actions al-Nahda has taken since the fall of the regime support the party’s claim that 
their conversion to pluralistic politics and their commitment to the construction of a 
civil democratic state is real. For example, they had stated before the October 2011 
elections they would seek a coalition government irrespective of the results. The 
party also argued that references to sharia in the constitution would not be sought. 
Finally, the party stated they would not have a presidential candidate in the 2014 
elections so to avoid a potential monopoly on both the legislative— should they win 
parliamentary elections—and the executive branches, which would set off 
problematic confrontations with other political movements and with the international 
community. In all of these instances, declarations were followed through. 
From all of this, it follows that the renewed interest and centrality for the Islamist 
movement in Tunisia in Tahar Ben Achour have also significant implications for the 
development of the so-called Islamic democracy, because it allows for the 
‘application’ of sharia, which is compulsory for each Muslim, in a philosophical and 
moral manner in so far as it rhymes with the highest Islamic principles of justice and 
liberty. For Ghannouchi, this is the basis for accepting democratic mechanisms and 
liberal freedoms as essentially Islamic. In a sense, the freedom of man is due not to 
natural rights, as in the western tradition, but to rights given to men from 
revelation.(39) 
Finally, there is a level of symbolic strength in the reference to Tahar Ben Achour in 
so far as it links his work to a Tunisian specificity, which is part of a larger Maghrebi 
one. Tahar Ben Achour re-stimulated an intellectual tradition coming from the 
historical Andalusian experience, which is a sui generis Islamic one. Shatibi, the 
father of Makasid in its modern sense, was an Andalus. Ibn Khaldoun, the first 
Muslim intellectual to talk about the Islamic world as a historical and sociological 
process, was born in Algeria and studied in Tunisia at the Zeituna mosque. Last but 
not least is the reference to the work of Malek Bennabi, a thinker considered by 
Ghannouchi ‘the modern Ibn Khaldoun(40). Bennabi is an Algerian scholar who rose 
to prominence in the middle of the 20th century for his writings on colonialism, 
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Islam, democracy and pluralism. While he can be considered an Islamist, he very 
early on adopted a positive view of democracy. His interest was not necessarily in 
the procedures and mechanisms of democratic government, but in the fact that 
democracy was a state of mind and a national spirit that needed to be developed 
because respect for the plurality of society was intrinsic to Islam. Crucial to his fame 
was also the polemic against Qutb, and this is where the rediscovery of Bennabi 
provides the theological framework necessary to place significant distance between 
the political project of Qutb, and by implication of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
one al-Nahda sustains in Tunisia. While Bennabi admired Qutb’s moral stance 
against authoritarianism and defended his right to voice his radical opinions on 
political change, he profoundly disagreed with his interpretation of the state of the 
modern Arab world. According to Bennabi, more democracy and more pluralism 
weremuch more necessary than a simple call to implement sharia law, and he 
effectively reversed their order of importance. Bennahi’s views were not very 
popular among Islamists across the Arab world who, at the time, had no time for a 
positive take on democratic government, although his work on—and against— 
colonialism remained important for all Islamists. The diatribe between Qutb and 
Bennabi has been quite influential in North African intellectual circles and in many 
ways Ghannouchi and al-Nahda have referred back to Bennabi’s work to argue that 
democracy and pluralism are necessary and functional to the defence and promotion 
of Islam and the Arab-Muslim identity(41). Bennabi’s work has of course to be seen 
in a wider context where other scholars close to the ‘Andalusian’ experience are 
mobilized to support the uniqueness of the Tunisian Islamist experience, which 
becomes one that was always characterized by tolerance for plural identities.(42) 
In conclusion, when the Qutb-inspired Ikhwani strand proved to be too inflexible 
and inefficient for the Tunisian Islamist movement, a process of rediscovery of more 
local sources of ideological commitment to Islamism was initiated. When this 
process begins, the project of Islamism inevitably changes and acquires the 
flexibility necessary to both justify and validate political choices that in an Ikhwani 
context would have been much more problematic. As prominent al- Nahda member 
of parliament, Salma Sarsout, put it, the approval of the constitution was explained 
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by the leadership according to the application of the principles of makasid. 
According to her, the opportunity to initiate a debate within the party on how to be 
Islamic today implied a new ideological outlook.”(43) This suggests that the decision 
made to approve the constitution was not simply a pragmatic one dictated by external 
constraints, but the product of a longer-running engagement with the ideological 
underpinnings of a renewed Islamism strongly contaminated by references to the 
specificity of tunisianité and, to a lesser degree, Maghrebi intellectual heritage. It 
follows that it should no longer be surprising to external observers of the Islamic 
party to discover that the nahdhouis are today reasonably at ease with Bourguiba’s 
modernist heritage, which was based on a similar recuperation of indigenous sources 
of legitimation for his nationalist secular project. Within this ideological framework, 
Bourguiba is not the initiator of Tunisian modernity and reformism which he 
captured with the term tunisianité, but only its secular interpreter.(44) Other more 
valid interpretations are not only possible but also necessary, particularly if they are 
more pluralistic, democratic and attuned to what ordinary Tunisians want. 
Beyond the experience of al-Nahda 
The case of the ideological evolution of the Tunisian al-Nahda embodies a form of 
political Islam that has not failed. On the contrary, it seems to demonstrate the 
richness of the categories and interpretation of religious sources that can be 
recuperated and discussed in order to implement a political project that can still be 
labelled Islamic. One needs not to be a supporter of the social conservatism or 
economic liberalism that the party stands for to recognize that it has made an effort 
over time to remain faithful to the goal of creating an Islamic state while coming to 
terms with the social and political pluralism that Tunisia always exhihited. In terms 
of the wider dehate about the thesis of post-lslamism, the case of al- Nahda can shed 
some light on broader directions and trajectories of political Islam, which remains a 
useful category to describe and analyse the phenomenon of political engagement 
through religious references. 
The rethinking of Islamist politics on the part of mainstream Islamist parties not 
only has had a tremendous influence on their ideology and the flexibility through 
which they have mediated different national realities, but also has strengthened the 
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idea that politics can and should be conducted through religious categories. This 
renewed strength is also the outcome of the re-positioning of mainstream Islamist 
parties and their shift to a different religious scholarship. It follows that this 
ideological evolution has left a significant space open to new political 
‘entrepreneurs’, which have entered the scene by claiming to be the genuine 
representatives of Islamism. At a time when Brotherhood-inspired Islamist parties 
have demonstrated sufficient ideological flexibility to adapt to the changed political 
circumstances, Salafism has emerged as a potent ideological alternative. This 
suggests that the category of Islamism still holds considerable importance. 
Specifically, it can be argued that the ideological evolution of Islamists has generated 
a backlash in Islamist circles in so far as such evolution, paradoxically, has also been 
interpreted as the failure or, worse, the betrayal of the original goals of Islamism: the 
creation of the Islamic state and the imposition of sharia. While the Tunisian al-
Nahda still claims to be an Islamic party that has been able to fulfil the Islamic 
project by subscribing to a political system that enshrines liberty and justice, other 
actors, notably Salafi parties and movements, have come on the scene claiming that 
‘liberty and justice’ in the context al-Nahda employs them are a travesty. This 
confrontation of course does not concern only al-Nahda and Tunisia, but is a much 
more widespread phenomenon that can be seen at work in Egypt, Yemen, Libya and 
Syria. In Egypt, for instance, the formation of the Salafi al-Nour party has challenged 
the political and ideological primacy of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Yemen also, a 
new Salafi party, al-Rashad, has come on the political scene to compete not only 
against more secular parties, but also against the Brotherhood-inspired Islah party. 
However, what is interesting to note is that such confrontation does not spring only 
from the traditional rivalry between political Islamists and Salafis regarding the 
concept of hizbya or divisions of the community through party politics. Traditionally, 
Salafis had been greatly opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood because it had decided 
to enter politics, abandoning therefore the primacy of doctrinal concerns. In some 
contexts, this is still valid, particularly where Salafis refuse to enter the political 
system and play the institutional game of party politics. However, and this is the 
interesting development, there is an increasing politicization of Salafism with a 
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number of Salafi parties and movements appearing on the scene and claiming 
political representation. This moves the rivalry with Brotherhood-inspired parties 
away from doctrinal debates and towards the political level, which is one to which 
Salafis are not used. 
 
The proto-politicization of Salafism” (45) demonstrates both the importance of 
ideology and the continued relevance of post-Islamism as a category to analyse the 
evolution and changes within political Islam. Once Salafi parties enter politics they 
do not do so on doctrinal grounds, but on political-ideological ones. In ideological 
terms, the main difference between Salafi parties and Islamist ones today is based on 
the conceptualization of the Islamic state. For the classic Islamic vision, the state 
should be forced to impose religion-inspired rules and legislation for the community 
in the name of the defence of the ummah. Once again, we find here an ideal of 
transcendence of the entity nation-state in favour of a transnational political project. 
It is about all Muslims being under the same political authority, which is religiously 
legitimated. In turn, this political order must be the guarantor of the application of 
sharia under which all Muslims can fulfil their lives as genuine believers. In many 
ways, thus, there is a contradiction with the requirements necessary today for living 
in a modern liberal state. Islamist parties like al-Nahda have been able to go beyond 
this classic vision not by subscribing to liberal-democratic norms and to human 
rights as natural rights, but by offering an ideological evolution that permits them to 
talk about citizenship, liberty and democracy within an Islamic framework. The 
imposition of sharia becomes problematic not because it is illiberal, but because, on 
religious grounds, it fails to ensure what the genuine objectives of Islam are, namely 
justice and liberty for all. 
The proto-politicization of Salafis, as the new classic Islamists, further highlights 
how the category of post-Islamism as ideological evolution is both useful and 
necessary because all sorts of different strands are ‘moving’ and shifting their 
ideological pillars to respond to the challenges of the Arab Awakening. In this 
context, it might be interesting to examine the broad world of Islamism on a 
continuum, whereby politicized Salafis represent the classical political vision of the 
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Islamic state, parties like al-Nahda represent the furthest point of ideological 
evolution towards a coincidence between liberal-democracy and Islamism, and 
parties such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood stuck somewhere in the middle, 
pulled on the one side towards the embrace with pluralistic democracy and on the 
other towards a renewed commitment to the classic Islamic state with its sharia 
corollary. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To a certain extent, it is rather sterile to once again talk about the failure or the end of 
Islamism. The dislodging of the Muslim Brotherhood from power through a military 
coup should not suggest that Islamism in Egypt is a spent force. Conversely, the 
ideological evolution of the Tunisian al-Nahda and its support for a constitutional 
document that does not include references to sharia and that does not go in the 
direction of building a classic Islamic state should also not be interpreted as an 
inevitable surrender to liberal-democracy. What emerges from these experiences is 
that religious references, however, interrogated by political actors, remain central to 
Arab politics.One aspect of the notion of post-Islamism seemed to indicate that such 
religious references were either pointless or would he hent so out of their real 
meaning as to become irrelevant for politics. Another aspect of post-Islamism 
suggested, however, the possibility and the potential for ideological evolution and it 
is this second aspect that has forcefully emerged when rethinking Islamist politics. 
Through an in-depth analysis of the case of al-Nahda, it emerges quite strongly that 
the ideological debates that had been taking place within the party contributed to 
shape the political responses that were given to the challenges of the Tunisian 
transition. In fact, al-Nahda has demonstrated to some, notably Salafi scholars and 
activists such a high degree of flexibility and pragmatism to suggest that the party is 
no longer Islamist. At a closer analysis, this proves to be a rather misguided 
interpretation in so far as the ideological debate is what enabled the party to adapt to 
changed circumstances and still remain plausibly Islamic. Ghannouchi’s view that 
Tunisia is now an Islamic state because it guarantees liberty and justice—the 
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fundamental social goals of Islam—might therefore not be a simple rhetorical device 
to convince a constituency that feels the party has abandoned the genuine striving for 
the creation of an Islamic state. Rather, it can be interpreted as the product of an 
important evolution that has taken place through the rethinking of religious 
categories and that is based on a solid and long tradition of Islamist engagement in 
politics with a particular focus on the scholarship of the Maghreb. 
The rediscovery of such scholarship with an ‘Andalusian’ heritage is important in 
a context where the Tunisian experience is increasingly looked at as a model of 
inspiration for the successful inclusion of an Islamist party in a pluralistic political 
system. According to Heydemann, the Tunisian experience is likely to be the only 
case of successful transition to democracy in the aftermath of the Arab 
Awakening”(46) and for Stepan this is due to the ‘twin tolerations’ between Islamists 
and seculars.”(47) It is for this very reason that political actors across the region are 
looking at Tunisia as a model to be inspired from to solve the political impasse a 
beleaguered Arab world is experiencing. This is not only true in terms of the 
practicalities of the Tunisian transition such as the creation of a constituent assembly 
or the national pact to solve the crisis that hit the country in late 2013. It is also true 
in terms of the ideological evolution of al-Nahda because integrating an Islamist 
party, today as in the past, represents the greatest challenge to a stable plural political 
system. In relation to this, it might be interesting to note that since the arrival of 
modern political Islam on the scene, all the most relevant scholarship about the 
relationship between religion and politics tended to travel from the Machrek 
westward towards the Maghreb. The focus on the Tunisian experience might lead to 
a reversal of direction whereby the Maghrebi scholarship of the Algerian Bennabi, 
the Tunisian Ben Achour or the Moroccan Abdessalam Tassine might finally be 
having a potent influence on the rest of the Arab world. Ideology and ideological 
evolutions are an important aspect of how political parties and social movements 
think about their role in society and in the political system of which they are part. At 
this crucial stage in the history of the Arab world, the innovations that seem to be 
successful in coupling Islamism with a modern nation-state that is truly post-colonial 
and pluralistic are coming from the Maghreh. 
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Post-scriptum 
 
In the previous chapter, I considered Nahda in the context of the political evolution 
Tunisia went through after 2011. The historical Islamist party came back on the 
scene after 20 years of exile and political repression. Contrary to what many analysts 
thought, it became the most important and best organized political party in the 
country. In particular, one trend of the post-Islamism debate, represented by Olivier 
Roy, argued that Islamism had failed and the Islamic identity had developed solely 
into an individualistic (pietistic and consumerist) behaviour. As the case of Nahda 
shows, Islamism is however still an important ideological frame of mobilization. To 
be sure, post-Islamism did not get it all wrong, especially when looking at Islamism 
from the standpoint of Asef Bayat. The Iranian author stressed that post-Islamism 
explains the transformation of Islamism from holistic and totalitarian to pragmatic 
and ‘politicking’. The case of Nahda proves how this evolution can take place. The 
case of Tunisian Islamism, however, is not only about the evolution of Nahda into a 
moderate and democratic party. The development of the Ikhwani party in fact has an 
influence on the evolution of the entire Islamist scene;new radical Islamist forces 
(Salafists) emerge in fact as a consequence of its moderation. I analyse in the next 
chapter the rise and fall of Ansar al-Sharia, which presented itself to the broader 
Islamist constituency as a new credible and genuine Islamist project.  
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Chapter 4. Rise  and fall of the salafi-jihadi movement of Ansar al-sharia 
Tunisia 
 
 
Introduction 
The main topic of this chapter is the evolution of the radical Islamist 
movement in Tunisia. The democratization process, based on institutions and 
constitution building, did not provide an answer to the popular and widespread 
expectations for socio-economic change. The process of contention and political 
liberalization left open the field to the ideological frame of new political and social 
actors. This process occurred in parallel with a dynamic of ‘Islamization’. A new 
Islamist scene took shape in the aftermath of the fall of the regime and the new 
generation of Islamists was different from the previous  and had become 
ideologically mature in the 2000s. In Tunisia, salafi-jihadists appeared on the scene 
for the first time in 2007. The police discovered a group of jihadists in Soliman (a 
town 50 km away from Tunis), allegedly preparing an attack against the state. In the 
aftermath of this operation, the regime triggered a campaign of repression, throwing 
in jail many new young radical Islamists known to the police. These youngsters, 
called afterwards the ‘Soliman generation’, provided the bulk of the salafi-jihadi 
movement in the period 2011-13. In the particular context of political liberalization, 
a new salafi-jihadi group, Ansar al-Sharia (AST), saw the light of day and occupied 
the scene of radical Islamism. I studied this movement in detail and argue that it was 
a unique case of evolution of a jihadi movement into a non-violent social movement. 
This approach raises the question of how much a free political environment can ease 
the integration into institutionalized politics of such a radical movement. I argue that 
Salafists played the role of the ‘scapegoat’ of the political transition. If the successful 
exit of the democratic transition implied  the ‘historical compromise’ between 
nationalists and Islamists of old generation, it was necessary for Nahda to cut off all 
links – political and ideological - with radical Salafists. 
This period of contention (2011-2013) highlights how the new born Tunisian 
salafi-jihadi movement was able to practice ‘politics from below’ better than any 
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other political or social movement, establishing hegemony among the lower urban 
social classes. The more the official ‘politics’ was institutionalized after the Ben 
Ali’s fall, the more AST’s project became legitimate in the eyes of a disenfranchised 
and radicalized public.  
The political scene of the country became very tense in 2013. Two  
assassinations of left wing leaders created a climate of confrontation. The 
polarization Islamists vs anti-Islamists framed the struggle. AST was finally 
outlawed in August 2013, opening the path to the institutional inclusion of Nahda 
and the exclusion of the new radicals. AST was a perfect case of a jihadi movement 
that was able, by the time the political landscape opened, to display the traits of a 
social movement. I further analyse the structural political dynamics that influenced 
the development of the movement in relation to the broader evolution of the 
international jihadi movement. Those among the Salafist militants who chose the 
military action in response to the governmental crackdown, felt that their action was 
legitimized by the brutal repression of the state. They believed they could raise 
support in their social ‘constituency’ for an armed uprising. Violence, however, led 
to a political deadlock. The violent confrontation pushed jihadis from being socially 
based to apocalyptic radicalism. Whether AST was a credible political project for the 
disenfranchised Tunisian masses or not, I show how salafi-jihadis may act (just like 
other Islamists trends) as social movements that re-act to the opportunities and 
constraints of the political context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
148 
 
Between social contention and takfirism: the evolution of the Salafi-jihadi 
movement in Tunisia114 
 
In 2011, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) experienced a number of upris-
ings that led to processes of political liberalization. After two years of' 
‘democratisation'(Stepan & Linz, 2013), these processes, at least in the short term, 
ended either with the re-legitimization of neo-authoritarian regimes or dissolved into 
civil strife.The notable exception isTunisia. Rather than being an absolute novelty, 
the events of the early 2010s have parallels in what occurred in the region in the 
1980s. In fact, the political and institutional dynamics unleashed in 2011 seem to 
have, as an overarching trait, the crackdown on Islamist movements following 
liberalization. Islamist movements, then and now, had become the main opposition 
groups and beneficiaries of political openings, representing the challenge of new 
social actors against the system in place. This article analyses the ideological and 
organizational developments of a particular Islamist family, the Salafist-Jihadi 
movement, in a context of political liberalization. The case of Tunisia is employed to 
provide the empirical data for such an analysis. 
The rise of Salafism in all of its forms and its interactions with a liberalized 
institutional environment is a recent phenomenon compared to the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB)'s historical development since its foundation in Egypt in 1928. 
Today the MB family (the original party and its offshoots) is still central, but there is 
a greater multiplicity of Islamist movements, and the MB parties no longer enjoy 
exclusivity. In fact, their strategy of political inclusion (Schwedler, 2007) following 
the 2011 uprisings and their participation in democratically elected governments 
(Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen) has led to a loss of supportfrom more radical 
constituencies. Emerging Salafist groups filled the political space MB parties left in 
                                                            
114 Published. Ref: Merone, F. (2017). Between social contention and takfirism: the evolution of the 
Salafi-jihadi movement in Tunisia. Mediterranean Politics, 22(1), 71-90. 
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the 2011-13 and became protagonists in the process of contention for social and 
political power. Salafists themselves also range from pietistic and in favour of the 
status quo to 'politicos'to revolutionaries (Wiktorowicz, 2006; Amgar, 2011), 
rendering even more complex the field of political Islam. This article focuses on a 
specific trend, the Salafi-Jihadis (Heghammer, 2006) and analyses groups belonging 
to it. That is, the representatives of a radical Islamist constituency left without 
political representation (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015). While Islamists and Salafists 
are usually considered separately, the former linked to the MB tradition and the latter 
to the Wahhabi influence (Guazzone, 2014); in this research, the jihadi movement is 
considered as a political actor participating in a process of social or political 
contention, representing therefore a new generation of radical Islamists. Although the 
international jihadi movement is known for its violent actions and apocalyptic 
discourses, it has evolved since its beginnings in the 1980s (Moubayed, 2015).The 
experiences of the countries that went through political transformations between 
2011 and 2013 saw the emergence of a new jihadi trend as a potent political and 
social force. While terrorist tendencies and an exclusive apocalyptic worldview are 
still part of the jihadi representation of the struggle (jihad), there is a new trend 
pushing jihadi groups to transform into social and political movements. Specifically, 
we have two different types of jihadi 'practices': one identified with the Islamic State 
(IS) and the other with different groups such as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Tunisia 
and Jabahat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham in Syria. 
This article deals with the issue of whether jihadi groups should be consid-
ered as Islamist groups, distinct from mainstream ones in their radicalism and 
revolutionary stance, or merely as theologian apocalyptic groups whose aim is to 
accelerate the ineluctable clash between the true believers and the rest of the world 
(unbelievers or apostates). Based on a social movement approach (Hafez, 2003; 
Wicktorovitz, 2006), the argument is that the Jihadi movement represents today a 
radical Islamist constituency that is emerging as a political actor - not simply a 
mindlessly violent one - in the wake of the MB's attempt to compete democratically. 
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This jihadi movement took part in open liberalized spaces of contention for the first 
time after 2011, varying its actions from Dowo to armed struggle and from 
consensus-based activism to exclusive and tokfiri practices. 
For the purpose of this analysis, the general jihadi movement is discussed 
within two frames: 'social movement' and ‘takfiri’.This distinction describes two 
different Salafi-jihadi developments. In the first, the Salafi-jihadi movement par-
ticipates in a process of contention and tends to represent a social base seeking 
political legitimisation and a degree of acceptance. In this case, the Salati group 
(jamaa) becomes similar to the other lslamist jamaat (plural of jamaa) or jamaia  
(association), in the sense that the chosen group (al-taifa al-mansura) evolves into an 
organization that is active in civil society through charity and religious teaching. In 
the second case, the jihadis create exclusive and uncompromising groups that 
accentuate an apocalyptic vision of the world, which they divide in true Muslims (the 
Salafi-jihadis) and unbelievers (Koffar).The distinction offered here is only 
methodological (ideal-types) and aspects of one trend can be recognized in the other 
and vice versa. 
The implication of this distinction is significant. The institutionalization of 
some jihadi group depends on several factors, in which the ideological frame, the 
social praxis and the political opportunities all play a role. This article deals with the 
evolution of the jihadi movement through the example of Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia 
(AST) and the political opportunity of institutionalization of this Salafi-jihadi 
movement in the specific context of political liberalization in Tunisia. In order to 
establish the connection between the two phenomena, Hafez's (2003) use of the 
political process approach is promising. In the first part of the article, the ideological 
frame of theTunisian jihadi group and its practice as a social movement are analysed. 
In the second part, the evolution of the movement in the context of the dramatic 
political transformation Tunisia went through in the period between 2011 and 2013 is 
explained. The evolution of the movement appears to be influenced by both theory 
and praxis: while the structural ideational repertoire frames the social and practical 
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activity of the movement (praxis), the ideological justification of action will evolve 
according to the reaction of the public to their activities. The evolution and pressures/ 
opportunities of the general political context moreover determine the strategic 
choices of the leadership. After the political crackdown of 2013, few resources and 
opportunities were available for the movement at the national level. The combination 
of state repression and failed strategic choices made the space of contention move 
from the local to the regional and from political-institutional to confrontational-
violent. The move towards the international political space became a more decisive 
factor because domestically there was no space left to compete politically. In this 
case, the regional political dynamics played a role in the development of the situation 
in so far as the national jihadi project proposed by Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia lost 
credibility and the Islamic State internationalist perspective has become 
progressively more attractive. The loss of open spaces of contention and 
social/political activity meant that the jihadi groups became more exclusive and self-
referential; their actions were no longer linked to a social group and became the 
monopoly of the exclusive chosen ones. In short, domestic repression provoked the 
internationalization of jihadism and the development of a takfiri-minded jihad. 
 
Ideology: political or takfirist? 
The institutionalization of the Salafi-jihadi movement may seem a contradiction in 
terms and most of the literature in fact deals with this Salati trend as being 
overwhelmingly related to political violence and terrorism (Burke, 2004; Cragin, 
2007; Gerges, 2009), although some exceptions, dealing with the social, political and 
historical context in which they develop, do exist (Cook, 2005; Meijer, 2006). Salafi-
Jihadism appears often as a purely violent movement based on intolerance and an 
apocalyptic vision of the world, according to which Islam should prevail over all. 
Contrary to this traditional outlook, the argument here is that not all jihadis are alike 
and under certain political conditions they can evolve into a social movement. Ansar 
al-Sharia Tunisia (AST) provides a good example of such a social Salafi-Jihadi 
movement capable of potentially evolving into an institutionalized organization 
within a plural political context. 
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Findings from fieldwork highlight how one of the most recurrent points in the 
discourse of activists was that 'AST (was) a new jihadi project different from any 
other before' (Interviews with AST leaders and ordinary activists, Tunis, 2012). 
When the movement first emerged in 2011, AST was suspected to be an offshoot of 
an al-Qaeda linked group that had appeared during the same period in Yemen. In 
reality, not only did AST leaders wanted to distance themselves from the Yemeni 
label, but they also insisted that theirs was a 'properly Tunisian' experience, taking 
place in an unprecedented context of freedom. While this alleged 'new project'was 
nothing but the formation of a group in a typical Islamist jomoo form similar to the 
one at the roots of the Muslim Brotherhood (Haqqani & Fradkin, 2008), the project's 
interesting and novel aspect was that it was evolving within the Salafi-jihadi frame. 
AST Islamist militants were 'jihadi' because they adopted the jihadi symbols, 
references (including Osama Bin Laden) and literature (notably the work of Abu 
Qottada al-Falistini and Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi). Thus, they considered 
themselves as part of the international jihadi movement. In terms of novelty, the 
starting point of the theoretical argument of AST leaders was the originality of 
Tunisia as a country and the Tunisian revolution as a political experience. This 
originality led to the adaptation of the jihadi experiment to the specific Tunisian 
social and political context and the development of a loose jomoo into a political 
organization that challenged the social and political space to other actors. It is 
interesting to note that a similar rhetoric appeared in the language of Ansar ol-Shorio 
Libya, which considered its activism as an extension of theTunisian experience 
(Salafi-jihadi activists, interview with the author, Tunis, Autumn 2012). For political 
organization, it must not be understood as a political party {hizb) but rather an 
association (jamaia). Politics (siyasa) still has a negative connotation for jihadis and 
the praxis they refer to is geared towards the realization of an Islamic state; AST 
militants are not concerned with the constitutional process and consider democracy 
Kafer (unbelief). The Islamic state, however, should be established through peaceful 
means and through the training of a new leadership that would draft the programme 
for ruling in the future (Merone, 2012). 
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In the period between 2011 and 2012, a large but unstructured Islamized 
public was already hegemonic in certain areas of the country. AST was only a small 
group when its leaders decided to set up informal local cells and encourage 
discussions among Salafis about the idea of creating an organization. Through a 
participatory process, the Jamaa discussed this 'new project' that the leadership 
proposed. Discussion groups were created in every area where a Salati cell was 
locally rooted, and Skype conferences were sometimes held with international jihadi 
sheikhs giving their opinions. The most important debate was about the choice of 
Ansar al-sharia as the name of the group and whether this new organization would 
divide the jamaa, distinguishing between insiders and outsiders. The two important 
sheikhs intervening in the debate were the Egyptian London-based cleric Hani Sibay 
and the Moroccan cleric Omar Hadushi (Ayari and Merone, 2014). The main idea 
behind the transformation of the Jamaa into a more typical political project was that 
Tunisia was a 'land of dawa': jihad as qital (fight) was not to be considered as a tool 
per se, but only something to be activated in specific circumstances, notably in a 
defensive situation (Badran, local AST leader, interview with the author, December 
2012, Douar Hisher).The'normalisation'of the jihad category made the Salafi-Jihadi 
movement more similar to mainstream MB-linked Islamist movements in their early 
days, when their priorities were the spiritual empowerment of the individual and 
active preaching in society (Mitchell, 1993). As a consequence of this new repertoire 
and organizational tools, the AST leadership established separate working groups 
(departments) with the purpose of elaborating a social, political and economic 
programme for the Islamic state to come. This intention was publically proclaimed at 
their annual rallies. The way to bring it about had to be a consensus-building process 
through dawa and proactive social activism. With an attitude similar to the ikhwani, 
they believed that'once people will be with us, the Islamic State will be demanded 
spontaneously'(Hassen Breik, AST leader, interview with the author, September 
2012, Yasminette). 
Although the public declarations of AST leaders were consistent with this 
idea, the majority of Tunisian social and political actors did not accept these 
arguments easily, as the Salafi-Jihadi ideology is particularly rigid, illiberal and 
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violence-prone. Some problematic ideological categories legitimately worried 
political and social opponents. The first one is the concept of takfir, which has been 
declared unconstitutional in the new Tunisian constitution approved in 2014. 
Declaring a Muslim a non-believer (or apostate or hypocrite) has been a historically 
important and controversial issue in the Muslim world, having given birth in the first 
century of Islam to the kharijite sect (Kenney, 2006). Under certain political 
conditions it can be used as a political/revolutionary tool against an unjust ruler 
because it implies the right of opposition (or revolt). Under other conditions, 
however, especially when the Salafi Jamaa develops a sect-minded behaviour, it can 
be used as a blind ideological justification of the conflict between a small group of 
people and the rest of society or the world. In the latter case, the concept of kafer can 
be expanded indefinitely. As in the 1980s in Egypt (Malthaner, 2012) or in Algeria in 
the 1990s (Labat, 2009), the anathema  of being kafer was extended to almost all of 
society, guilty of not rising up against the tyrant {Taghut) (Hafez, 2003). The fear of 
this occurring in post-revolutionaryTunisia existed. 
The second concept that led the Salafi-Jihadi ideology in Tunisia to be seen as 
dangerous is the wala wa al-bara. This is the idea, usually applied in Wahhabi 
Salafism, that Muslims should be faithful to God and Islam (walaa) and stay away 
from everything else, be it a non-Muslim or a hypocrite (baraa). In the Salafi-Jihadi 
innovation of this concept, famously interpreted by its major living theorist Abu 
Mohammad al-Maqdisi, al wala wa al bara should be applied not only toward 
individuals or groups but also to state institutions when they are kofer (Wagemakers, 
2009). The wala wa al bara principle, within certain limits, can have a positive 
conceptualization for social struggle, through which the individual empowers his 
social action. Pushed to its extreme, though, especially in a context of political 
isolation and repression, this may bring Salati groups to emphasize sectarian 
tendencies. 
The ideas of takfir, taghout and wala wa al bara were all present in the liter-
ature and rhetoric of the Salafi-Jihadi movement in Tunisia, and shaped to an extent 
the political and social activism of Salati militants. However, there was a 
considerable gap between the concepts and extent to which they were applied in 
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reality, as the actual political actions of the militants and leaders seemed to respond 
to the pragmatic concerns of operating in a liberal environment rather than to fixed 
ideological categories. AST was successful in proposing a political project able to 
adapt to the specificTunisian post-revolutionary period. In doing so, the concept of 
the state as taghout was toned down and adapted according to the level of 
confrontation with the state, and it was never in any case used against other sections 
of society, although the security services and the police were often labelled taghout. 
Concerning the wala wa al- bara's principle, it was not applied rigidly when the 
movement began building a social movement, although it had an important role in 
giving the Salafist group a sense of belonging and awareness, especially in the first 
stage of empowerment of local cells. According to Hassen Breik (Dawa officer for 
AST) AST want(ed) to show Tunisians that we are a normal group, not threatening 
society. That is why, for example, I decided to participate in TV programs'. The 
specific objective of speaking on television was to reach the wider public with the 
aim of normalizing the image of the movement as a new legitimate actor. The wala 
wa al-bara, if applied in its proper and limited understanding, means to keep at a 
distance all those who do not belong to the elected group {el farqa al-najia). AST 
aimed instead to acquire people's consensus for the achievement of their political 
goals. 
All this does not mean that more radical elements were absent in the larger 
jihadi constituency. In fact, they emerged clearly after the ban of AST in the summer 
of 2013. The killing of foreign tourists at the Bardo museum (March 2015) and the 
tourist resort of Sousse (July 2015) were a giant step towards an apocalyptic vision 
of good versus evil that justified the political strategy of reacting to the Tunisian 
state's crackdown through a religious ideological frame within which innocent 
European and Christians became legitimate targets (France 24, 2015). 
Social movement or criminal jihadi? 
While social movement theory has been already applied to mainstream Islamist 
movements (Wiktorowicz 2004), it has not been widely employed to examine jihadi 
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movements.This depends in parton the way jihadism has been conceived of until 
now, being strongly influenced by the story of Al-Qaeda. The argument here is that 
5alafi-Jihadi movements can potentially evolve into'legitimate'political actors and 
that they may be considered in some cases (like AST in Tunisia) more similar to a 
radical socially oriented Islamist movement than a 'terrorist' organization. In Tunisia, 
5alafi-Jihadism is the result of the arrival on the political scene of a generation 
politically forged in revolution. The social constituency of the movement is largely 
represented by an urban proletarian mass (Lamloum, 2015), suggesting engagement 
for social radicalism rather than terrorist violence. As argued elsewhere (Merone, 
2015), AST represented in fact the attempt of a marginal social class to organize a 
political voice. The following section examines how AST was successful in 
proposing its political project and flirted with ideas and practices rarely associated 
with Salafi-jihadism. 
The Tunisian 5alafi-Jihadi movement, which took centre stage on the public 
scene in Tunisia between 2011 and 2013, was a phenomenon rooted in specific areas 
of the country: the poorer suburbs of large and middle-sized cities. Historically 
speaking, the process of urbanization of the twentieth century was accomplished in 
different stages, leading each time to social and political transformations (Anderson, 
2014). In Tunisia, by the late 1970s, rural masses had already moved to the richest 
coastal regions (Sfax, Sousse, Bizerte and Tunis), becoming large urban masses.The 
management of large, populated urban belts around the historical traditional 
perimeter of those cities had been a considerable political preoccupation for the Ben 
Ali regime in the 1990s because of the potential of unrest that could be generated 
there (Ben Romdhane, 2011). Ben Ali himself had already experienced how social 
contention could result in Islamization in the 1989 parliamentary elections when 
Nahda did particularly well in the poorer urban belts. When the uprising began in late 
2010, it was indeed not particularly surprising that it originated in the most 
disenfranchised areas of the country (the interior regions and the urban belt of these 
big cities). As had been the case in the 1980s, a 'rioting' and 'revolutionary'class 
emerged from the uprising. After the breakdown of the regime, the process 
of'democra- tisation'opened up new political spaces and new opportunities were 
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created for alternative social movements. After a few months, the revolutionary 
process adopted Islamist undertones of contestation. 
The first Salafis who appeared in Tunisian working-class neighbourhoods 
were young Islamists imprisoned during the 2000s. Although a small number of 
charismatic leaders whose credibility came from previous experiences of jihad 
abroad or from their prison records imposed themselves at the beginning of the 
transition, young and new militants came to play a significant role (Merone & 
Cavatorta, 2013). Salafi-jihadi literature linked to jihadi web-forums (most famously 
jihad wa tawhid) had circulated in Tunisia during the previous decade, and many had 
developed a sense of belonging, through their own individual paths, to a larger umma 
(Dhia, young Salafis, interview with the author, Tunis, September 2012). 
The success in the integration of many new young militants in the organi-
zation was due to two factors. First, Salafis belonged to the same urban space of their 
activism, sharing the same social conditions of their potential public thereby 
facilitating recruitment. Second, the process of participating in the movement's 
activities was largely based on self-empowerment and engagement without any 
vertical structure. The egalitarian spirit, together with the feeling of empowerment 
and belonging to a special group, offset the sense of social frustration that this youth 
felt towards the rest of society (Haj Ben Salem, 2015). Recruiting new members 
occurred typically through 'commanding good and forbidding wrong'activities. This 
Islamist principle is based on the idea that is the duty of each Muslim as an 
individual to act for the good of the Islamist society (Cook, 2005). As Meijer (2006) 
convincingly argued, it is in fact through the personal duty of forbidding wrong and 
commanding good to fellow Muslims that the new'reformed'individual feels his 
engagement in civil life. 'Newly-lslamized' individuals start their activity following a 
group in dawa missions (preaching) around the neighbourhood. Dawa activities can 
take place anywhere; one can approach someone on the street perceived as'doing 
wrong'and suggest ways to correct his or her behaviour or simply go to a café or 
public space and start preaching. In contexts of social marginalization, where Salafis 
have had the most success, this Islamist empowerment for many young Tunisians 
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was often hugely appealing and filled the absence of other forms of social and 
political engagement. 
The distance between a normal process of social engagement through 
religious activities and violent ones for controlling social space may be slight, 
however, particularly when the Jamaa is also composed of former thugs from 
marginalized urban areas who founds in Salafism opportunities not necessarily 
related to spiritual growth nor altruistic social activism. In that case, the Salati group 
can take the form of a purely violent gang employing the pretence of religion for its 
actions. Ln Tunisia, for example, during this period of open contention (2011 -13), 
violent actions with a Salafi-jihadi tinge occurred and at times it was genuine 
criminal activity taking place underthe cover of the Salafist movement. For instance, 
punishments (hudud) were implemented to punish people who persisted in 'doing 
wrong', such as selling or consuming alcohol or being extremely provocative such as 
swearing against the prophet or the religion (Gartenstein- Ross, 2013). These types 
of actions generally led to a loss of support for Salafi- Jihadis.The ambiguity of this 
social practice as much as the development of the AST political project made the 
Salati leaders aware of the political implications of the correct application of 
theological/theoretical principles. As Abu el Muwahid, a young leader stated in 
repeating Abu Ayad's famous statement,'we want to reach the hearts of people, not 
hurt them' (Interview, with the author, Douar Hisher, January 2012). Because AST 
was moving toward a strategy of popular legitimization, spontaneous and 
'criminal'actions such as the ones highlighted above undermined social support for 
the movement and were condemned by the leadership. However, in a contest of 
fierce confrontation with the state and under harsh repression, extreme and takfiri 
justifications are brought forth to support violent actions. This indicates that the 
environment surrounding Salafi- Jihadism matters because the activities of the group 
are modulated according to it rather than adhering strictly to rigid ideological tenants. 
In a liberalized environment where there is'free'competition for hearts and minds, 
mindless violence (even if ostensibly committed to forbid evil) might have negative 
repercussions for the group in terms of support. Conversely, in an environment 
where such competition does not exist because the state or because other 
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social/political actors prevent it, the employment ofviolence to forbid evil is much 
more readily justified, as it does not undermine potential support. 
It is for this reason that in the newly liberalized Tunisian environment AST 
was particularly concerned with social and welfare activities. According to their 
Facebook (FB) pages, which Zelin (2012) monitored extensively, the more state 
propaganda depicted the group as violent and takfiri, the more AST emphasized 
dawa and social activities, suggesting that the group was particularly sensitive to 
public legitimization. AST strongly focused on social activities like free medical 
care, donations for specific religious celebrations and, occasionally, welfare 
provision for the poor in targeted campaigns. 
The coexistence between charitable activities and violent social control 
remained nevertheless an enduring contradiction within the Salafi-Jihadi movement. 
While it took considerable steps to normalize its social and political action, as 
suggested in their public statements and propaganda, it did not sufficiently distance 
itself from the more disturbing actions of social control. 
Political transformation 
In an October 2015 interview, Seif Eddine Arrais, official AST spokesperson, 
compared the political path of Ansar al-Sharia to the one Nahda, the moderate 
Tunisian Islamist political party, walked at the beginning of the 1990s (Andalou 
Post, 2015). He meant that AST, like its Ikhwani predecessor 20 years earlier, 
underwent a process of transformation during a period of political change. Just like 
the older generation of Islamists, violent actions were committed without the 
approval of the movement's leaders. Moreover, the movement found itself squeezed 
between the state's crackdown and radicals within its own constituency. In this sense, 
Arrais was stating once again that the AST political project was a peaceful one 
whose increasing moderation was undermined by both the state crackdown and an 
extremist element from within. This declaration may seem surprising if we look at 
AST as a typical jihadi movement. As we have seen in the previous sections, jihadi 
theory and praxis is revolutionary in theological and political terms and can be lived 
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in its daily practices either through takfirism or through the traditional means of 
social activism.The previous sections postulated thus that a Salafi-Jihadi movement 
does not necessarily operate through indiscriminate violence, but can evolve into a 
more traditional Islamist jamaa. Seif Eddin Arrais's declaration implicitly confirmed 
that the latter development was the objective of the AST leadership. Rachid 
Ghannouchi indeed had seen something of the early Nahda days in AST when he 
admitted, in reference to the behaviour of Salafis early on in the transitional period, 
that'they remind him of his youth' (Kapitalis, 2013). 
 
Ansar al-Sharia had declared its existence at a public event in Soukra, a 
suburb of Tunis in April 2011 (Huffington Post, 2013). By 2012, with Nahda in 
government, AST had succeeded in mobilizing segments of social groups, mainly 
disenfranchised youth, who did not recognize the legitimacy, validity and ends of the 
electoral process. Unknown to the larger public, a process of consultation had been 
going on within the Salafi-Jihadi family to discuss AST's alternative political project, 
which had finally gained the approval of the majority of activists (Ayari & Merone, 
2014).The project included the structuration of local groups {makteb al-dawa), 
providing therefore formal discussion settings for Salafi youths across different 
neighbourhoods.The'AST'project was discussed among activists and at least one of 
the most respected Salafi-Jihadi scholars, sheikh Khatib Idrissi, had opposed it as a 
bidaa (blameable innovation) (Interview with Abu Abdallah Attunsi, prominent 
jihadi sheikh, Sidi Bousid, October 2012). In spite of Idrissi's opposition, the project 
of formally setting up an association signalled the evolution of the movement into a 
more typical Islamist organization. It was also a process of leadership formation, as a 
number of young people came to prominence through spontaneous activism in their 
neighbourhoods.The evolution of the political project was to be presented to the 
widerTunisian public in annual rallies. After the first founding congress of Soukra in 
2011, a second successful one was organized in Keirouan in 2012 (Al-Arabiyya, 
2012). The police did not allow, however,  the planned third rally of May 2013 to 
take place, thus escalating repressive measures against AST, which led to the group's 
ban in August of the same year. 
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As mentioned, though not all the members of theTunisian jihadi movement 
were comfortable with what can be termed an embryonic moderation process. After 
AST was criminalized in August 2013, in particular, terrorist actions with a clear 
tokfiri tone took place and seemed to suggest that the choice of violence had been 
presentali along for the movement.The work of Hafez (2003) suggests that this might 
not be entirely true, as resorting to violence is often the response to repression, 
indicating that the political environment therefore is crucial when it comes to making 
decisions about the appropriate methods for achieving political goals. In any case, 
the path that seemed to lead to some sort of political and social inclusion of Salafi-
Jihadis in the liberal and democratic structures of post-revolutionaryTunisia was 
closed in summer 2013, when the organization was officially banned. In order to 
explain the reasons that led to this outcome, it is necessary to examine the conflicting 
actions of the different actors on the political scene because they provide a test for 
Hafez's argument. This analysis has important consequences as to how scholars and 
policy makers look at Salafi- Jihadi groups because the context and the actors 
surrounding them can have a profound impact on the direction of their political 
behaviour and ideological developments (Cavatorta, 2015). 
After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia has gone through a quasi-exem- 
plary transition process (Stepan, 2012) that ended with a constitutional consensus. 
The new constitution was approved almost unanimously in January 2014 with the 
support of the two major cultural and political blocs: Islamist and nationalist-secular. 
However, turmoil and volatility characterized the transitional period leading up to 
this constitutional consensus and polarization between secular and Islamist forces 
reached its peak between 2011 and 2013. After the overthrow of the regime, the 
transition process took two different intertwined directions. On the one hand, classic 
party politics took centre-stage according to traditional expectations of the 
democratization literature. On the other hand, contention in the social sphere 
occurred through street politics. In both realms, the Islamist and Salati ideological 
banners were present and active. With an Islamist party in power and a radical and 
anti-systemic Salafi/jihadi movement on the streets, the traditional secular bloc, 
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which later unified its forces into the new Nidaa Tunis party, reacted to what it 
perceived to be an Islamist take over of political institutions and society. Nahda was 
put under pressure, forcing the party to cede power and support a technocratic 
government, while Ansar al-Sharia was declared a terrorist organization and was 
banned in August 2013 with the approval of Nahda. 
The political and organizational development of AST-its success and 
limitations-can be explained through its relation with the moderate Islamist party and 
its ideological stance towards state institutions and democracy. In February 2013, the 
first of two political assassinations of left-wing leaders was committed at a time of 
intense political polarization, when the Nahda party had begun to be harshly 
criticized by the anti-Islamist frontfor its performance in government and its 
tolerance of the spread of the Salati ideology in the country. After the assassination, 
left-wing parties tried to turn the march of solidarity organized for the funeral into an 
anti-Nahda uprising (Independent, 2013). The Nahdawi leadership denounced it as 
an attempted coup d'étot and, in many neighbourhoods, local committees 'to protect 
the revolution' were organized against this perceived threat. There was indeed a 
dynamic of increasing confrontation within society, now clearly split in two 
camps.The tension increased further also because of the first terrorist attacks on the 
Tunisian military in the Chaamby mountains in March-April 2013. In July 2013, a 
second assassination of a prominent left-wing figure took place and almost at the 
same time the overthrow of the Islamist president in Egypt occurred. All this created 
a very tense political atmosphere that endangered the success of the transition to 
democracy, now caught between domestic volatility and a deteriorating international 
situation. 
Between February and August 2013, as the political confrontation developed 
into a fierce polarization and anti-lslamistforces gained ground with the support of 
the repressive apparatus of the state, AST's strategy was to push its reformist/ 
Islamist 'cousin’; which had committed to democratic institutional politics, into a 
revolutionary political front of resistance, the so-called Islamic front (YouTube, 
2013). Nahda, however, challenged AST's strategy because it wanted to ensure the 
success of the transition, the only way in which the party would be able to survive an 
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inevitable backlash of the security apparatus and the international community to the 
formation of an Islamic Front. Moreover, the older generation of Nahdawis had 
travelled too long on the road of political and ideological moderation to sacrifice it 
for an uncertain and destabilizing alliance with AST (Cavatorta & Merone, 2013). 
Thus, the Nahdawi Minister of Interior ordered the ban of the AST annual rally in 
Keirouan. The argument Nahda and the state apparatus employed to forbid the rally 
was framed in 'democratic' language. If AST wanted to organize a rally in Keirouan, 
it had to request official authorization from the Interior Minister just as any other 
association or party would (Al Jazeera, 2013). The Salati organization was asked to 
conform to the rules of democratic institutions. This move pushed AST to make clear 
its political position on the most controversial ideological issue: the recognition of 
the state-Taghut. While AST leaders tried to overcome the obstacle by presenting the 
request to hold the rally through an association close to them (Mohammed Khlif, 
prominent jihadi sheikh, interview with the author, Kairouan, September 2013), the 
process of moderation was still ongoing and had not yet been finalized. This led Saif 
Eddine Arrais during a press conference, to reassure its constituency that the Jamaa 
would ask permission for dawa from nobody but God (Al-Akhbar English, 2013). In 
other words, the movement was still in a period of evolution (and ideological 
confusion) during which it was willing to push towards legitimization into a political 
pluralist context, but at the same time, it was still speaking to its constituency within 
a 'Salafi/revolutionary' framework that included takfiri references. This double 
dynamic shows how the movement was pulled toward two different potential 
outcomes. The political process and its opportunities were creating this tension. If the 
movement had not had the chance to prove itself in an open liberal space, it would 
have never experienced the evolution into an association similar to the more 
traditional ikhwani ones in their early days. It was an absolutely unique experience 
for a jihadi movement that was to be repeated in different contexts, including Libya 
(Ansar al-Sharia Libya) and Syria (Jabahat al-Nusra and Ahar al-Sham), proving the 
multifaceted nature of the jihadi movement. 
The failure of the Islamic front project occurred when the Nahda-led gov-
ernment outlawed AST with the approval of the same security forces that had for 
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years repressed all Islamist activism in the country. For AST it was a political failure, 
because it found itself alone in a confrontation with the state, caught between 
institutionalization and revolution.The organization disappeared, the political project 
dissolved and a numberof activists from the salati Jamaa turned to a sectarian 
strategy of struggle against the koffar (unbelievers). The 2013 crisis determined as 
much the success of the constitutional deal (and the full inclusion of the moderate 
Islamist party in democratic practices) as the failure of the Salati movement to find a 
place in post-revolutionary Tunisia.The loss of a free domestic space of contention 
opened up the country to the influence of the international jihadi movement. By that 
time, between 2013 and 2014, the regional political situation had changed and local 
Salati movements reactivated their regional connections, switching from being a 
social movement to a tokfiri and global one. 
 
Domestic versus regional dynamics and the Tunisian Salafi- Jihadism 
In the period of post-revolutionary contention (2011 -13), violent actions were 
mostly linked to the jihadization of previously criminal gangs and the product of the 
mantra of'commanding good and forbidding wrong'. After the legal ban of AST, 
however, and the beginning of a harsh campaign of eradication of the movement 
(World Report, 2015), violence became a political tool of confrontation with the 
state. A new religious jihadi frame appeared and two new actors monopolized the 
scene: Okba Ibn Nefaa (and its offshoots) domestically and the Islamic State (IS) 
transnationally. Even though this development is largely the consequence of 
domestic political events, regional dynamics became increasingly crucial, in 
particular because of the growing importance of the proclamation of a global Islamist 
Caliphate (Al-Akhbar English, 2013).The Arab uprisings of 2011 had opened up new 
spaces of contention and new political opportunities for social Islamist actors. As 
spaces closed in Arab national politics, the international dimension took centre stage. 
This shows how the jihadi movement, although full of apocalyptic language and a 
Manichean vision of the world, reacts to political realities on the ground, and 
primarily the political opportunities in the domestic landscape. When the political 
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terrain of contention shrinks or disappears, the struggle becomes international and 
the enemy is placed in a universal dimension. Domestic tyrants and western backers 
are all listed into the same category of 'enemy of Islam' and the confrontation tends 
to become apocalyptic. 
The dialectic between domestic and international factors is never completely 
absent. The jihadi community perceives itself as being unique and transnational, even 
though it tends to operate domestically. In Tunisia, both domestic and regional 
dynamics existed from the beginning, but the importance of one factor over the other 
depended on local and international political developments. The AST leader, Abu 
Ayadh, expressed several times this double nature of the movement. He said that 
AST was ideologically part of the international jihadi movement, but politically and 
organizationally specifically Tunisian and autonomous (Merone, 2013). The jihadi 
movement was at the beginning quite a loose movement within which two different 
souls coexisted. The assassinations of the two leftist leaders, for example, were 
committed by a small group of jihadi militants isolated from the mainstream of the 
social movement process that AST had begun. This small group wanted the 
destabilization of the state in application of the jihadi/anarchical theory of the 
'management of savagery', according to which in a period of revolutionary 
transformation the generalized chaos will favour an Islamist coup and the taking over 
of the power by the Islamist vanguard (Merone, 2015). 
The overlapping of internal and external factors was more evident in the 
evolution of Okba Ibn Nefaa (hereafter Okba).It was a small jihadi group operated on 
the border between Algeria and Tunisia. As an offshoot of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb 
(AQMI), it had a role in smuggling arms and mujahedeen in the 2012 jihadi struggle 
for theTouareg Azawad Republic in Mali. The group had little or nothing to do with 
the Tunisian Salati movement until AST was declared a terrorist organization. 
Following the crackdown on the group, it offered itself as the vanguard for resistance 
against the state. Okba's offer was attractive for those who had always been sceptical 
of the political path and for those who were left disappointed with its failure. Thus, 
violence became for them the only available course of action. 
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Another regional factor that influenced the development of the Tunisian 
Salafi-jihadi movement was the Libyan crisis and in particular its increasing 
importance in the strategy of the Islamic State. Libya became not only the nearest 
place to go to join other mujahedeens, but also a safe haven to plan attacks back in 
Tunisia. As the political and social space of contention had been completely 
eliminated by the end of 2013 in Tunisia, jihadi militants found themselves targeted 
by the violent reaction of the state security apparatus. Three different options 
presented themselves. First, accept the crackdown passively, hoping for a long-term 
political solution and some sort of return to activism in more stable times. This was 
the choice of the more important AST leaders such as Saiffedine Arrais, Sami Essid 
and Hassen el Breik. Second, leave for international jihad or asylum {hijra) in Libya 
or Syria. Abu Ayadh, the former leader of AST, went to Libya while another 
prominent leader, Kamel Zarrouk, chose Syria. Third, undertake more direct action 
against the Tunisian state. Two types of militants made the third choice.There are the 
more resistance-minded militants, who acted as a guerrilla group and joined Okbo, 
and more martyrdom-minded ones, who acted according to the strategy of the Libya-
based Islamic State. The first type of militants targeted theTunisian military, while 
the others undertook martyrdom operations against foreign tourists inTunisia (the 
Bardo and Sousse attacks in 2015). 
Between 2011 and 2012, the democratic rhetoric had prevailed among Arab 
public opinions and political actors. By 2013, the polarization between an Islamist 
camp and a secular/nationalist one characterized the political debate, infusing it with 
tension. Like inTunisia, the situation in Syria, Libya and Egypt had turned into a 
confrontation between opposing segments of the political landscape. Each country 
evolved according to its specific political context, but everywhere the logic of mutual 
elimination seemed to prevail. The Syrian/Iraqi civil war provided an opportunity for 
a new jihadi organization to experiment with state building (Mecham, 2015). As 
political opportunities disappeared domestically in Tunisia, the Islamic State building 
process in Syria and Iraq became an obvious destination for many Tunisian jihadis. 
The AST experience had failed, and some of its militants found it almost logical 
to'emigrate'to Syria or Iraq. Before the political process of institutionalization of AST 
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ended, the group's leader Abu Ayadh had discouraged Tunisian militants from going 
to international jihadi battlefields, but once the domestic crackdown began each 
militant chose his own path.This was officially the declaration of failure of the'new 
jihadi' project, i.e. the transformation into a regular Islamist jamaa (YouTube, 2014). 
As Tunisian jihadis failed in building asocial movement that would be accepted by 
state institutions, they developed a more apocalyptic idea of jihad in which the spirit 
of sacrifice for religion is emphasized and martyrdom operations are left as the only 
option. Politics is transformed into a militaristic campaign against undefined enemies 
of Islam. IS claimed responsibility for operations in Tunis and Sousse and justified 
them in the name of the struggle against the state-taghut, identifying the tourists 
as'Christian crusaders'. The general frame of the justification for the attacks claimed 
that the operations were carried out to defend the umma, which was under attack by a 
Christian-Jewish alliance backed by apostate {murtaddin) accomplices. 
 
Conclusion 
The article analysed the evolution of the international Salafi-jihadi movement 
through the lens of the particular experience of Ansar al-Sharia, theTunisian jihadi 
organization that emerged during the political transformation of 2011 -13. 
The empirics-based and innovative argument is that a Salafi-jihadi movement 
can potentially develop into an Islamist jomoo similar to the one of the Ikhwoni 
movement in its early days and therefore follow a process of political institution-
alization. Even though the salafi ideology stresses specific theoretical aspects such as 
walaa wa al-baraa that are'new'compared to the old Muslim Brotherhood's tradition, 
others such as 'commanding good and forbidding wrong'orthe relationship to dowo 
and politics are more comparable. The aim of this article, however, is not to show the 
similarity between the MB and the Salafis. The category of jihad is in fact a tool 
Salafi-Jihadis exploit in order to develop an anti-systemic stance. Salafi-Jihadis 
translate their repertoire of contention into theologically pure categories. On the one 
hand, they react against the perceived Westernization of society and state; on the 
other hand, they fight against the perceived injustice of the political and social 
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system. The Salafi-Jihadi movement, as all Islamist movements, does not have a 
social class reading of the world, but its egalitarian ethos and revolutionary political 
stance can attract popular masses that feel excluded socially or politically. 
In the Tunisian case, just like in Libya and Syria, different types ofjihadism 
emerged during the Arab uprisings. On one side, we have a social jihadi movement 
capable of'representing'specific areas of the country, where social problems and 
exclusion are key issues. On the other, a more radical type ofjihadism stresses 
uncompromising theological/ideological stances. For the latter, martyrdom and an 
apocalyptic vision of the world prevail. 
This article employed a methodological distinction between the two types of 
jihadi movements, putting the first into the category of social movement and the 
second in the'takfiri'one.The use of the term takfiri is not completely satisfactory, but 
it can be useful for methodological purposes because in the common political 
language of the Arab word it identifies a specific theological attitude in which each 
contender is an 'evil' enemy to eliminate whatever the political situation. 
Applying the political process approach suggested by Hafez (2003) to the 
Ansar al-ShariaTunisia case, this article shows howthe development of the jihadi 
movement in one sense or another depends on the political context and the 
interactions between social and political actors. Takf rist aspects of the ideology can 
be adapted to more social movement-minded activism if political spaces are 
provided. On the contrary, when the action of the state is limited to repression and no 
space is left for the evolution of both Salafi-jihadi theory and praxis, the Salafi-jihadi 
militant becomes a martyr. 
TheTunisian jihadi experience shows also the overlapping of domestic polit-
ical dynamics with regional and international ones.Thus, the evolution into an 
international type of jihad depends on the failure of political inclusion of Salafi- 
Jihadism at the national/local level in its social movement form. The international 
struggle for jihad is more takfiri-minded than the national one, because for the latter 
political non-violent contention is more important to pursue if some space of 
freedom exists. Once the Salafi-Jihadi organization acts within an open political 
polity, it is forced to consider the reactions of a larger public that it had not 
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previously considered. This consensus-seeking dynamic leads the movement to iron 
out its more uncompromising ideological tenets. When the struggle is de-coupled 
from the original national space, the international jihad tends to accentuate 
apocalyptic features. 
AST leaders presented the Salafi-Jihadi Tunisian project as novelty. This 
meant in practice that jihadis were not irrational actors bent on war for the sake of 
conflict. The theoretical and practical evolution of thejihadi movement within the 
new opportunities the political liberalization of the 2011 -12 created were a test for 
the radical Islamist movement to come on the scene in different Arab countries and 
prove able to occupy the political space left behind by the moderation of the Ikhwani 
movement. 
In conclusion, the Salati movement, in all its different trends, represents the 
new generation of Islamist actors. Political inclusion implies today a degree of 
acceptance of a multifaceted Islamist landscape. As with the Muslim Brotherhoods 
during the past 20 years, their inclusion in the political arena is a challenge that Arab 
countries must overcome if they truly want to succeed in their path towards 
democracy. 
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Post-scriptum 
AST represented an important moment of revolutionary mobilization in post-2011 
politics. Islamism evolved; a new radical organization emerged in addition to the 
traditional Nahda party and acquired considerable space and support for radical 
politics in the urban and semi-urban working class neighbourhoods. The democratic 
compromise, which is also a compromise between middle classes, imposed the 
normalization of contentious politics. This new phase influenced the landscape of 
Islamism in general. The Nahda leadership imposed a moderate turn to its 
constituency and gained consensus in the ‘democratic’ camp as a legitimate actor to 
deal with. Radical Salafists were in the meantime outlawed and the politics of 
contention silenced. This new situation produced not only the constitutional deal, but 
also an ideological consensus. I explain in the next chapter how this ideological 
consensus acquired the language of Tunisianité. However, during the electoral 
campaign of 2014 Nahda tried a counter-hegemonic strategy. I therefore analyse 
Nahda’s electoral campaign in the city of Sfax, suggesting that the Islamist party 
tried to gain consensus among local economic elites by presenting itself as the party 
of the traditional marginalized  middle and upper classes. Geographic resentment and 
religious piety are the backdrop of this strategy. 
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Chapter 5. Nahdha party and the strategy of counter-hegemony 
 
 
Introduction 
The last chapter is based on a fieldwork conducted in the autumn of 2014 in 
the city of Sfax, during the legislative campaign. Nahda was by that time losing 
support while feeling the hostility of what they called ‘the deep state’. The 2014 
campaign was based consequently on a counter hegemonic strategy. In particular, 
Nahda tried to convince the traditional Sfaxian middle class to back the party for the 
sake of a new political front against the old economic oligarchy linked to the 
previous regime and to its current representatives.  
Sfax had been the economic centre of Tunisia from the 1960s/70s, but it was 
traditionally marginalized by the regionalist policy of the post-independence elite. It 
is also a city famous for the ethical and puritanical ‘spirit of capitalism’ of its 
entrepreneurs. After the revolution, a new Islamic constituency emerged in the city. 
It was indeed the place where Nahda could try a new strategy to counter the old 
nationalist elites on the base of a new Islamic alternative, credible to new middle 
classes with an important economic leverage.  
The problem of Nahda was however not only to convince new rising middle 
classes of the credibility of its project for the country. After 2 years of government, 
complaints grew within its constituency as well. The leadership was under scrutiny 
because of the poor results of its government in terms of social change and 
transitional justice. In particular, the party lost its capacity to link its politics to the 
social movements. The city of Sfax was a key place where an important Islamic 
social movement developed. While most of the urban working class areas of the 
country followed the experience of Ansar al-Sharia, in Sfax there was a large Islamic 
constituency that, although distant from the radical Salafists (mainly because of the 
issue of violence), did not entirely trust Nahda, which, in their eyes, had 
compromised too much for the sake of government.  
177 
 
Sfax was indeed a privileged place where monitoring the strategy of Nahda at 
this juncture of political change and the evolution of the Islamist landscape after 2 
years of turmoil.  
 
 
 
 
The new Islamic middle class115 
 
During the 2014 legislative elections, the two main political contenders, the 
nationalist, Bourguiba-inspired1 Nida Tunis (Tunisian Call) and the Islamist al-Nahda 
fielded two businessmen as the heads of their list in Sfax, the second largest city in 
Tunisia. Mohammed Frikha is the first entrepreneur to have launched a privately 
owned Tunisian airline, Syphax, while Moncef Sellemi is the founder and President 
of Holding One Tech, the second private exporter in Tunisia. He is also well known 
for having been the Chairman of the local football team CSS. Frikha decided to run 
as an independent candidate heading al-Nahda’s list, while Mr Sellemi ran with Nida 
Tunis. It is not a coincidence that two important economic personalities of the city, 
and the country, decided to run for the two main parties. First of all, there is a 
struggle for political hegemony that goes through the "taking over" of the economic 
sector of society. Second, and most important for the scope of this article, this 
hegemonic struggle finds a special playing field in Sfax and in its middle class social 
milieu. 
Although the electoral success of al-Nahda and Congrès pour la République 
(CPR) in 2011 led to the formation of a coalition government (together with 
Ettakatol), the outcome was not sufficient for the Islamic party to be accepted by the 
                                                            
115 Published. Ref: Merone, F., & De Facci, D. (2015). The new Islamic middle class and the struggle 
for hegemony in Tunisia. AFRICHE E ORIENTI, (1-2), 56-69. The authors shared the fieldwork and 
the theoretical frame. However, I wrote most of the article. De Facci focused in particular on the 
experience of the Islamic associations in Sfax. 
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traditional elite of the country, which began denouncing in dramatic and exaggerated 
terms the Islamization of the country. In order to present itself as a valid political 
alternative, al-Nahda needs to gain a wider political hegemony, in the sense Gramsci 
understood the term.2 We thus consider the hegemony of the old elites to be the result 
of the strength of its ideological discourse based over a historical social bloc 
(Gramsci 1971: 12). The Bourguibian nationalist party Neo-Destour3 interpreted the 
nation-state project as based on the idea of modernization, and, as a consequence, the 
Islamists are rejected as anti-modern by the dominant middle class (Hermassi 1994).4 
In order to reverse this image, al-Nahda needs to propose a new model for the middle 
class through which a different image of social success and modernity can be 
presented as a clear alternative. In our case study of Sfax, we show the emergence of 
a new Islamic constituency that takes the form of a new civil society. Most of the 
new social entrepreneurs are Islamic, in the sense that their social and individual 
behaviour is influenced by religious references, but not all are identifiable 
automatically with the traditional al-Nahda project. Since the scope of this article is 
limited to the counter-hegemonic strategy of the traditional Islamic political actor al-
Nahda, we will focus on the emergence of what we call a “new middle class”, whose 
political allegiance became the centre of the Islamic counter-hegemonic strategy. 
 
Hegemony and the Islamic middle class 
The process of nation-building in Tunisia has produced an inclusion/exclusion 
dynamic of social groups. Independence and the institution-building path5 of the 
modern state created a new category of people occupying state institutions (e.g. civil 
servants, teachers, etc.). This shaping of social groups is a consequence of a unique 
modernization process, developed according to different cleavages (Anderson 2014). 
In particular we distinguish between two "middle classes": the first became the base 
of the Bourguibian ideological process of nation building; the second, identified 
politically in the Youssefist movement and mainly located in the south and in the 
immigrant neighbourhoods of the northern cities, developed a sense of frustration 
and exclusion.6 The first group had its references in the Western Enlightenment-
based idea of modernity, while the second referred to a modernity oriented by and 
179 
 
interpreted through traditional cultural and religious values. The Youssefist 
movement is that political trend that developed between the end of the anti-colonial 
struggle and the beginning of independence in opposition to the hegemony 
Bourguiba imposed in the Destourian party. Salah Ben Youssef was an important 
leader of the nationalist movement that interpreted a different vision of the national 
idea, more oriented on Islam and pan-Arabist references. Zeitunians were those 
intellectuals and clerics that stood in defence of the traditional Arab system of 
education based on the mosque/university Zeituna. They became allies of Ben 
Youssef in the struggle against Bourguiba that saw them as an archaic system to be 
erased in order to impose a modernist vision of the nation. The Youssefist movement 
dispersed after Bourguiba had imposed its authority. In the seventies the Islamist 
movement emerged as inheriting the old social cleavages that were translated into a 
renewed political struggle. Today, two conflicting social groups with different 
ideological representations are still struggling to conquer the state and claim the right 
to impose their vision of society (Merone 2015). 
This article focuses on the strategy al-Nahda is putting in place after its 
leadership understood that the battle for the realization of an Islamic program, having 
abandoned the revolutionary vision of the Islamic state (Cavatorta, Merone 2013), 
cannot be only a matter of electoral success.7 During the political crisis between July 
and December 2013, as a consequence of the Egyptian coup against the Muslim 
Brothers and a second political assassination in Tunisia, the opposition retired from 
the assembly and asked for a new government. Within the Islamic party, this new 
political dynamic started off a debate on whether they should resign and support a 
technocratic government or insist on claiming the respect of electoral legitimacy. 
Ghannouchi argued that the party should read this particular political juncture as 
strategic: for this reason the political choices should take into account the benefit of 
long term democratic institutionalization instead of merely partisan and electoral 
calculation. Nahda’s experience in power (November 2011- January 2014) with a 
heterogeneous governmental coalition during a process of democratization, has 
transformed the party into a much more pragmatic actor with a new vision of the 
“political” (Guazzone 2013). Analysing their own experience in government, Nahda 
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activists and cadres expressed both frustration and self-criticism for having 
underestimated the difficulties of the practical side of governing.8 Beyond the 
traditional hostility of the economic and bureaucratic apparatus of the state, the party 
did not achieve the objective of setting itself up as a new ruling class. During the 
2014 electoral campaign, the party tried to offer a different image of itself,9 
emphasizing in public speeches that Nahda is the party to trust and to which 
Tunisians should entrust their future, because it had been responsible and pragmatic10 
during the turbulent transition period. In other words, it looks as if Nahda widened its 
electoral constituency and increased its attention towards a dynamic, entrepreneurial, 
and socially conservative middle class that is rather competing for power and 
inclusion instead of trying to overthrow it. Being the traditional middle-class 
acquired to the nationalistic, Bourguibian ideology, for Nahda it was a matter of 
establishing a pact with a new, emerging middle class that is closer to its vision of the 
world and frustrated by its historical exclusion from genuine political and economic 
power. 
There has been a long discussion over middle classes in the Middle East, ever 
since the article by Martin Lipset Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy (1959), which analysed the relationship 
between democracy and development.11 Dating back from Aristotle, the argument 
goes that the making of democracy is more difficult where a large income gap exists 
between the masses and the elites. This argument holds that the middle class 
represents the main agent for democratic change. This debate played a role in 
particular in transitology.12 The middle class became synonymous of civil society, 
studied as in the social science tradition dating back from Tocqueville. Our use of 
“middle class” or “new middle class” draws from Janine Clarck’s pivotal study on 
Islamic middle classes and associative system (Clarck 2004). Clarck considers the 
Islamic associative system within the frame of social movements’ theory. She argues 
that those social institutions have to be considered as organizations within a larger 
social movement (Clarck 2004: 21). As such, she highlights the horizontal 
networking between people of the same social group constituting a "new middle 
class". The concept of new middle class refers to the development of the country’s 
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social structure. Following Clarck’s analysis, this new middle class is "new" because 
of its emergence in the process of modernization and education. Examples are 
professionals like lawyers, engineers, doctors. In our case study however, we further 
develop the idea of novelty, because this social class seems to be "new" even within 
the same Islamic constituency. The old Nahda generation was in fact belonging to 
what Clark herself calls «petite bourgoisie» (Clarck 2004: 9). This new middle class 
is more successful economically, self-confident and less politicized. This diversified 
Islamic constituency clearly manifested itself in the social context of the Islamic 
activism in Sfax. 
We chose to analyse a specific case, the city of Sfax, in order to show how the 
social and political dynamics of this strategy are put in place on the ground. The 
choice of the city derives from two considerations. First, since independence, Sfax 
has been marginalized from the central power in Tunis and for that reason it has 
maintained a feeling of frustration vis à vis the traditional power group. As the de 
facto capital of the south, it is seen as the symbol of the political and economic 
discrimination of the southern part of the country. Second, because of its economic 
strength, its social conservatism and the sense of marginalization felt by its 
inhabitants, it has been considered by the Nahda leadership as a laboratory for the 
consolidation of a counter-hegemonic strategy based on the deal between the party 
and the large Islamic constituency that appeared after the revolution. In Sfax, the 
Islamic party is trying to convince the new Islamic middle class to back the 
Nahdaoui political project as an alternative counter-power to oppose to the traditional 
elite, linked ideologically and socially to Nida Tunis. In this respect, the Nahdaoui 
leaders are thinking of the Turkish model, and consider themselves like the AKP and 
the Sfaxian region as a counterpart to Anatolia,13 hoping to become a leader in 
economic and political success.14 This research is based on the authors’ personal 
fieldwork15 and supported by the existing literature.16 
 
Nahdha and the struggle for hegemony 
The three years of the Tunisian democratic transition (2011-14) mark the change 
from an authoritarian regime to a liberal-democratic one. This was not an easily pre-
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determined outcome in the region, especially since the countries of the region had 
already missed the so-called third wave of democratization (Huntington 1993) that 
began in the 1970s. The main issue in the democratization debate in the region 
revolves around Islamism and the capacity of these countries to absorb democratic 
liberal principles into the Islamic cultural and social background (Ozzano, Cavatorta 
2013). This is why one important point of interest in analysing the transitional 
process in Tunisia is the evolution of Islamism in general and its most important 
representative, the Ikhwani-inspired Nahda party. The approach we apply here 
considers the integration of the Islamist party into the constitutional political 
landscape as depending on its capacity not only to win electoral victories, but also to 
adapt to the official discourse of the nation, until then monopolised by a traditional 
nationalist-Bourguibian elite. We define this process as a struggle for hegemony. 
In looking at the practical political experience of Nahda since the fall of the 
regime in 2011 to its defeat in the 2014 elections,17 it is possible to divide this period 
in three phases: the first starts from the arrival to power and the Ninth, mainly 
celebrative, Party Congress (2012); the second, the tensions and conflicts while in 
government (2012-13); and, the third, Nahda’s resignation from the government and 
partial defeat in the legislative election of 2014, which was the end point of a long 
path of ideological evolution. 
The party had already changed considerably during the long years of 
repression under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, though, since 2009, all its leaders had been 
freed from prison. Since 2000, the local leadership was active in human rights 
organizations, sharing with most of the opposition a common negative judgement of 
the regime and the aspiration to freedom. When the 2011 revolution allowed the 
leaders who lived abroad to come home, their political experiences were significantly 
different. Since the 1991 crackdown, the party was no longer a homogeneous group, 
but they found a way to muddle through and proved to have a solid basis of support, 
imposing the party as an efficient machine for campaigning and running the country. 
As said by the party activists in those days of rapid change, the praxis counted more 
than any theory.18 However, the transformation of the party remained incomplete, 
and the 2011 electoral victory was only able to hide it for a short while. A key 
183 
 
question remained: to what degree are we preachers and/or politicians?19 The 2012 
Ninth Congress, when the party was already in power, tried to handle the issue, but 
the importance of the historical moment made the leaders decide not to push the 
party into divisive issues,20 such as it had been historically the debate about splitting 
the party in two different components, Dawa association and political party, such as 
the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Although such split did not happen, in 
practice, party militants and party officials started to engage in two different ways, 
some choosing associative activities and others focusing on politics, especially since 
Nahda was now a ruling party. The exercise of power created practical consequences. 
On one side, in fact, the party became just like any other political party that had to 
deal with economic and social issues, linked to the governing functions and meeting 
the expectation of the people. On the other hand, to be Islamic meant to carry a 
revolutionary idea of transforming society that was still inspiring part of the Islamic 
public and preachers. The conflict over articles 1 and 45 of the constitution was an 
example of this struggle,21 as much as issues such as transitional justice and the 
political future of former regime leaders.22 For Nahda, a hard trade-off meant 
postponing the original and inspirational Islamic project of transforming society, 
thereby deceiving some within its own traditional constituency, so as to enlarge its 
acceptance within society. 
Since October 2012, pressure from the opposition parties became stronger. 
They complained that the legitimacy of the government had been eroded after the 
end of the formal one-year mandate.23 Within society, polarization grew stronger, 
especially for fear of the "Islamization of the revolution" due to the public presence 
of radical Salafist movements;24 a general feeling of insecurity spread across the 
country, adding to a deepening social and economic crisis. Nahda and its partners 
defended the constitutional and electoral legitimacy of their government until August 
2013 when they finally agreed to form a quartet composed of national forces which 
formed a new technocratic government.25 
The Nahda-lead government finally resigned on January 201426 and a period 
of self-criticism started within the party.27 The party members’ analysis of the 
situation brought two aspects to light. First, they mainly blamed themselves for their 
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failure to govern effectively and provide concrete responses to the social and 
economic needs of the people.28 Secondly, they expressed resentment vis-à-vis 
external factors, and in particular the role of the so-called “deep state”.29 By “deep 
state”, in Islamist mindset is intended an immaterial, hegemonic corpus within the 
state apparatus, but also a political and social elite that controls, for example, the 
media system. This is very close to the analysis Gramsci made for explaining the 
historical defeat of communists when the fascist party took power in Italy without 
any popular opposition.30 The deep state was and still is an important part of the 
political vision the Islamic constituency has of the situation in Tunisia during the 
transitional period. 
After Nahda’s resignation from government, its leadership decided, contrary 
to what the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt did, to change their strategy and tried to 
persuade the Tunisian public that they left power in the name of the broader national 
interest rather than the narrower party’s one. As Nahda leaders repeated during the 
2014 legislative electoral rallies: «Nahda is the only responsible party in the nation, 
willing to stabilize the political situation and put the country back on track».31 The 
traditional elite demonstrated very little support for the Islamic party and Nida Tunis, 
the political party opposed to Nahda, was busy re-shaping the traditional social front 
against Islamists. Nahda, however, had another card to play: in a similar move to 
what the AKP did in Turkey, it envisaged a strategy of co-optation of members of the 
a new emerging middle class, frustrated by the old and corrupt economic elite and 
the kind of crony capitalism that had dominated under the last years of Ben Ali. This 
social group, ethically Islamic and economically dynamic, could represent the 
starting point of a counter-hegemonic strategy to oppose to the resilience of the 
traditional, nationalist elites. 
 
Sfaxian capitalism as an alternative 
When referring to capitalism in Tunisia it is imperative to discuss Sfax (and 
Sfaxians) insofar as the city is unique due to its particular model of development 
(Zghal 1992). Isolated from its hinterland for centuries because of the threatening 
presence of Bedouins and nomads on the plains outside the city, its commercial 
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growth came from the sea.32 The expansion outside the city walls began under the 
French colonization; the people of Sfax came to a deal with the French colonizers, 
because their campaign of pacification against tribal warriors was seen as a chance. 
Having liberated the plains from the Bedouin threat, the French protectorate 
reorganized the land system by encouraging an agrarian expansion: together with the 
French farmers, a Sfaxian entrepreneurial class emerged.33 From the 1970s on, 
Sfaxian capitalism developed: important entrepreneurial families emerged by this 
time, mostly in the construction sector, tourism, and different industrial 
specializations.34 This economic success story stands in contrast to the city’s low 
level of infrastructure, which contributed to Sfaxian inhabitants’ perception of 
marginalization when compared to the rest of the country, especially Tunis and 
Sousse. In particular, during the Ben Ali era (1987-2011), Sousse had a 
disproportionate number of public investments, further fuelling regionalist 
discontent.35 This situation developed into a sentiment of political antagonism 
against the centralistic patronage system of power. The symbol of this conflict 
between a dynamic and laborious bourgeoisie and a corrupted power system was the 
story of BIAT, the first Tunisian private bank, founded by Moalla, a Sfaxian 
entrepreneur who was forced to step down from his firm after having dared to resist 
pressure from Ben Ali’s family.36 
However, not all of the Sfaxian entrepreneurial class was independent and not 
all demonstrated the same integrity. Part of it in fact rather happily dealt with the 
corrupt power structures in place, taking advantage of the patronage system, just like 
the vast majority of the broader national business class.37 This narrative was 
particularly prominent within the Islamic public, traditionally antagonist to the old 
regime. According to this version, the entrepreneurial Sfaxian elite was divided 
between a corrupt segment, not seriously engaged in business and focused on its own 
interests, and a more dynamic one committed to ethical and traditional values, rooted 
in the identity of the city and interested in working both for their own business and 
the welfare of the community;38 the latter being historically marginalized and in 
search of further influence in the decision-making process. This narrative of the 
economic elite was revived by Nahda during the 2014 legislative and presidential 
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campaigns and led to the formation of an electoral and political strategy that saw the 
famous entrepreneur of Syphax, Mr Frikha heading the party’s list in the 
constituency of Sfax. 
 
A new Islamic constituency 
Al-Nahda’s political, counter hegemonic-strategy in Sfax is relevant because of the 
city’s strong Arab and Islamic orientationi and its importance as the “capital of the 
south” and possibly the country’s economic capital. Sfax represents both a different 
social and geographical Tunisia and a different model of economic success, the ideal 
place for an Islamic counter-hegemonic strategy. This strategy, however, could not 
work without a strong and dynamic middle class to support its social legitimization. 
Sfax proved to be a privileged space of expression of this new Islamic constituency. 
Although Nahda’s success represented, in a sense, one way of assimilating this 
traditional social group into the nation-state, a feeling of frustration remained. The 
westernized middle class of Tunis and Sousse and the economic elite continued to 
despise the Islamic public, exemplified by this Sfaxian bourgeoisie, even after the 
transition, considering it "backward" and incapable of producing an effective ruling 
class. 
A new Islamic constituency appeared after the revolution, with no sense of 
inferiority, and partially crowned by economic success. This new class expressed 
itself with different social and cultural codes, liberated from the constraints of the 
former regime. This public was not automatically assimilated to the old Islamic 
generation directly linked to Nahda, but it became a natural potential Islamic 
constituency for the traditional Islamic party, especially since the political landscape 
lacked an alternative Islamic political project.39 The new Islamic sphere (Hohendahl, 
Russian 1974) emerged in the form of associations, radio and TV outlets: a new type 
of "modern" preachers, entrepreneurs interested in developing the ethical Islamic 
codes, and a new lobby demanding the opportunity to put forth an Islamic model of 
development.40 We call this large public a “new Islamic middle class” in the sense 
that it is different from the traditional Nahda constituency, largely the product of an 
excluded educated social group emerged in the process of modernization of the 
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country but excluded from power (Merone 2014) and  more interested to social and 
economic affirmation than in the achievement of a specifically political project 
(Haenni 2005; Rougier 2008). This is the kind of social and economic contest that 
constitutes in Sfax the base of the Nahda strategy of counter-hegemony. 
There exists thus a network of people connecting with each other and acting 
with a similar social behaviour and a common vision of the public space.41 Their 
social activity is intertwined with an economic one, where success appears to be an 
important part of their value system.42 For example, the Islamic Economy 
Association organizes special meeting for researchers and businessmen interested in 
knowing more about the Islamic economic system.43 The Tunisian Association for 
Zakat (legal alms), instead, plays an important social role for people interested in the 
precise calculation of the zakat. The members of those two associations are 
independent professionals, university professors, bankers, entrepreneurs, students, 
sheikhs, ideological activists, and politicians. These actors come from a similar 
social and economic environment44 and their social activities are located in the centre 
of a large network of people interested in improving their economic opportunities. 
For example, students of Islamic subjects are interested in the job market, while 
professionals and investors want to take advantage of the Islamic economic 
opportunities and networking. 
This large public is an example of the Islamic constituency that emerged after 
the 2011 revolution. They do not necessarily strive for the same type of political 
representation, but share a common way of representing themselves in the public 
space, either sharing economic interests or cultural and religious references (Solie 
2014). It is normal that the political attention of Nahda leaders, especially local ones, 
is focused on this large public; it is both a natural electoral constituency and a social 
and cultural counterforce - helping the party in presenting itself as a credible ruling 
class, able to help Sfax and the South to improve its status. The larger national 
context and the model of reference for Nahda is Turkey. The similarity with the 
situation in Turkey is often underlined by current and former Nahda militants in 
Sfax. What they point at is not only the obstacle represented by a westernized elite 
linked to the state’s apparatus, but an hegemonic struggle that only can be achieved 
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through a progressive and moderate action of penetrating the institutions and gaining 
consensus in key sectors of society.45 In order to achieve this strategic objective, only 
a dynamic business class able to support an economic take-off, can provide strength 
to the Islamist party and its political project. The famous Anatolian middle class, 
characterized by a dynamic spirit of enterprise and a conservative Islamic social 
behaviour seems to be very similar to what is characteristic of Sfax and its economic 
and social uniqueness.46 The importance of the economic and financial Islamic 
associations, in particular the collection of zakat and the development of the Islamic 
bank system,47 seems to confirm the comparison of the Sfaxian milieu with the 
Anatolian one, at least in the eyes of the Nahda leadership. An array of economic 
actors may be attracted by this model, which perfectly espouses the Sfaxian work 
ethic, while the political project of Nahda may be considered an alternative to the old 
elite power system that is re-emerging and backing Nida Tunis.48 
 
Conclusion 
The 2014 legislative and presidential elections showed that Nahda has lost some of 
the appeal it had at the beginning of the democratization process. Although it 
managed to hold on to most of its constituency obtaining 32% of votes compared to 
37% in 2011, it has lost a good part of the fluctuating voters. This is in part natural 
because any transition implies quite typically a return of old forces. It may be argued 
as well that the party lost its appeal because once tested in power it showed its 
limitations, especially in responding to practical material issues. The Islamic 
leadership, and its allies such as CPR presidential candidate Marzouki, underlines 
however that this is not enough to explain the changing political landscape. The 
Islamic party still has, for them, a specific problem in sharing with other national 
forces the "right to govern", pointing out the necessity of a counter-hegemonic 
strategy. 
In this article, we gave an example of how Nahda reacted to what it perceives 
as a hegemonic weakness. The case study of Sfax was in particular intended to 
highlight what Nahda considered a key tool in their counter-hegemonic strategy. For 
them it had to come from a new entrepreneurial class able to propose a national 
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strategy of economic growth, far from the traditional "corrupt" business-class. The 
confrontation between businessmen in the two Sfaxian electoral districts, running for 
Nahda and Nida, made clear this reading of the political landscape. 
After having accepted to resign from government, the party’s strategy has 
changed and, keeping in mind the successful model of the AKP in Turkey, has started 
building a counter-hegemonic project. The city of Sfax has become the centre of a 
new middle-class, which is dynamic, ethically Islamic, and frustrated because 
traditionally marginalized from the mechanism of power influence. Using a 
Gramscian approach, this article shows how gaining power is not only a matter of 
elections, but, more broadly, a process of constructing hegemony. The Islamic 
Tunisian Nahda party has understood that and tried to set about doing just that. 
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Notes 
(1) The Bourguibian ideological trend is the one which refers to the national 
modernist project of the independence identified with the personality of Bourguiba, 
the independence hero and the first President of the new state. 
(2) For a Gramscian reading of the Ikhwani movement see Campanini, Mezram 
(2010). 
(3) The neo-Destour was the party founded by Bourguiba and the younger nationalist 
generation in 1934, in opposition to the "old" Destour party. In 1964, after opting for 
a socialist program the party was called PSD (Socialist Destourian Party) until it was 
dissolved in 1987 by the new President Ben Ali, that in this way wanted to mark an 
opposition with the past. 
(4)Hermassi proposes a political and sociological explanation to the birth and rise of 
the Islamic movement in relation to the development of the nation-state. 
(5)Pierson (Pierson 2000) defines path dependence a «social process grounded in a 
dynamic of "increasing returns"». «Path dependent arguments based on positive 
feedback suggest that not only "big" events have big consequences; little ones that 
happen at the right time can have major consequences as well». 
(6)According to Camau and Geisser: «le youssefisme est devenu le paradigme de 
l’opposition pour tous ceux qui ne se satisfaisaient pas de la victoire de Bourguiba et 
de la mainmise de ses affidés. Il a symbolisé une fracture pérenne entre outsiders et 
insiders d’une polité tenue pour illégitime» (Camau, Geisser 2003: 144). 
(7)Salma Sarsut, Nahda’s PM, interview with authors. Hammam Lif, 4/4/2014. 
(8)Mohammed Rachid, historic leader in Kasserine, 11 June 2014 and Salma Sarsut, 
Nahda MP, Hammam Lif 4 June 2014 among others. Personal interviews with the 
authors. 
(9)In the electoral leaflets distributed during the campaign, the party has placed faces 
of "normal people", representing all strata of society, on the first page. 
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(10)We attended two Nahda electoral rallies in Manouba, in the north, and in Djerba, 
in the south. In the first one, Lotfi Zitouni, an important national leader, gave the 
speech; in the second Rached Ghannouchi, the President of the party, himself gave 
the speech. In both speeches the main discourse of the campaign was based on 
presenting Nahda as the responsible party to trust, in order both to maintain 
democratic country and to start a new period of economic growth. 
(11)On the same topic see also the pivotal study by Rueshemeyer D., E.H. Stephens 
and J.D. Stephens (1992) Capitalist, Development and Democracy and O’Donnell, 
Schmitter and Whitehead (1986). 
(12)For a good synthetic overview on the transitology debate and its future 
perspective see Schmitter P.C. (2013) Reflections on "Transitology" - Before and 
After. 
(13) For a reference to an historical critical overview of the use of "civil society" as a 
paradigm in political science see Fooley, Edwards (1998). 
(14)On the phenomenon of the Anatolian Tigers see: Demir, Acar, Toprak (2004) and 
Hosgör (2011). For the links between the AKP and the bourgeois, financial Islamic 
constituency see: Gumuscu, Sert (2009). 
(15)The  Nahda hegemonic strategy as being inspired from the AKP’s experience has 
been indirectly unveiled during the fieldwork. In particular, during the interview with 
Lubna Moalla,  human rights activist and  close to the local party   in Sfax. Interview 
with the authors, Sfax, 23 September 2014. For a comparative study between the 
AKP’s model and the experience of Nahda in Tunisia see: Torelli (2012). 
(16)This article is part of a larger study on the Tunisian transition that both the 
authors are pursuing for their PhD dissertations. For this specific topic, fieldwork in 
Sfax was conducted from 17 to 25 September 2014. 
(17) The main reference for the historical importance of the Sfaxian entrepreneurial 
class see: Denieuil (1992). 
(18) For an analysis of the experience of government of Nahda party see: Guazzone 
(2013). 
(19) Ziyed, Youssef, Hissam, Nahda militants of the youth section of the party, 
interview with the authors, Tunis, 15 November 2012. 
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(20) As a proof of such debate within Islamist trends, see also: S. Lacroix, Sheikhs 
and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism, Policy briefing, Brooking Doha 
Center, June 2012: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/07-egyptian-
salafism-lacroix/stephane-lacroix-policy-briefing-english.pdf. 
(21)9th Conference: Ghannouchi Remains Leader as Ennahda Denies Any Conflict 
Within the Movement, in «Nawaat» (on-line), 18 July 2012: 
http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/07/18/ninth-conference-ghannouchi-remains-leader-
as-ennahda-denies-any-conflict-within-the-movement. 
(22)The article 1 of the constitution states that Tunisia is a sovereign nation and that 
Islam is its religion. It was for many Islamist too general concerning the relationship 
between the nation and their religion. As for article 45, regarding gender equality, 
Nahda introduced an amendment considering equality between men and women 
linked to complementarity, which stirred a polarizing debate. 
(23) For the evolution of Nahda in relation to the constitutional debate see: M.L. 
Marks, Convince, Coerce, or Compromise? Ennahda Approach to Tunisia’s 
Constitution, Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, February 2014: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/02/10%20ennahda%2
0tunisia%20constitution%20marks/ennahda%20approach%20tunisia%20constitution
%20english.pdf. 
(24) E. Auffray, L’ivresse du pouvoir a saisi Ennahda, in «Libération» (on-line), 9 
October 2012: http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2012/10/09/l-ivresse-du-pouvoir-a-
saisi-ennahda_852088. 
(25)For a general overview of the evolution of the emergence of Salafism  in Tunisia 
during the transitional process see: Torelli, Merone, Cavatorta (2012). 
(26)M. Teyeb, The winners and the losers in Tunisia’s political dialogue, in «Middle 
East Monitor» (on-line), 20 December 2013: 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/8904-the-winners-and-the-losers-
in-tunisias-political-dialogue.html. 
(27)I. Mandraud, Ennahda quitte le gouvernement en Tunisie, in «Le Monde» (on-
line), 10 January 2014: 
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http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/01/10/ennahda-quitte-le-
gouvernement-en-tunisie_4345920_3210.html. 
(28) Salma Sarsut, Nahda PM, interview with authors. Hammam Linf, 4 April 2014. 
(29) Mihammed Rachid, historical Nahda militant and member of the Majlis Shoura, 
Kasserine, 11 June 2014. 
(30) Militants would argue that the party didn’t have the chance to run the country 
because of the resilience on the "deep state". Interview with militants, Tunis, October 
2014. 
(31)Fascism as Passive Revolution (Gramsci 1971: 118-120). 
(32) This discourse was repeated clearly during the two electoral rallies that we 
attended in October 2014 during fieldwork. At the first of these meetings (Manouba) 
was Lotfi Zeitouna, prominent national leader, and the second in Jerba (Medenine) 
Rached Ghannouchi, the President of the party. 
(33) The history of the city is commercial and mostly linked to the Mediterranean 
trade network, linking the city to Alexandria in Egypt much more easily than with 
Tunis, the capital of the country. The families of big traders used to send their 
children to Egypt in order to run the family shops and study at the same time. The 
city acquired historically a cultural identity closer to the Middle East than the other 
Sahelian cities of Tunisia, Sousse and Tunis (Denieuil 1992). 
(34) This period for the Sfaxian new elite is comparable to the period of the land 
enclosure in XVI century in England. A very unique circumstance was exploited until 
economic activity transferred from trade to agriculture, especially olive trees 
plantations, began in the period, consisting historically in the capitalistic original 
accumulation. By the beginning of the 1970s, the Sfaxian businessmen were 
prepared for leading the new era of capitalism building inaugurated by Minister Hedi 
Nouira. Symbolically, the first industrial zone in the country was developed in Sfax. 
Interview with Tarek Chaabouni, Sfaxian entrepreneur, 5 November 2014, Tunis. 
(35) The most famous one is the Pauline group of Abdelwahab Ben Ayed. Other 
examples include Chakira and Coficab of Mr. Hichem Elloumi and Mr Lotfi 
Addennadher, former president of the Sfaxian football team (CSS) that diversified its 
activities in construction and the food industry. 
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(36) Sfax, interdite de développement?, «Leaders» (on-line), 6 July 2011: 
http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/sfax-interdite-de-developpement. Ben Ali and his 
family are from the region of Sousse. For more details on the marginality of Sfax 
compared to Tunis and Sousse see: Zghal (1992) and B'chir (1994). 
(37) This event is interpreted both as the will of the power to prevent an important 
private business from becoming too important and an opportunity to teach a lesson to 
the Sfaxian network that the central government suspected as having a strategy to 
emancipate themselves from the political system. See: Hibou (2008). 
(38) The history of the Sfaxian capitalism is not lacking in success stories of large 
entrepreneurial groups developing in the patronage system of the power, the most 
notably the Poulina group, the biggest private enterprise in Tunisia. Even the exodus 
to Tunis of hundreds of Sfaxian entrepreneurs since the 1970s shows the difficulties 
Sfaxians faced in operating in their own birth town as well as a strategy of proximity 
to the power centres. There is indeed a gap in the Sfaxian business environment 
between those that took advantage of the regime and others, new entrepreneurs and 
the marginalized. See: Nabli (2008). 
(39) «We have two types of businessmen here in Sfax: on one hand, the founders of 
the Sfaxian economy, who work according to moral principles and clean economic 
activities; on the other hand the ones that merged into the Ben Ali system together 
with the Trabelsi mafia». Interview with Loubna, lawyer and Nahda activist. Sfax, 23 
September 2014. 
(40) It is mainly based on a traditional conservative model of social life, typically 
organized on the big family religious’ values (Denieuil 1992; B'chir 1994). Having a 
strong religious feeling doesn’t mean to be immediately elected as an Islamist. Any 
political project though should pay attention to the importance of certain values 
especially for the importance they have in social behaviour. 
(41) For the evolution of Islamism in Tunisia during the transition see: F. Merone, F. 
Volpi, "Trajectories of Tunisian Islam", in E. Stein, F. Volpi, F. Merone, K. Alfasi, L. 
Alles (eds.), Islamism and the Arab Uprisings, CASAW-AHRC People Power and 
State Power Network, June 2014: http://www.casaw.ac.uk/wp-
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content/uploads/2014/04/Islamism-and-the-Arab-Uprising-June-2014-Ewan-Stein-
Report.pdf. 
(42) See: Ben Néfissa (2011) and Rapport de diagnostic sur la société civile 
tunisienne, “UE”, 15 March 2012: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/tunisia/documents/projets/rapportdiagnostic_stecivi
le_mars2012_fr.pdf 
(43) In our fieldwork in Sfax we met two associations in particular, the Islamic 
Economic Association and the Tunisian Association for Zakat. 
(44) Some of the people we met expressed clearly that their view of economic 
success was not to be detached by an Islamic behaviour, mainly linked to specific 
religious precepts. «God loves who can support the community. That is a move for 
the believer who looks for God’s approbation in it economic activity», interview with 
Ahmed, 16 September 2014, Sfax; «Work’s value in Islam is superior to the cult’s 
practice. This Islamic spirit is supporting the economic Sfaxian success. The Islamic 
movement renews this spirit», interview with Habib, 17 September 2014, Sfax. 
(45) For three years, it has organized an International Forum of Islamic Financing in 
Sfax and it has promoted the first master sin Islamic Finance in the country at the 
University of Sfax. 
(46) Ridha, founder of one of the associations, is a professor for the new Islamic 
finance master (he is also one of the master’s creators). Oussama, Sfax’s Zeitouna 
bank director: he also teaches in the master courses. Mohamed, accountant, helps for 
the zakat calculation in collaboration with Habib, expert in religious science, who is 
the guarantee for the conformity of the calculation to the Islamic jurisprudence. 
Habib is entrepreneur, an important association activist and one of the leaders of the 
Nahda local section. 
(47) The Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PjD) is also referred to as an 
Islamist party. In this chapter however we make specific reference to the relationship 
between an entrepreneurial middle class and the Islamist political project, which is 
typical of the Turkish case. 
(48) Interview with Loubna, lawyer and Nahda activist, 23 September 2014, Sfax. 
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(49) The phenomenon of the Islamic finance system was a widespread trend since the 
1980s. In Tunisia a limited access was allowed to the Saudi bank Baraka and a new 
brand Tunisian bank was created in 2009. It lasts limited though until the fall of the 
regime in 2011, when a new enthusiasm gained the spirits of Islamic economic and 
financial cadres. 
(50) The emergence of a party such as Nidaa Tunis is considered to be by a part of 
society as the party under which the old interests are reorganizing themselves. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
Political studies on the MENA region have been largely focusing for the last 
20 years on the structures of the state and its political apparatus116. This was because 
after the so called third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), world politics 
seemed to the eyes of  political scientists moving towards a gradual process of 
adaptation of the world system to the democratic liberal model of politics 
(Fukuyama, 1989). The shortcomings of this approach became apparent to the 
academic community working on the Middle East and North Africa once the first 
attempts at ‘democratization’ failed and the political structure of the countries in the 
region remained stable, notwithstanding some cosmetic change of controlled 
multiparty politics and façade liberal reforms. As a result of the failure of democratic 
transitions, democratization studies were accused of being teleological because each 
political change was studied as one from an authoritarian to a democratic system. As 
a number of authors subsequently demonstrated (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; 
Hinnebusch 2006; Schlumberger 2007), political change could go otherwise into a 
direction from authoritarianism to authoritarianism, although of a different type.  
 If democratization studies had been too optimistic in interpreting processes of 
political change, studies of authoritarian resilience were instead too pessimistic, 
paying attention to ‘stable’ macro political structures and neglecting to a large extent 
what was occurring in society ‘under the radar’ (Lust 2012). The result was an 
overwhelming focus on the structure of governing in a authoritarian environment, the 
strategies of ruling elites to remain in power (Heydemann 2007) as well on state 
apparatuses such as the military and security services (Bellin 2004). The uprising of 
2010/11 came as a surprise both to the political and academic community. This is 
why many started to raise the question: “what went wrong”? Why wasn’t the 
scientific community able to foresee the events, not either to understand that changes 
could come from societal movements? 
Self-reflection on how to conceptualise political change (or lack thereof) in 
the MENA led to different ‘adjustments’. The most convincing approach is that of 
                                                            
116See Introduction. 
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the so-called ‘paradogma’, which is supposed to have a balanced approach between 
the two traditional paradigms of democratization and authoritarian resilience 
(Valbjørn, 2012; 2015). Another trend took Lisa Anderson’s 2005 critical article 
“Where the sun shines” to plead in favour  of an approach that went back to state 
society relations and that would be able to go to find out what is ‘below the radar’ 
(Pace and  Cavatorta, 2012). 
Following this call for bottom up analysis of societal change, this research 
applied a method of research borrowed by anthropology  to explain and analyse the 
changes coming from places rarely studied in the past. To do so, it was necessary to 
employ an ethnographic approach, based on long and patient observant participation. 
As I have already explained, the topic of the study as much as the epistemology 
underpinning it implied the choice of a methodological approach similar to an 
anthropological work. It follows that fieldwork was  long and ‘participative’ and  
unfolded along a specific period of change in Tunisia from 2011 to 2014. It is the 
experience and witnessing of this historical moment that shaped the rationale, 
direction and outcome of this dissertation. 
After the first period of enthusiasm for a new democratic ‘spring’ in the 
region, conflict and authoritarian resilience came back on the scene. In a way, it was 
a repetition of the same dynamics of  late 1980s and early 1990s, when the first cycle 
of attempts at democratization and authoritarian responses unfolded. Even the steps 
of political change seemed very similar. First, popular enthusiasm and political 
liberalization shook the authoritarian ruling elites; second, political struggle and 
societal polarization occurred in the ‘free-market’ of ideas and contending visions of 
society; third, authoritarian re-legitimazation through (popular/populist) calls for the 
strong man rang out to quell the ‘chaos’ of democratic politics. The similarity of the 
events of 2011-14 with those of the 1980s neglects however the fact that this time 
change was the outcome of popular uprisings and the degree of democratization was 
deeper than ever in the past. Thus, the political outcome itself was not the exact 
repetition of the history. While in Egypt a neo-authoritarian regime emerged, it is not 
a given that it will take the same shape as the previous one; the civil war in Syria will 
probably not lead the country back to same pre-2011 political and socio-economic 
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set-up. The most significant  difference with the past though comes from the political 
evolution of Tunisia. In this North African country complete regime change did 
succeed. While in Egypt the first stage of political liberalization ended in a military 
coup and in Libya and Yemen evolved into an open civil conflict, in Tunisia there 
was a constitutional bargaining and the setting up of liberal-democratic institutions.  
The central aim of this thesis was delving into the social space where politics 
took place in a country in transition and to, more specifically, examine Islamic 
politics and its evolution in a period of regime change and contention. The dynamics 
of change in particular brought my attention to the longer historical process. While 
the literature analysed post-revolutionary politics through the framework of 
traditional democratization (Stepan 2012; Murphy 2012), I tried to make sense of 
such a period as that of inclusion and exclusion of social groups. The constitutional 
period from 2011 to 2014 was characterized by a process of democratic building and 
its defining trait was the inclusion of the historical Islamist party Nahda. I explained 
the inclusion of Nahda as the product of an historical political bargain, but I also 
argue that this bargain had as a consequence the exclusion of the new emergent 
radical Islamists, represented by Ansar al-Sharia. Salafists represented new social 
groups - the marginalized urban masses -  which did not find a place in the new 
democratic scenario. Democratization appeared indeed, within this frame, as a long 
historical process of change and continuity: change, because the two Tunisian 
historical ideological families (and their social constituencies) came to a democratic 
agreement, continuity because of the exclusion of the (Islamist) most radical groups.  
In this respect, the historical dynamics of change developed since 
independence within the frame of a national political community embedded in the 
institutions of the nation-state. I argued in this research that the dialectic between 
social groups in the fight for power during the process of nation-building was 
expressed by ideologies - nationalism and Islamism - that shaped the form and 
language of the conflict. Although referring to different ideologies, due to different 
social and economic conditions such as the lack of industrialization, the conflicts and 
dynamics of change in the region are comparable to the ones that occurred in Europe 
in the XIX and XX centuries. This implies, methodologically, that democratization is 
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to be conceptualised as a struggle between social groups for the inclusion in the 
national political community rather than as the simple setting up of procedural 
mechanisms to elect those who will govern. The main purpose of this research was to 
show how social groups shape their struggle and how change comes as a overcoming 
of the oppositions through the analysis of a particular period of contention. 
The use of a Gramscian approach in the context of Islamist studies offered the 
theoretical tools to understand this form of political change. Islamism, in this 
research, is conceptualised as the ideology of excluded social groups. As Marx and 
Engels observed for the history of Europe, large moments of change are 
characterised by the intellectual leadership of the bourgeoisie (or the petty 
bourgeoisie as in the case of the French revolution) and the factual struggle of larger 
popular strata (peasants or urban). When it comes to the post uprising period, the 
bourgeoisie can bargain with the upper classes for a new pacted regime, as long as its 
interests are guaranteed117. In Tunisia (as in the rest of the region) there is not the 
same type of social structure than in XIX century Europe; the process of nation-
building and ‘democratization’ however goes through similar obstacles. Islamism is 
the modern ideology that provided the shape of the struggle of new social groups. 
The Muslim Brotherhood represented for decades part of the emerging middle 
classes, a product of the modern education system. Radical salafists represent today 
(or try to) popular (mostly urban) social groups that make sense of their collective 
reality though mass political organization according to religious injunctions and 
frames. While the conflict in Europe emerged as one about economic resources, in 
the region it manifests itself as an identity conflict. The obsession of the relation to 
the ‘turath’ (the traditional heritage) is the marking point of each political and 
intellectual discussion in the Arab world (Campanini, 2005); and even in post-
revolutionary politics, the national debate did not include economic issues. The shape 
and rhetoric of the conflict are indeed not marked by an economic analysis of class 
struggle, as it was the case in Marxist ideologies, but rather a 
communitarian/culturalist one. 
                                                            
117They  share with those same classes the fear of popular mobilization. See K. Marx, the Eighteen 
Brumaire (1977). 
202 
 
In the second chapter of the dissertation, I set the historical frame of the 
process of change and continuity. I went through three topical moments of crisis in 
contemporary Tunisia history and highlighted how these key junctures produced 
factors of inclusion and exclusion. In chapter 3, I went through the rise of Nahda as 
key actor of political change. I dealt with the academic debate on how and why the 
Islamist party changed. In particular, I discussed the moderation through inclusion 
hypothesis and the post-Islamism thesis. Through the example of Nahda, I argued 
that moderation is  the outcome of a process of exclusion, but not in the traditional 
sense of the exclusion caused by the repressive apparatus. It is a moderation, rather, 
that is  a political process of understanding the limits the social space imposes in 
terms of acceptable policies and ideological references. The evolution of Islamism in 
Tunisia proved as well that the failure of political Islam that authors such as Roy 
predicted in the early 1990s  is still a long way to come. Post-Islamism, in the 
version Bayat set forth, was however useful in showing the evolution of Islamism 
into a democratic liberal/conservative type of politics. In chapter 4, I focused on the 
Salafi-Jihadi group Ansar al-sharia. In this chapter, I used the literature on social 
movements to show how radical Salafism is the ideology of the new radicals filling 
up the empty space on the political spectrum created by Nahda’s moderation process. 
I described in details the process of developing of an Islamic jamaa and its capacity 
to integrate young people from marginalised urban areas into a process of political 
engagement (even though within a theological mind-set). 
Finally, in chapter 5 I go through the bargaining between Nahda and the 
nationalist block and the construction of a new shared ideological concept of 
Tunisianité. The constitutional draft in particular revealed the contents of a new 
political agreement based on a new negotiated and now shared definition of the 
national community. Tunisianité is an old concept elaborated at the independence by 
Bourguiba. This idea implied a nationalistic, modernist idea of the nation, based on 
the French Enlightenment. In the past decade, Tunisianité was a concept often used 
against Islamists, considered backward and opposed to modernity. In the post-
revolutionary political democratic bargaining a new inclusive definition of the nation 
was at stake. Nahda strove for the inclusion of Islam and Islamic history in the 
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preamble of the constitution. The concept of Islam used however is not the same to 
the one employed in the past. The Nahda’s leadership claimed a progressive 
conception of Islam, supposedly being the backbone of a modern nation able to 
evolve within its own tradition without borrowing from outside political conceptions.  
How much will this ideological configuration definetely shape the politics in 
contemporary Arab countries  is not clear for now. In Islamist politics, integration 
into political participation implies some degree of secularisation and Nahda accepted 
this. There is no doubt though that a salafist-jihadi politics is in many ways 
theological up to the point to transform its praxis into an ‘apocalyptic’ and 
Manichean struggle between the good and the evil, which does not sit well with 
secularisation. This evolution of Islamist politics into secularization depends 
however, as showed by the Tunisian case, by opportunities for political participation. 
I argued in this dissertation that democratization is a factor of inclusion and political 
transformation. The opening of free political participation gives the chance to further 
development of the political landscape and the articulation of the Islamist political 
spectrum in particular. Some general trends are already clear by now: parties of the 
MB ideological family developed as moderate parties (inspired by Islam in the same 
way Catholic parties are in the European tradition) while a large Salafist camp takes 
the political space left empty by this moderations process. Salafists however are also 
divided along different line, from political conservatives keen to support 
authoritarian regimes to political radicals and ‘revolutionary’ questioning authority 
and favourable to armed struggle. This thesis, by providing the example of Ansar al-
Sharia in Tunisia, argued that political opportunities lead to the evolution of jihadism 
into a revolutionary movement less apocalyptic minded and closer to an European 
vision of ‘radical politics’. However, when such opportunities are closed off, the 
apocalyptic mind-set returns. 
This research demonstrated that political inclusion is the key point of the 
accomplishment of the process of nation building. In this respect the several political 
crises of post-independence politics is to be read as the continuation of de-
colonisation. The quest for identity, the issue of modernization and the struggle for 
citizenship (implicit in the political struggle) are part of a process of liberation. The 
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conflict among different social groups could be in the middle/long term ‘normalized’ 
when it comes to political inclusion. It would eventually evolve according to the 
Tunisian model of a pacted democracy (although revolutionary outcomes of different 
type cannot be completely excluded). Once integrated into an institutional liberal 
politics, Islamism could lose its original transformative force and be reduced to a 
conservative democratic party (as again the example of Tunisian Nahda shows). Just 
like communism in the western world was almost completely absorbed by liberal 
democracy, it could be that Islamists will follow the same path. However, socialist 
and workers organizations not only were changed by the democratic liberal system, 
but they changed it as well. We cannot exclude therefore that this process of 
‘normalization’ of the Islamic polity would in the middle term transform the political 
system; not into Islamic states, however, but in different models of democracy. 
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